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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Foreclosures have increased in the US since the 1970’s.  The increase in 
foreclosures has caused concern among some researchers on their affect on crime.  
Social disorganization theory measures the effect various structural characteristics, 
such as poverty, residential instability/mobility, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, and family 
disruption have on crime.  This study, though, is concerned with residential 
instability/mobility, or the presence of foreclosed houses in neighborhoods.  Although 
most studies using this theory look at low-income neighborhoods, the following research 
looks at middle- and upper-income neighborhoods, which have been greatly affected by 
foreclosures.  The theory also argues that the level of collective efficacy can reduce 
crime even in neighborhoods that are otherwise considered to be socially disorganized.  
Using ArcGIS mapping, the following research investigated 30 neighborhoods in 
Orange County, Florida that have high foreclosures in neighborhoods for the years of 
2005-2009.  Canvasses were conducted in all 30 neighborhoods to measure the level of 
collective efficacy within the neighborhoods to help explain the presence of high or low 
residential burglary.  Thirteen neighborhoods stood out as noteworthy because they fell 
at the far end of the spectrum – high foreclosures and high crime, and high foreclosures 
and low crime.  Some of the neighborhoods with high residential burglary did have 
strong indicators of low collective efficacy, while neighborhoods with low residential 
burglary had indicators of high collective efficacy.  The majority of the indicators found in 
this research support previous research on various indicators of collective efficacy.    
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I dedicate this to my husband, John Hoskin.  Because of his expertise on the subject, he 
acted as a mentor and confidant during this study.  He also provided me with the 
confidence and encouragement to not give up.  I would not have made it without you.  
This is for you. 
  
v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the chair of my dissertation 
committee, John Lynxwiler.  It has been many years in the making and I could not have 
accomplished it without him.  I am very grateful of all the assistance, suggestions, and 
long discussions he provided through the process of writing this dissertation, as well as 
my entire academic experience in the sociology department and the graduate program.  
Not only has he been an exceptional professor, but also a great boss and mentor who 
always offered advice and shared his endless knowledge.   
I would also like to thank my dissertation committee members, Jana Jasinski, 
Jason Ford, and K. Michael Reynolds for their time and suggestions as well as the 
insight they provided during the process.  A special thanks also to Sheena Lovette from 
the Orange County Sheriff’s Office for providing the crime data and Mike Blinn from the 
Orlando Realtors Association for all of his assistance in collecting the foreclosure data.   
 
  
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ......................................................... 7 
Social Disorganization Theory ................................................................................... 10 
Poverty ................................................................................................................... 18 
Racial and Ethnic Heterogeneity ............................................................................ 21 
Residential Mobility/Instability ................................................................................ 22 
Family Disruption ................................................................................................... 26 
Academic Performance .......................................................................................... 29 
CHAPTER THREE: FORECLOSURES ........................................................................ 32 
Subprime Lending...................................................................................................... 34 
Minority Factors ...................................................................................................... 39 
Income Factors ...................................................................................................... 42 
Age Factors ............................................................................................................ 46 
Impact of Unemployment ....................................................................................... 48 
Foreclosures and Crime ............................................................................................ 49 
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY ............................................................................ 54 
CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS ......................................................................................... 65 
Foreclosures and Residential Burglary in 2005-2009 ................................................ 76 
Neighborhood Canvassing ........................................................................................ 83 
Field Observations of the Thirty Neighborhoods .................................................... 90 
CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS...................................................... 199 
Disorganization in the Suburbs ................................................................................ 211 
Contextualizing Social Disorganization among the Affluent ................................. 219 
APPENDIX A: NEIGHBORHOOD CANVASSING CHECKLIST ................................. 226 
APPENDIX B: STRUCTURAL SOCIAL CONTROLS BY PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 
SURROUNDING NEIGHBORHOOD QUESTIONNAIRE ............................................ 229 
APPENDIX C: NEIGHBORHOOD CANVASSING RESULTS TABLE ......................... 232 
APPENDIX D: TOP 30 NEIGHBORHOODS RANKING BY RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY 
AND FORECLOSURES RATES ................................................................................. 236 
LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 238 
vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Foreclosure Neighborhoods by Count, 2005 .................................................. 66 
Figure 2: Foreclosures Neighborhoods by Count, 2006 ................................................ 67 
Figure 3: Foreclosure Neighborhoods by Count, 2007 .................................................. 68 
Figure 4: Foreclosure Neighborhoods by Count, 2008 .................................................. 69 
Figure 5: Foreclosure Neighborhoods by Count, 2009 .................................................. 70 
Figure 6: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2005 ..................................... 71 
Figure 7: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2006 ..................................... 72 
Figure 8: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2007 ..................................... 73 
Figure 9: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2008 ..................................... 74 
Figure 10: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2009 ................................... 75 
Figure 11: Total Foreclosures and Residential Burglary by Count, 5 Years Combined . 86 
Figure 12: Map of Top 30 Neighborhoods ..................................................................... 89 
Figure 13: Collective Efficacy among the Thirteen Neighborhoods ............................. 200 
  
viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1: Foreclosures and Residential Burglary Counts, 2005-2009 ............................ 77 
Table 2: Top 30 Neighborhoods’ Foreclosure and Residential Burglary Rates ............. 88 
Table 3: Observations of Neighborhood Characteristics by Residential Burglary and 
Foreclosure Rates ....................................................................................................... 198 
 
1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Since the 1970’s, foreclosure levels in the United States have been on the rise 
(Elmer and Seelig 1998; Immergluck and Smith 2006).  In fact, Edmiston and Zalneraitis 
(2007) note that since 2006 residential foreclosures in the United States have been 
increasing rapidly.  By mid-2007, the number of mortgages in some stage of the 
foreclosure process was at an all-time high, which suggested that the foreclosure 
problem in the U.S. is likely to get “worse before it gets better” (Edmiston and Zalneraitis 
2007:115).  Of particular concern are the increasing foreclosures on singly-family 
homes, which are thought to be a serious threat to the stability and well-being of 
neighborhoods and communities (Immergluck and Smith 2006a).  Housing markets in 
the Northeast, as well as states such as California and Florida, for example, have been 
experiencing decreasing rates of appreciation since 2006.  This trend has increased 
national awareness of the foreclosure crisis.  In effect, these areas of the U.S. have 
experienced dramatic increases in local foreclosure rates, which have increased the 
national foreclosure levels to record highs (Immergluck 2008).   
In response to the rapid increase in foreclosures, the federal government has 
taken steps to alleviate homeowners and mortgage lenders from financial pressures.  
First, in March 2009 a $75 billion federal initiative to curtail foreclosures was 
implemented by the government.  It was estimated that as many as 9 million 
homeowners would be able to obtain more affordable mortgages, working to make their 
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mortgage payments no more than thirty-one percent of their income (Wolf and Armour 
2009).  More recently, the government has taken even more drastic steps to help 
certain states that have been hit the hardest with foreclosures.  The Obama 
Administration approved a $1.5 billion funding plan for foreclosure-prevention in 
February 2010.  The states that received these extra funds were Arizona, California, 
Florida, Michigan, and Nevada.  The “Hardest Hit Fund” caters to those who are 
unemployed and/or “underwater” homeowners, where the original federal initiative did 
not cover (Office of the Press Secretary 2010).  Even more, in March 2010 the Obama 
Administration declared a second targeted plan for additional states that are in dire 
need of assistance because of high rates of concentrated unemployment – North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, and South Carolina (Press Room 2010).  Thus, 
with the government stepping in to assist homeowners all over the country who are 
losing, or facing the loss of their homes, it is evident that the foreclosure crisis has 
reached an all time high.      
Additionally, a major concern that has emerged due to increased foreclosures is 
the impact they have on crime in these vulnerable neighborhoods.  Despite this public 
concern, there has been very little research that directly measures the impact that 
foreclosed homes have on neighborhood crime.  In fact, I could locate only two studies 
and a special issue that address this topic.  One study examined the link between 
abandoned buildings and crime (Spelman 1993), while another study explores the effect 
that foreclosures have on crime (Immergluck and Smith 2006b).  Obviously, with the 
rapid increase in foreclosures in the past several years, it seems vital for researchers to 
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further gain an understanding of the link between foreclosures and crime.  The special 
issue published in 2008 by Geography & Public Safety is a quarterly bulletin of applied 
geography for the study of crime and public safety.  The seven articles published in the 
special issue focus on the public concern that foreclosures have on crime.  Most of the 
articles in the special issue made recommendations for policy; unfortunately, few 
presented actual research findings.  
To date, RealtyTrac®, which offers information for pre-foreclosures, foreclosure 
auctions, bank owned foreclosures, for sale by owner homes, and resale MLS in all of 
the states in the U.S., reports that the national foreclosure filings reached 2.8 million in 
2009.  In fact, 2.9 million properties went into foreclosure in 2010, an increase from the 
year before (RealtyTrac®).  Even more striking, the Center for Responsible Lending 
(2010a) projected that between 2009-2012 foreclosures nationwide will reach 9 million.  
Nationally, Florida has one of the largest numbers of foreclosures.  The Center for 
Responsible Lending reported that the projected foreclosures for Florida over the next 
four years were almost 1.5 million (2009).  In fact, the highest number of total 
foreclosures (default, auction, and bank-owned) in Florida was in September, 2009, 
when foreclosures reached just over one million (RealtyTrac®).  With that said, Florida 
is of particular concern when examining the impact of foreclosures in the United States.  
When Florida is broken down into foreclosures by county, Orange County has ranked 
within the top four counties in the last four years for highest foreclosures.  Even more, 
Orange County foreclosures significantly increased between 2008 and 2009, with a total 
of 26,131 foreclosures in 2008, and 31,308 foreclosures in 2009 (Nolz 2010).  
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According to Orange County Clerk of Courts, the highest peak in foreclosures was in 
2009, with a drastic decrease in 2010 (17,921 foreclosures) and 2011 (10,320 
foreclosures) (Nolz 2012).    
The foreclosure process differs by state, as well as by county.  First, states differ 
in the foreclosure procedure depending on whether they are judicial or non-judicial 
foreclosures.  Most states only allow the judicial process of foreclosure – the foreclosure 
is ordered by the court and the court “supervises the sale and disbursement of the 
proceeds” (p.157).  In contrast, a non-judicial foreclosure procedure is not conducted 
and overseen by the courts, and thus they are typically less time-consuming and costly 
than a judicial foreclosure (Clauretie 1987).  With that said, the state of Florida is a 
judicial state and therefore foreclosures are court ordered and handled by the court 
system.  Moreover, Orange County, Florida’s foreclosures process differs than other 
counties in the state.   
According to the Orange County Board of County Commissioners (2008), the first 
step of the foreclosure process is a default period that can take anywhere from two to 
six months.  Then, the foreclosure process moves on to the court systems where a 
lawsuit/Lis Pendens is filed, which takes approximately 30 days.  After the Lis Pendens 
is filed, the parties, or homeowners are served, and this can take between one to six 
months.  Often, the homeowners will voluntarily move out of the home, but in some 
instances, the court will order an eviction to remove the tenants.  Just as important, 
because of the high volume of foreclosures and the backlog of foreclosures, this stage 
of the foreclosure process mostly likely will take six months, if not more.  Next, the 
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foreclosure is back in the court’s hands where a final judgment is made, and followed by 
the sale of the foreclosed home or property.  Lastly, the home or property becomes 
REO, or real-estate owned, and is put back on the market for resale.  These last three 
stages of the foreclosure process take 30 to 60 days.  Thus, the foreclosure process for 
Orange County, Florida can take anywhere from five months to around a year and a half 
to finalize.   
 With the drastic increase in foreclosures, it seems pertinent to investigate the 
impact foreclosures have on various social problems, specifically crime.  Thus, by 
building on social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay 1942), I am interested in 
exploring the relationship between foreclosures, an indicator of social disorganization, 
and crime in Orange County, Florida.  Although social disorganization theory has been 
used primarily to explain the relationship between disorganized areas and crime using 
characteristics such as poverty, racial and ethnic heterogeneity, and female headed-
households, my research attempts to fill the gap on another indicator of disorganization 
and measure of residential instability and mobility – foreclosures.   Foreclosures can 
also indicate that a neighborhood is disorganized, and thus likely to demonstrate a 
greater level of crime and delinquency.   
 In the chapters that follow, I present an overview of the social disorganization 
approach to crime.  Next, I discuss the existing research on foreclosures, followed by 
existing, but minimal, research on the relationship between foreclosures and crime.  
Subsequently, I discuss the methodology used to examine social disorganization and 
foreclosures, which occurred in two stages – geographical mapping and unobtrusive, 
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field observations of neighborhoods.  I then end with a presentation of the findings, as 
well as a discussion of my research.    
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
Those who study crime and deviance in society employ an array of theories to 
help explain and understand criminal and deviant behavior.  In fact, these theories focus 
on answering the question of why legal and social norms are violated.  To answer this 
question, theories focus on two interconnected parts; first, “why are there variations in 
group rates of crime and deviance”, and second, “why are some individuals more likely 
than others to commit criminal and deviant acts” (Akers and Sellers 2009:3).  The first 
theoretical question seeks to understand differences in proportion and location of 
criminal and deviant behavior in a variety of groups and societies, which focuses on 
group and societal patterns.  For instance, comparing crime rates of various states or 
countries, or comparing crime rates by different race/ethnicities, genders, and age 
intervals.  The second theoretical question focuses on explaining variations among 
individuals who refrain from or commit criminal acts.  For example, why are some 
people more likely to not obey the law than others, and what is the process by which 
some people either choose to violate or obey the law?  This approach to crime and 
deviance is interested in the individual differences of crime and deviance (Akers and 
Sellers 2009).   
  Other theories focus on ecological factors of delinquency and crime that occur at 
the neighborhood level.  These theories are concerned with specific neighborhood 
structural characteristics and how they lead to increased levels of crime and disorder.  
More specifically, these theories focus on how the presence or absence of guardians, 
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as well as physical and social decay, either increase or decrease criminal behavior.  For 
instance, routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979), broken windows theory 
(Wilson and Kelling 1982), and social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay 1943, 
1969) help to understand and explain criminal behavior.    
 To begin with, routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979) explains that 
criminal acts depend on three, co-occurring characteristics of time and space: motivated 
offenders, suitable targets, and lack of capable guardians.  According to this theory, 
criminal acts occur if all three of these characteristics transpire at the same time.  
However, if there are no motivated offenders, no suitable targets, and there is a 
presence of capable guardians, routine activities theory states that crime will not occur.  
It is important to point out that a capable guardian is not only the police (e.g., official 
role), but also people in everyday life – family, friends, neighbors, and even oneself 
(e.g., unofficial role) (Jacobs 1961).  By and large, routine activities theory is concerned 
with the ecological distribution of crime (i.e., the criminal ecosystem), such as its 
motivated offenders, victims, and criminal opportunities (Felson 2006).   
 Similarly, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling’s (1982) broken windows 
theory was developed to understand and explore urban decline and aide policy in New 
Jersey.  A book published, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing 
Crime in Our Communities (Kelling and Coles 1996), discussed how minor forms of 
public disorder lead to serious crime.  The authors concluded that disorder and crime 
lead to a downward spiral of urban decay.  According to this theory, disorder impedes 
the manners in which communities typically maintain social control (c.f. Skogan 1992).  
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Thus, criminals and delinquents see that the members in the community cannot 
collectively control the activities that are occurring in their community and disorder 
arises.  Just as important, if neighborhoods tolerate or cannot effectively deter these 
forms of disorder, crime and other forms of disorder will continue.  Visual signs of 
disorder, such as broken windows, litter, and graffiti indicate that an area lacks social 
control, and therefore crime and delinquency will persist and escalate in that area 
because criminals are drawn to these disorganized areas (Wilson and Kelling 1982; 
Kelling and Coles 1996).   
 All in all, routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979) and broken windows 
theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982) are interested in the ecological aspect of crime, as well 
as some sort of social control agent, whether it is an individual (e.g., capable guardian) 
or a community (e.g., one’s neighbors).  Although both of these theories can be, and 
have been, widely used to study deviance and crime in neighborhoods, the theory of 
social disorganization (Shaw and McKay 1943, 1969) is the most relevant theory to use 
in the following study concerning foreclosures and crime.  For instance, one of the 
ecological characteristics that social disorganization theory states increases crime is 
residential instability or mobility.  With that said, with the recent increase in foreclosures, 
or neighbors frequently moving in and out of neighborhoods and often leaving houses 
empty, a new interesting indicator of social disorganization in neighborhoods needs to 
be explored. Even more, social disorganization theory asserts that social change 
increases disorganization in neighborhoods.  With the recent economic crisis, the U.S. 
has undoubtedly experienced social change.  Thus, social disorganization theory, 
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extending the concept of residential mobility/instability to include foreclosures, could  
offer a deeper understanding into the current state of our neighborhoods and economy 
as a whole.  Therefore, a discussion of social disorganization is presented next.   
Social Disorganization Theory 
 
 Two sociologists from the University of Chicago and the Institute for Juvenile 
Research in Chicago, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, developed social 
disorganization theory from studies of urban crime and delinquency (1942, 1969).  The 
authors found a systematic pattern of residential location of youths who had been sent 
to juvenile court.  Specifically, Shaw and McKay found that rates of delinquency were 
significantly higher in inner city, lower class neighborhoods compared to more affluent 
neighborhoods that reside on the outer limits of the area.  In fact, social disorganization 
borrowed much of its foundation from Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess’ (1924) 
concept of human and urban ecology.  This model presumed that residential mobility 
was influenced by a variation in the amount of assimilation of populations into urban 
areas for occupational reasons.  Their research focused on immigrants migrating and 
taking on primarily low-earning jobs, which would tend to place them in neighborhoods 
that were economically deprived.  However, their argument was that as time passed, 
they would increase in their occupational level which would lead to residential mobility 
into more desirable neighborhoods.   
 Contrary to much of the research on crime around the time of social 
disorganization theory’s naissance, Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that the residents 
in these socially disorganized areas were not psychologically or biologically abnormal, 
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but instead that deviance and crime is a normal response committed by normal people 
to abnormal social conditions.  Moreover, they emphasized that social changes, such as 
urbanization, industrialization, and so on, cause social disorganization because there is 
a decrease in social control.  According to Akers and Sellers (2009), the “notion of 
social disorganization as the breakdown of social control at the local or neighborhood 
level has remained at the center of the theory” (p. 178).  A central theme to social 
disorganization is that it is not only characteristics of the residents who live in the 
neighborhood that shape crime rates, but it is also the neighborhood ecological 
conditions, which they argue are more influential on crime (Shaw and McKay 1942).  
Characteristics of disadvantaged neighborhoods are high levels of poverty, racial and 
ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility or instability, and family disruption, most often 
measured by female-headed households (Shaw and McKay 1942; Sampson and 
Groves 1989; Bursik and Grasmick 1993a, 1993b; Sampson 1997). 
 The theory of social disorganization helps explain and understand how a 
community is unable to recognize common goals and “solve chronic problems” (Kubrin 
and Weitzer 2003) by measuring structural factors that influence a breakdown within the 
community.  Research on social disorganization often branches into two types of 
neighborhood social processes - informal and formal networks of association and 
informal social control, which increases when neighborhood’s collective efficacy 
increases (Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002; Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn 
2003).  In the first conceptual explanation of neighboring process, it is argued that social 
networks, such as informal and formal associations, shape neighborhood life.  These 
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associations affect a neighborhood’s informal social control, social support, and the 
resources available.  The second framework, which will be discussed in more detail 
below, is interested in the collective efficacy, or the linkage of social control through 
social ties and cohesion (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001) within 
neighborhoods.   
After the initial work of Shaw and McKay (1942) other researchers have further 
developed the theory of social disorganization by adapting the idea of neighborhood 
social control (Sampson 1987; Sampson and Groves 1989; Bursik and Grasmick 
1993a) from systemic theory of urban communities (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974).  This 
more developed approach to the theory of social disorganization emphasized the 
importance of both informal and formal networks and informal social control among 
neighborhoods to reduce crime and delinquency.  The systemic approach’s viewpoint of 
local communities is that they are a complex system of kinship and friendship networks, 
as well as informal and formal ties formed through socialization and withheld within 
family life (see also Sampson 1988).  It is through these informal and formal networks 
that tie neighborhood residents together (Bursik and Grasmick 1993a).  Even more, the 
systemic approach also emphasizes that residential stability exemplifies a community’s 
social organization (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974).  Having local ties and attachment are 
imperative in the formation and support of social networks and control, and residential 
instability undermines the ability for communities to form these vital relationships 
(Sampson 1988). 
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From the systemic approach to social disorganization, researchers distinguish 
between three levels of relationships in systemic social control (Bursik and Grasmick 
1993a).  The level of neighborhood systemic control relies on private, parochial, and 
public dimensions of social order.  The private system of social order is based on 
intimate, informal groups, such as the family.  The next level of systemic social control is 
the parochial system, which is made up of informal networks of acquaintances and 
friends.  According to Bursik and Grasmick (1993a), the parochial system of social 
control “represents the effects of the broader local interpersonal networks and the 
interlocking of local institutions” (p. 17).  In fact, this system of control is highly effective 
when members have mutual acceptance among friends and acquaintances in the 
community.  The parochial network system acts as supervision and surveillance for the 
community, as long as the residents have local ties and attachment, as pointed out by 
Sampson (1988).  Even more, parochial control can emerge from participation in local 
institutions, with relationships primarily consisting of secondary groups with weak ties.  
Bursik and Grasmick (1993a) go on to say that control at the parochial level is 
accomplished through “the effects of the broader local interpersonal networks and the 
interlocking of local institutions such as store, schools, churches, and voluntary 
organizations” (p. 17).  Lastly, the public system of control refers to the relationship 
between the community and agencies that provide goods and services outside of that 
community (Bursik and Grasmick 1993a).  The private and parochial systems are 
systems of social order that illustrate a community’s social networks that become 
apparent among community residents as they interrelate in their everyday lives (Hunter 
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1985).  Undoubtedly, these two systems are most important to social disorganization 
and the concept of collective efficacy, which is discussed next.   
 The second conceptual framework from the systemic approach of social 
disorganization, informal social control through social ties, or collective efficacy as it is 
described in the literature, is frequently used to study social disorganization.  Supporters 
of this approach argue that while social networks are important and necessary, they are 
not necessarily sufficient for informal control of crime and delinquency.  Sampson, 
Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) argue that mutual trust and expectations of residents in 
a neighborhood greatly affects the willingness of residents to intervene in acts of crime 
and delinquency.  Informal social control, according to Sampson and colleagues (1997), 
is the willingness of residents to intervene in various acts of crime and delinquency.  
Even more, the shared norms and values, as well as mutual trust among neighbors, is 
used to assess social cohesion within communities.  The link between mutual trust and 
the willingness of residents to intervene for the good of the community is what they coin 
collective efficacy.  Thus, the more collective efficacy among neighbors, the more likely 
they are to take on the role of informal social control agents.  Sampson (1997) analyzed 
crime in Chicago and found that less collective efficacy in neighborhoods increased 
rates of violence.  Just as important, this research found that the effects of residential 
instability and concentrated disadvantage on violence were significantly reduced when 
collective efficacy was present in neighborhoods.  Sampson and colleagues (Sampson 
et al. 1997; Morenoff et al. 2001) have shown that collective efficacy does in fact 
prevent violence, property crime, and delinquency.   
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Neighborhood attachment has frequently been used to measure a 
neighborhood’s level of collective efficacy.  Obviously, if there is more neighborhood 
attachment, crime and disorder would decrease, according to social disorganization 
theory and collective efficacy.  In fact, Woldoff (2002) measured neighborhood 
attachment using attitudinal and behavioral attachment to analyze the collective efficacy 
of neighborhoods and found very interesting results.  For example, she found that 
residents who were more educated were less sentimentally attached to their 
neighborhood, and that long-time residents and Blacks were more sentimentally 
attached.  However, Woldoff concluded that victimization and perception of crime had 
no affect on sentimental attachment to one’s neighborhood.  In all, it appears that order 
in the physical and social environment is more important than crime factors in 
determining resident’s sentimental attachment.  In evaluating neighborhood satisfaction, 
the author found that even though more educated people were less sentimental toward 
their neighborhood, they were actually more satisfied with their neighborhood.  Also 
contrary to sentimental attachment findings, Blacks had lower neighborhood 
satisfaction.  Thus, Blacks may live in areas that they are not necessarily satisfied to 
live, but nonetheless they have a strong sentimental tie to their neighborhood.  Once 
again, one’s satisfaction with his/her neighborhood was not significantly affected by 
victimization or perception of crime (Woldoff 2002). 
 Researchers have also been interested in how behavioral attachment is affected 
by victimization and crime in one’s neighborhood.  Woldoff (2002) measured this by 
analyzing routine neighboring (e.g., saying “hi”, knowing neighbor by name, etc.) and 
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social neighboring (e.g., eating dinner with neighbor, more communication on a regular 
basis with neighbor).  Routine neighboring was most commonly performed by Blacks 
compared to other populations.  Also, neighborhoods with social disorder also had a 
decrease in routine neighboring.  The other behavioral measurement, social 
neighboring, found that Blacks and women socialize and had more intimate interactions 
with their neighbors, while older people were less likely to socialize.  Additionally, while 
physical disorder had no affect on social neighboring, social disorder was found to 
decreased.  Perhaps neighbors were hesitant on establishing a close friendship when 
they were leery about the residents who live in the neighborhood.  Once again, 
victimization or perception of crime did not influence social neighboring (Woldoff 2002). 
 Other research has looked at the physical features of neighborhoods to measure 
social ties, or collective efficacy, among residents (Newman 1972; Brower, Dockett, and 
Taylor 1983; Taylor 1984).  Much of the research looks at the social ties among 
residents, either intimates or acquaintances, in reference to their likelihood to intervene 
if crime is witnessed in the neighborhood.  However, according to the systemic 
approach, the parochial level of control also includes ties to local institutions (e.g., 
schools, churches, and stores) and the community as a whole (Bursik and Grasmick 
1993a).  With that said, the physical residential environment can impact social ties 
among residents in a neighborhood (Taylor 1984).  For instance, researchers found that 
the presence of a fence around a home implied to the observers that the homeowners 
would react toward any intruders (Brower et al. 1983), thus reducing crime because 
neighbors are taking actions, as a community, to reduce crime.   
17 
 The physical environment of a neighborhood and its surroundings can either 
increase or decrease perception of fear among residents, and the more secure 
residents feel in their neighborhood, the more likely they are to be outside and more 
likely to come into contact with other residents (Newman 1972).  Naturally, coming into 
contact with other residents, making friendships or acquaintanceships, increases social 
ties and mutual trust among residents of a neighborhood.  Thus, the physical 
environment of a neighborhood can impede or facilitate a neighborhood’s level of 
collective efficacy, and therefore has a bearing on the ability to control crime and 
delinquency.  The theory used to explain how physical characteristics of a residential 
environment can help residents gain a sense of security and control is Newman’s theory 
of defensible space (1972).  Therefore, the collective efficacy of a neighborhood can be 
affected if residents do not feel safe in their neighborhood to formulate social ties and 
gain mutual trust among other residents.   
Social disorganization theory commonly focuses on ecological characteristics, 
such as high levels of poverty, racial and ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, and 
family disruption (Shaw and McKay 1942; Bursik and Grasmick 1993b; Sampson 1997; 
Oh 2005).  However, poverty seems to be one of the leading explanations of 
neighborhood crime (Oh 2005; Boyle and Hassett-Walker 2008).  Moreover, another 
ecological characteristic associated with a community being socially disorganized is 
racial and ethnic heterogeneity.  Racial and ethnic heterogeneity is said to disrupt local 
social networks because communities with different racial and ethnic groups often have 
different cultures and traditions, weakening the community and reducing the ability for 
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the residents to identify and solve common problems (Kornhauser 1978).  Residential 
mobility, or residential instability, can also cause neighborhoods to be socially 
disorganized.  Many contend that with a lack of residential stability, it is exceedingly 
difficult to create a strong network among residents, which results in “weak ties” within 
the community (Cantillon, Davidson, and Schweitzer 2003).  Lastly, the importance of 
family structure was later added to the list of ecological characteristics of social 
disorganization.  Sampson (1986, 1987) adapts the premise of control theory, arguing 
that a variety of family structures, such as single-parent or divorced families, weaken 
the ability of members to exert informal social control within the community.  The lack of 
parental and/or other adult figures within the neighborhood reduces the overall ability of 
the neighborhood to control other members’ behavior.    
Poverty 
 
One indicator of social disorganization, poverty, is often measured as the 
socioeconomic status (SES) of a community or using the poverty rate as a determinant.  
A community with high levels of poverty is said to have a difficult time developing local 
networks between members (Bursik and Grasmick 1993a).  However, the results are 
mixed on the effect poverty has on the development of local friendship networks (Bellair 
1997).  Some studies indicate that poverty is unrelated to the development of 
community friendship networks (Sampson 1988; Sampson and Groves 1989), while 
others argue that social class is in fact inversely related to community friendship 
networks (Sampson 1991).  For instance, in a study using the British Crime Survey, 
researchers found that SES had a statistically significant inverse effect on neighborhood 
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friendship networks (Lowenkamp, Cullen, and Pratt 2003).  Yet, it has been reported 
that neighborhood disorder and decay is more common in areas with less household 
income, which is explained by the fact that there is a breakdown of social control among 
residents (Ross and Mirowsky 1999).  Analyzing physical and social disorder and 
poverty, Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) found that poverty is strongly associated 
with disorder.  What’s more, comparing different classes of neighborhoods, those in 
higher class neighborhoods indicate that there is more commitment to the area and 
more involvement with other residents (Taylor 1996).    
Research has repeatedly shown that socioeconomic disadvantaged 
neighborhoods have higher rates of crime and delinquency (Olson et al. 2009; 
Markowitz et al. 2001; Morenoff et al. 2001).  For instance, even after controlling for 
neighborhood disorder, researchers reported that an increase in concentrated 
disadvantage increased burglary (Wilcox et al. 2004).  Looking at neighborhood 
characteristics and individual homicide risks, researchers found that the higher the 
socioeconomic disadvantage, as well as the lower the social cohesion, the higher 
probability that the residents in the neighborhood would be murdered (Nieuwbeerta et 
al. 2008).  This is consistent with other findings indicating that neighborhoods with high 
levels of poverty often have less social contact with other members (Bellair 1997; 
Morenoff et al. 2001), and thus have less social cohesion.  In other words, crimes, such 
as homicides, occur in neighborhoods that are socioeconomically disadvantaged more 
frequently because of the mediating factor of the level of social cohesion among 
residents (Nieuwbeerta et al. 2008).   
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 Neighborhood disadvantage, or in other words poverty, was found to have a 
significant, positive relationship on the number of gang homicides committed within 
census tracts in Chicago (Mares 2010).  Additionally, injuries resulting from assaults 
were also found to be correlated with poverty in a study conducted in Newark, New 
Jersey.  The authors measured three structural characteristics of social disorganization 
– poverty concentration, percentage of vacant housing units, and percentage of rental 
housing units – and they concluded that concentrated poverty was the strongest 
predictor of assault injuries (Boyle and Hassett-Walker 2008).  While Kingston, 
Huizinga, and Elliott (2009) found poverty to be a strong predictor of violent offending, 
they did not find poverty to be significant for property offending.  In contrast, applying 
social disorganization theory to the study of American Indian Homicides using the 
measurement of below poverty level, Lanier and Huff-Corzine (2006) did not find a 
statistically significant relationship between poverty and homicide among an American 
Indian population.   
 Using the poverty rate to test social disorganization theory of youths in 
nonmetropolitan counties, Osgood and Chambers (2000) also did not find a relationship 
between delinquency rates and poverty.  In fact, neither did they find a relationship in 
economic status or unemployment and delinquency rates.  Similarily, other researchers 
have also found no significant effect of unemployment on crime (Olson et al. 2009).  In 
the end, the Osgood and Chambers (2000) concluded that they did not find that 
delinquency increases with higher rates of poverty, and that “poverty comes in a very 
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different ‘structural package’ in small towns and rural communities than in larger urban 
areas” (104).     
Racial and Ethnic Heterogeneity 
 
 Similar to research findings on the relationship of poverty and crime and 
collective efficacy, research findings for racial and ethnic heterogeneity are also mixed.  
First, Bellair (1997) found that racial diversity within the 60 urban neighborhoods studied 
did impede the formation of social networks.  In fact, he concluded that residents in 
homogeneous communities engage in more interaction because they are more likely to 
recognize commonalties with neighbors.   However, another study concluded that ethnic 
heterogeneity had an inverse effect on local friendship networks (Lowenkamp et al. 
2003), which is consistent with previous findings from Sampson and Groves (1989).  In 
addition, in analyzing 66 Baltimore, Maryland neighborhoods, Taylor (1996) found that 
neighborhood racial composition did not have an impact on residents’ attachment and 
involvement, or their responses to disorder.  Just as important, according to Cantillon 
and colleagues (2003), racial homogeneity was not significantly correlated with stealing, 
fighting, school delinquency, and severe delinquency among the youths in their study.   
Despite these findings, others have concluded that neighborhood heterogeneity 
does increase crime and delinquency.  For example, neighborhood heterogeneity had a 
significant positive effect on the number of homicides in Chicago (Mares 2010).  Also, 
Olson et al. (2009) argued that racial heterogeneity is a significant, positive indicator of 
aggravated assault among their sample, but not homicide, sexual assault, or robbery.  
Comparing urban and rural communities, researchers report that racial diversity is a 
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strong indicator for violent crime, but not property crime (Wells and Weisheit 2004).  
Looking at youth violence in a rural setting, research has concluded that ethnic 
heterogeneity is significantly and positively related to higher rates of all violent offenses 
(e.g., homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and weapons) and simple assaults 
(Osgood and Chambers 2000).   
Residential Mobility/Instability 
 
Like poverty, residential mobility, or instability, has had mixed results in the 
research as a determinant of neighborhood social disorganization for both collective 
efficacy and crime.  Sampson and Groves (1989) and Lowenkamp et al. (2003) found 
that residential stability had a large direct effect on community friendship networks, 
meaning that as residential stability increased, friendship networks also increased.  
Other findings also report that stability, as well as education, had the most significant 
impacts on neighborhood attachment and responses to disorder.  This is undoubtedly 
consistent with the systemic approach to social disorganization, where in more stable 
communities residents feel more attached to one another and the community and are 
more involved within the community (Taylor 1996).  Interestingly however, others also 
found that residential stability has a positive, significant effect on unsupervised peer 
groups, which is contrary to social disorganization theory (Sampson and Groves 1989).  
In fact, looking at the role of nonresidential land use on violent crime and burglary, 
population instability negatively affected neighboring behaviors (Wilcox et al. 2004).  
Recent research found neighborhoods with higher levels of residential mobility actually 
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had higher levels of institutional effectiveness1, which is contrary to social 
disorganization theory (Kingston et al. 2009).    
Other research examined the effects of physical and social disorder as stressors 
for neighborhood attachment (Skogan 1992; Perkins and Taylor 1996; Woldoff 2002).  
In fact, one measure of physical disorder is abandoned buildings and empty lots.  Other 
measures of physical disorder are poor property maintenance, absentee landlords, and 
poor housing.  Interestingly, social disorder is very similar to the concept of collective 
efficacy.  For example, social disorder is said to occur when residents in a 
neighborhood “cannot be trusted, do not get along, and cannot be relied upon to look 
out for trouble” when a resident is away (Woldoff 2002).  However, according to Woldoff 
(2002) these indicators differ from other research that measures trust and social 
cohesion (Sampson et al. 1997) because these also measure the respondent’s views of 
social disorder in the neighborhood.  Despite other social disorganization literature that 
supports the contention that local stressors (such as crime or disorder) negatively affect 
attachment to one’s community, Woldoff’s (2002) research did not support this claim, 
nor did other research claiming that neighborhoods that have higher rates of crime 
actually had more involved, attached residents (Taylor 1996). 
Looking at residential mobility/instability and crime or delinquency, Mares (2010) 
stated that an increase in neighborhood instability actually predicted a reduction in gang 
related homicides, and thus was not a relevant factor in explaining gang violence in the 
different Chicago neighborhoods in the study.  Others (Lanier and Huff-Corzine 2006) 
                                            
1
 Institutional Effectiveness was a 7-item scale constructed to measure the quality of parochial networks 
in the neighborhoods.   
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also concluded that mobility was not a significant predictor of homicides among an 
American Indian population.  Yet, taking into account all homicides2, Mares (2010) 
found that instability was highly significant, which is consistent with previous studies of 
residential mobility in socially disorganized neighborhoods in Chicago (Papachristos 
and Kirk 2006).  In measuring instability as neighborhood residential turnover, others 
stated that the odds of being victimized increased by 62 percent when new residents 
replaced longer term residents (Xie and McDowall 2008), further supporting the claim 
that mobility reduces collective efficacy, and thus increases crime in these 
neighborhoods.   Just as interesting, Xie and McDowall (2008) also conclude that the 
effect of household turnover is the same in affluent rural neighborhoods as it is in 
deteriorating inner-city neighborhoods.   
Some research found that family instability is the most consistently strong 
predictor of crime rates in both urban and rural settings.  However, household instability 
is less consistent and a weak predictor with differences in crime rates in the 
communities (Wells and Weisheit 2004).  In testing different crimes and their 
association with the theory of social disorganization, Osgood and Chambers (2000) 
found that residential instability was related to higher rates of weapons violations, 
aggravated assault, rape, and simple assaults, as well as an increase in the overall 
violent crime index.  Even more interesting, they found that within a five-year span, the 
arrest rate for violent offenses would double with a 24% increase in residential turnover.  
Residential stability has also been used to study delinquency among youths, and these 
                                            
2
 Mares (2010) analyzed different homicides in Chicago between 1985-1995, such as homicides resulting 
from gang and nongang activities, robberies, intimate violence, and drug-related activities. 
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researchers claim that the more stability, the less stealing, fighting, and severe 
delinquency (Cantillon et al. 2003).  Stability overall, nonetheless, has been reported as 
the most important determinant of residents’ responses to disorder as compared to 
other characteristics of neighborhood structure (Taylor 1996).     
While residential mobility is often measured by the frequency of changes in 
residency (Osgood and Chambers 2000; Kingston et al. 2009), the idea of moving out 
and having a household vacant for a long period of time is also supportive of 
neighborhoods being socially disorganized.  For instance, Skogan described in his book 
Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods 
(1992) that vacant buildings and houses are visible evidence of social disorder, which 
“provides direct, behavioral evidence” that a community is disorganized.  Moreover, 
similar to Skogan’s argument of vacant structures being a sign of social disorganization 
in a community, Boyle and Hassett-Walker (2008) measure residential mobility by the 
percentage of vacant houses and percentage of rental housing units.  In fact, prior 
research points out that low rates of home ownership and residential instability are 
associated with problematic behaviors (Sampson et al. 2002).   
In comparing the impact that vacant housing and rental housing has on rate of 
assault, Boyle and Hassett-Walker (2008) reported that there was a moderate 
correlation among vacant housing units and the assault rate.  In all, they found that 
areas with a higher percentage of vacant housing units were associated with increased 
rates of assault, and thus they are ideal measures of social disorganization.  On the 
other hand, rental housing units were not found to be a good measure of social 
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disorganization.  Interestingly, they emphasized the impact that vacant housing units 
have on crime rates, and indicated that they contribute “above and beyond the direct 
effects of poverty” (p. 1022).  For instance, areas with higher numbers of vacant houses 
may set up an ideal environment for violence and crime to occur because of the 
increased likelihood of the community having less collective efficacy.  Also, 
neighborhoods that are in poverty but have less vacant houses have more residents 
that are willing to keep an eye out for others, or in other words, have greater collective 
efficacy (Boyle and Hassett-Walker 2008).   
Moreover, other research argues that residential mobility does not cause crime, 
but instead crime causes people to be more mobile (Hipp, Tita, and Greenbaum 2009).  
Kingston et al. (2009) however found that when looking at juvenile delinquency in high-
risk neighborhoods, neighborhoods with high levels of residential mobility actually had 
more effective social institutions, (police, schools, medical services, and transportation 
services) which was a measurement of neighborhood social processes. They also found 
that mobility was not a statistically significant predictor of property or violent offending.  
Thus, the research findings on the effects that residential mobility has on crime are 
mixed.    
Family Disruption 
 
 Family disruption, a structural indicator of social disorganization, is typically 
measured by the presence of female-headed households in a neighborhood or the 
divorce rate in a neighborhood, and once again, these findings are often mixed.  Both 
measures of family disruption are said to impact a neighborhood because single parents 
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are strained with time and money, which hinders parents’ abilities to supervise their 
children and communicate with other members of the neighborhood.  Even more, the 
fewer adults in a neighborhood, the less supervision there will be and a decrease in 
collective efficacy (Sampson 1985).  Although the theory of social disorganization would 
argue that family disruption would negatively impact the ability to collectively enforce 
neighborhood controls, Lowenkamp et al. (2003) found that family disruption was not 
related to local friendship networks.   
As discussed previously, some research differentiates between three different 
systemic control groups within neighborhoods – private, parochial, and public.  The 
private system of social order is based on intimate, informal groups, such as the family, 
while the parochial system is made up of informal networks of acquaintances and 
friends.  The parochial network system acts as supervision and surveillance for the 
community, as long as the residents have local ties and attachment, as pointed out by 
Sampson (1988).  Lastly, the public system of control refers to the relationship between 
the community and agencies that provide goods and services outside of that community 
(Bursik and Grasmick 1993a).  The private and parochial control groups are most 
important to social disorganization and the concept of collective efficacy.  With that said, 
some researchers seek to identify which systemic control groups are most effective.   
Interestingly, Capowich (2003) reported that the most disorganized 
neighborhoods also had the weakest parochial and public mechanisms of control.  In 
fact, there was a relationship between a low level of informal control and a weak 
parochial control method, further supporting the claim of the importance of systemic 
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control groups in operating collectively to reduce crime and delinquency.  As stated 
already, the concept of collective efficacy is apparent among the private and parochial 
systemic control groups.  Thus, a study further supported this claim, reporting that with 
an increase in collective efficacy among neighborhoods, there was a reduction in the 
homicide rate (Morenoff et al. 2001).  Once again, these findings illustrate the 
importance of different system control groups that collectively work to reduce crime in 
neighborhoods, even those that are structurally disadvantaged.  In contrast, others have 
found that “residents of geographic areas characterized by lower levels of collective 
efficacy are no more or less likely to intervene” (Wells et al. 2006:540) and act out as 
informal control agents.   
 Osgood and Chambers (2000) investigated the relationship between female-
headed households and crime or delinquency and found that higher levels of female-
headed households were strongly associated with higher rates of rape, robbery, 
aggravated assault, and weapons violations.  In truth, the presence of female-headed 
households was the strongest indicator in their research. They found that an increase of 
13% of female-headed households, the overall offense rate double (Osgood and 
Chambers 2000).  Moreover, an increase in American Indian female-headed 
households was associated with an increase in the homicide rate among American 
Indians (Lanier and Huff-Corzine 2006).  Comparing immigrants and homicide, 
researchers reported that female-headed households positively and significantly 
influenced the homicide and robbery rates, and aggravated assault count in Orange 
County, Florida (Olson et al. 2009).  Interestingly though, research has reported that 
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female-headed households are not inherently at risk for crime and/or victimization, but 
rather it is explained by other structural conditions, such as the fact the many female-
headed households reside in poorer, more disadvantaged neighborhoods (Capowich 
2003:54).   
Academic Performance 
 
 At the naissance of Shaw and McKay’s theory of social disorganization (1942), 
academic performance or achievement was not one of the indicators included in 
characteristics of socially disorganized neighborhoods, which have been discussed 
above.  However, research has shown that disadvantaged neighborhoods have poorer 
academic performance and achievement.  According to Berliner (2005), poverty within 
neighborhoods needs to be addressed in order to improve academic achievement and 
school performance among children.  Although there is a modest amount of empirical 
research reporting the impact of neighborhood characteristics on academic 
achievement, it is growing.  Past research has shown that neighborhood structural 
characteristics such as high levels of crime and violence exposure (Schwartz and 
Gorman 2003; Shumow, Vandell, and Posner 1999), high levels of economic 
impoverishment (Plunkett, Abarca-Mortensen, and Behnke 2007), and low levels of 
employment in professional jobs (Ensminger, Lamkin, and Jacobson 1996) are 
associated with poorer academic achievement.  In addition, research has found a 
relationship between homeownership and academic performance.  For example, 
homeownership has been found to have positive effects on the educational 
development and attainments of children (Aaronson 2000; Bramley and Karley 2007; 
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Green and White 1997; Harkness and Newman 2001).  Clearly, in line with human 
capital theory, homeownership is positively related with social capital, specifically 
because there is a lower mobility rate; this in turn, has been linked to education 
(DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999).   
 Comparing the effects of neighborhood characteristics on school performance for 
black and white students, Dornbusch, Ritter, and Steinberg (1991) reported that 
neighborhood SES was a good predictor of self-reported grades.  Basically, the authors 
found that as a community’s SES increased, so did the grades of the students.   In 
measuring the impact of neighborhood disadvantage among black and white students’ 
achievement, Lee and Madyun (2009) found consistent results with arguments posed 
by social disorganization theory.  For example, neighborhoods with low poverty and low 
crime had higher achievement rates for students in both reading and math.  Conversely, 
students residing in neighborhoods with high poverty and high crime lagged in both 
reading and math.  In the end, they found that the “achievement gap between the 
advantaged (low crime-poverty) and the disadvantaged (high crime-poverty) 
neighborhoods were substantial” (p. 159).    
As discussed above, neighborhood characteristics, such as poverty, racial and 
ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility/instability, and family disruption are the 
common factors researchers use to measure socially disorganized neighborhoods.  
Research has also shown that academic performance and/or achievement has been 
found to be associated with neighborhoods that are disadvantage and socially 
disorganized.  Furthermore, researchers argue that a neighborhood’s level of collective 
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efficacy determines whether crime and delinquency will occur.  Even neighborhoods 
that are structurally disorganized can have lower crime and delinquency rates as long 
as their level of collective efficacy is high and neighbors work together to instill informal 
social control.  However, with the recent increase in foreclosures nationwide, residents 
are often left in neighborhoods with fewer neighbors with whom to engage in informal 
social control, and therefore it would seem that these areas are at risk for increasing 
rates of crime and delinquency.  Accordingly, the impact foreclosures have on crime 
and delinquency deserves attention.   
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CHAPTER THREE: FORECLOSURES 
 
 
 
Starting in the early 1990’s, America has promoted and expanded the opportunity 
of homeownership to ethnic and racial minorities who prominently live in low- and 
moderate-income areas (Newman and Wyly 2004).  At the same time that the U.S. 
started promoting the importance of homeownership, there was also a large increase in 
the number of subprime loans – loans which have high interest rates that are offered to 
borrowers who are considered a high risk for default – made by mortgage companies 
(Immergluck and Smith 2005, 2006a).  Although the increase in homeownership has 
been viewed as a positive trend, there are also negative repercussions that have and 
will continue to occur after the boom in real estate and homeownership.  For instance, 
subprime lending is the most default-prone mortgage type of all home loans (Apgar and 
Calder 2005).  The increase in foreclosures not only harms the already financially 
unstable households but they also lower home price appreciation in neighboring areas, 
weaken communities, and decrease  homebuyers’ wealth (Delgadillo and Gallagher 
2006).   
It is pertinent to point out the difference between defaulting and foreclosing.  
Defaulting is the failure to make a payment on a home loan, and often researchers see 
defaulting and foreclosing as synonymous, but foreclosure is not the result in every 
default (Ambrose and Capone 1998).  In other words, allowing one’s property or 
household to go into foreclosure is in fact a two-step process.  First, the mortgage 
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borrower decides to default on his or her property or household by missing a payment.  
The second step is to let the property or home go into foreclosure by not taking certain 
actions to avoid foreclosure, whether intentionally or not (Ambrose and Capone 1998; 
Ambrose and Buttimer 2000).  Sometimes those who default on a mortgage loan do so 
to obtain expenditures for other expenses.  However, when defaulting for that purpose, 
a foreclosure is often the outcome because of the “result of new and unforeseen 
expenditures or else the inability to gain new income after a trigger event causing the 
initial default” (Ambrose and Capone 1998:394).   
Those who default, and often do eventually foreclose, can be divided into two 
categories, what Ambrose and Capone (1998) call ruthless and trigger-event defaulters.  
While these two categories undoubtedly help to explain why people choose to default, it 
is safe to assume that those who foreclose on their home can also fall into these two 
categories, and thus these categories can be applied to those who default as well as 
those who foreclose.  First, ruthless defaulters are those whose local area has 
experienced declines in price, and in effect the estimated loan-to-value ratios (LTV 
ratios – where the appraised value of one’s home drops below the value of the loan) are 
above one at default.  Ruthless defaulters see their behavior as being effective by 
allowing a foreclosure to occur.  In contrast, trigger-event defaulters are those whose 
estimated LTV ratios are below one at default and the probabilities of having negative 
equity are significantly lower than ruthless defaulters.3  Borrowers who default due to a 
                                            
3
 Having the LTV ratio greater than one indicates that one has a high LTV ratio, meaning one borrowed 
more than the home was valued at, i.e. a ruthless defaulter.  Often this puts mortgage lenders and 
mortgage borrowers at great risk of default and/or foreclosure, and thus considered high risk.  Having the 
LTV ratio below one indicates that one has a low LTV ratio, i.e. a trigger-event defaulter.  Typically, those 
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trigger-event may only foreclose on their home because of reasons outside of their 
control.  Therefore, while foreclosures occur for ruthless defaulters and trigger-event 
defaulters, the motivations for foreclosing are different and the rate at which they 
foreclose is different (Ambrose and Capone 1998).  In fact, the research conducted by 
Ambrose and Capone (1998) on this phenomenon concluded that ruthless defaulters, or 
those classified as high-LTV defaulters, have a tendency toward foreclosure.  While on 
the other hand, trigger-event defaulters, or those classified as low-LTV defaulters, have 
a tendency to reinstate their mortgage loan.   
Subprime Lending 
 
Before the 1990’s, those who applied for a home loan did not have much of an 
option on loan type.  Mortgage companies varied their loans by different characteristics 
such as adjustable rates, fifteen- or thirty-year loans, and attributes of the home and/or 
property.  In fact, if the borrower was not seen as being creditworthy by the mortgage 
company, he or she was not granted the loan.  Those who qualified for the loan, 
however, paid around the same price (Avery et al 2005).  Not surprisingly, these 
practices resulted in mortgage lenders not granting loans to inner city residents which 
led to the lenders being racially biased (Squires and Velez 1987; Buist, Megolugbe, and 
Trent 1994; Leven and Sykuta 1994).  However, during the 1990’s subprime loans were 
expanded and gave more opportunities to those who were not so creditworthy but still 
wanted to acquire a home mortgage loan.  Inside Mortgage Finance, an industry 
                                                                                                                                            
who have a low LTV ratio put a larger down payment on the loan, and therefore has more home equity 
and less debt toward the home.  
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publication, reported that subprime lending increased in 1994 from approximately $35 
billion to $665 billion in 2005 (Schloemer et al. 2006).  Also, in 2006 subprime loans 
accounted for approximately 20 percent of the total mortgages in the U.S. (Avery, 
Brevoort, and Canner 2006; Joint Center for Housing Studies 2007).    
 The idea behind subprime lending is rather straightforward.  Potential 
homeowners who cannot qualify for a prime loan, typically rated as having A credit, 
need to find a means of obtaining a different loan to purchase a home.  Thus, these 
potential homeowners resort to subprime loans, typically rated as A (i.e., Alt-A or near 
prime) B, C, and D.  The majority of individuals who fall within these subprime loan 
categories are in A or B credit ratings (Center for Responsible Lending 2003).  Yet, it is 
argued that if subprime lending, especially B, C, or D lending, is highly concentrated in 
certain neighborhoods, then these vulnerable neighborhoods “will bear a 
disproportionate share of the foreclosures” (Immergluck 2004:31).  In fact, the majority 
of households that are considered as not creditworthy are concentrated in lower and 
middle-income households, and therefore these households constitute the majority of 
subprime loans.  Since these borrowers are considered high risk because of their credit 
history, subprime loans are more expensive than prime mortgage loans (Carr 2007), 
and that undoubtedly has a negative impact on many neighborhoods comprised of low 
and middle-income households.   
The abuses of subprime lending have been implicated as the number one 
explanation for the recent increase in foreclosures nationwide (Kaplan and Sommers 
2009).  In fact, Hevesi (2002) found that between 1993 and 2002 the foreclosure rate 
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nationwide increased by 68 percent.  The significant increase in foreclosures were 
found exclusively in loans that were subprime, while prime loans (A rated) decreased 
during these same years (Hevesi 2002).  This is supported by the fact that a mortgage 
borrower with positive home equity prefers to refinance or sell the home, instead of 
defaulting, while a mortgage borrower with negative home equity will not have these 
options, and thus will default and possibly foreclose (Gerardi and Willen 2009).  Lending 
practices are very important to policy makers who seek to control and monitor mortgage 
companies lending practices to ensure that loans are not discriminatory.  The 
relationship between mortgages and foreclosures is the simple fact that “you cannot 
have a foreclosure unless you have a loan” (Immergluck and Smith 2005).  Most 
research emphasizes the relationship between subprime lending, also known as 
predatory lending, and the number of foreclosures (Walters and Hermanson 2001; Cutts 
and Van Order 2004; Immergluck and Smith 2005; Nichols, Pennington-Cross, and 
Yezer 2005; Grover, Smith, and Todd 2008; Immergluck 2008; Rose 2008), as indicated 
above.  While subprime lending has come under extreme scrutiny for being responsible 
for many increases in foreclosures around the nation, subprime mortgages undoubtedly 
bring many benefits for homebuyers who cannot receive another type of loan due to 
credit history problems (Immergluck 2008).   
In fact, in the U.S. home mortgages with subprime loans have increased 
significantly during the 1990’s, with some estimates indicating that subprime loans 
accounted for $200 billion by the end of the 1990’s (Gruenstein and Herbert 2000) while 
others estimated that in 2005 subprime loans were a $600 billion business (Avery et al. 
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2006; Joint Center for Housing Studies 2007).  It has been argued that subprime 
lending contributes the most to foreclosures (Immergluck 2008).  Immergluck and Smith 
(2005) reported that home mortgages that had a 100 or more subprime loans per 
Census tract between 1996 and 2001 corresponded to having almost 86% more 
foreclosures in 2002.   
While most research has centered on policies relating to subprime lending (e.g., 
underwriting techniques), some researchers and policy makers have focused on 
prevention and/or counseling programs for borrowers (see for example the MFP 
Program discussed below).  Unfortunately however, little research has focused on the 
role of homeownership counseling and foreclosure (Delgadillo and Gallagher 2006).   
The major studies (1995; 1998) that have concentrated on mortgage foreclosure 
prevention programs have been promoted by the Family Housing Fund in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota.  They have analyzed the impact and cost effectiveness of their program in 
reducing mortgage foreclosures in the area.  A summary of the Mortgage Foreclosure 
Prevention Program (MFP Program) reported that in the initial six years (beginning in 
1991) of the program in operation, the MFP Program “provided intensive counseling” to 
nearly 1,700 homeowners and successfully assisted over half of them in reinstating their 
mortgages.   
The MFP Program also found that the counseling was a cost-effective and 
practical way to assist homeowners with their mortgages and prevent them from 
foreclosure.  At the time, the MFP Program’s expenditures were on average $2,800 to 
assist a homebuyer in reinstating his or her mortgage, while the estimated cost of 
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foreclosure losses to mortgage companies ranged from $10,000 to $28,000.  Lastly, the 
MFP Program concluded that during the six years in operation, the program estimated 
saving the mortgage companies around $7.6 million in the areas of Minneapolis/Saint 
Paul.  The MFP Program reported that their success was due to two main factors: 
working closely with homeowners and mortgage services to getting borrowers’ home 
loans back on track and early delinquency intervention (Moreno 1998).   
Many studies have shown that borrowers’ race/minority, income, and age 
increase the chance of receiving a subprime loan, and in effect the borrowers have a 
higher possibility of their home becoming delinquent and subsequently placed into 
foreclosure (Calem, Gillen, and Wachter 2004; Delgadillo and Gallagher 2006; 
Immergluck and Smith 2005, 2006a; Immergluck 2008).  The relationship of subprime 
lending and foreclosures has been demonstrated in many different geographical studies 
(Gruenstein and Herbert 2000; Burnett, Herbert, and Kaul 2002; Collins 2003; Newman 
and Wyly 2004).  Although there is a positive relationship between subprime lending 
and foreclosures, a characteristic of economic instability– unemployment – which is not 
directly related to subprime lending, can also increase foreclosures (Immergluck 2009).  
According to Kaplan and Sommers (2009), “foreclosures are unevenly distributed, 
concentrated in particular neighborhoods” (p. 102), and thus, the following sections 
present a discussion of the race/minority, income, and age characteristics that previous 
research indicates influences subprime lending and subsequently increases the chance 
of foreclosures, as well as the role unemployment plays in foreclosures.     
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Minority Factors 
 
Of particular concern is the tendency of foreclosed homes to have increased at 
higher rates in areas with substantial concentrations of low-income minority households 
(Apgar and Calder 2005).  The incentives for subprime lenders to target minority 
communities to gain more business are common routines subprime/predator lenders 
use (Newman and Wyly 2004).  Not only will minority communities, and especially low-
income minority communities, have more of a hardship because of higher-cost 
subprime mortgages, but they are also at high risk of financial problems down the road 
(Apgar and Calder 2005).  Further, many minorities who are new homeowners are fairly 
unsophisticated in financial operations and do not necessarily fully understand the 
process of obtaining and maintaining a mortgage loan (Immergluck 2004).  The National 
Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) reports that minority neighborhoods receive 
significantly higher levels of subprime lending (2003).  In fact, the NCRC found that 
African-Americans are considered high risk in the mortgage market based on their race, 
and therefore they have higher levels of subprime lending.   
Moreover, a study by Nichols, Pennington-Cross and Yezer (2005) concluded 
that the borrower demographic characteristics of their study of racial groups behaved 
differently.  For instance, Hispanics, African Americans, Indians and Asians were more 
likely to use subprime financing than Whites.  Similarly, Asian and African American 
borrowers were found to have a “higher probability of using the subprime market” 
(Pennington-Cross, Yezer, and Nichols 2000).  Using data from foreclosures in Chicago 
however, Immergluck and Smith (2005) noted that Hispanic neighborhoods had lower 
40 
foreclosure levels compared to similar White neighborhoods, but there were higher 
rates of foreclosures in Black neighborhoods because of higher subprime lending.  
Another study found that African Americans were twice as likely as non-Hispanic whites 
to have a subprime mortgage, and that Hispanics are somewhat less likely to have a 
subprime loan (Newman and Wyly 2004).   
The Center for Responsible Lending conducted a study in 2007 and found that 
African American and Latino borrowers were more likely than non-Latino borrowers to 
receive “higher-rate” purchase loans, such as subprime loans (Gruenstein-Bocian, 
Ernst, and Li 2007).  Even more, looking strictly at refinance loans, Immergluck (2004) 
concluded that in predominantly African American neighborhoods, 58 percent of the 
refinance loans were granted by subprime lenders; while in predominantly white 
neighborhoods, less than 10 percent of the refinance loans were given by subprime 
lenders.  Quercia, Cowan, and Moreno’s (2005) findings show that Black homeowners 
have substantially higher interest rates than the average interest rate for other race 
borrowers, which help why Black borrowers have drastically higher rates of default 
(Anderson and VanderHoff 1999).  In fact, compared to other racial groups, the authors 
reported that other than having a full-time job, being a Black homeowner reduced that 
chance of avoiding a foreclosure by 40 percent.  African American borrowers are 
repeatedly found to have a higher probability of obtaining a subprime loan compared to 
borrowers of other racial or ethnic groups (Calem, Gillen, and Wachter 2004).  Just as 
interesting, the American Association of Retired Persons (i.e., AARP) conducted a study 
on the elderly population and subprime lending and discovered that 18 percent of the 
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older African American borrowers held subprime mortgages, while only 7 percent had 
prime mortgages.  The older Hispanic borrowers accounted for 7 percent of the 
subprime lending, but only 2 percent of the prime mortgages.  Conversely, older white 
borrowers accounted for 68 percent of the subprime and 85 percent of the prime 
mortgages (Walters and Hermanson 2001).   
Moreover, Abt Associates conducted a study in the Atlanta metro area and 
observed that since 1998, the amount of subprime lending in high-minority communities 
has doubled.  Just as interesting, subprime lending grew to more than 158 percent in 
moderately high minority tracts and grew to 317 percent in high minority tracts 
(Gruenstein and Herbert 2000).  Even after controlling for income on loan type, 
subprime lenders granted more loans than prime lenders in the 40 middle-income, 
African American neighborhoods in a study conducted in Chicago (Immergluck 2004).  
Immergluck and Smith (2005) conducted foreclosure research in Chicago as well and 
they reported that neighborhoods with minority populations of 10 percent or less in 2000 
saw an increase in foreclosures of 215 percent, while neighborhoods with a minority 
population of 90 percent or more had an increase of foreclosures of 544 percent.    
A study conducted on foreclosures in Utah also reported that race was a 
statistically significant indicator of foreclosure, and that as race changes from “white” to 
“non-White” the chance of foreclosure increased by a factor of 2.8 (Delgadillo and 
Gallagher 2006).  Another study conducted between 2001 and 2003 in Ohio reported 
that the percentage of minorities in general, and African Americans in particular, are 
highly correlated with foreclosures (Kaplan and Sommers 2009).  Similarly, research 
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findings from Massachusetts support the same findings and also conclude that 
foreclosures are exceedingly concentrated in minority neighborhoods (Gerardi and 
Willen 2009).  All together, prior research suggests that “racial composition plays a 
tremendous role in the geographical distribution of foreclosures” (Kaplan and Sommers 
2009:115).   
Instead of being denied any form of credit, minorities are being targeted by 
higher-cost, and often abusive, lenders (Immergluck 2004).  So, because of those who 
have credit problems and/or other financial instabilities, they are disproportionately 
singled out for subprime loans.  However, researchers also argue that credit risk by its 
self may not entirely explain why some borrowers end up in the subprime market 
(Couchrane, Surette, and Zorn 2004).  In other words, these loan companies are racially 
discriminating in their loan practices (Apgar and Calder 2005), and lack of or bad credit 
cannot solely be used to explain who is targeted for subprime lending.  As presented 
above, numerous studies have found that minorities, specifically Blacks, are more likely 
to become victims of predatory lending practices.  And although they have been granted 
more access to homeownership by these lenders, numerous abuses have also arisen, 
such as predatory lending (Apgar and Calder 2005).   Unfortunately, many of these 
minority groups who sought homeownership through the use of subprime lending are 
feeling the backlash of such risky borrowing – foreclosures.  
Income Factors 
 
 Traditionally, a steady and rather substantial income was necessary in obtaining 
a home mortgage.  Low-income families or individuals have typically had a difficult time 
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obtaining a home mortgage loan (Delgadillo and Gallagher 2006), and they typically are 
less sophisticated regarding the process of obtaining and maintaining a home mortgage 
compared to middle- and upper-income households (Immergluck 2004).  Nevertheless, 
down payment requirements had become more lenient and mortgage companies were 
granting mortgages to individuals that would have been considered high risk borrowers 
at one time, but were then able to obtain homeownership with a lower level of income.  
However, because of the lower income bracket of individuals now being able to obtain 
mortgages (mostly subprime mortgages because of their high risk), there have been an 
increase in the number of foreclosures in areas of low- and moderate-income 
households (Delgadillo and Gallagher 2006).   
In truth, Bunce and colleagues (2001) reported that by 1998, subprime loans 
encompassed one in every three loans granted to low-income areas in Chicago and 
Baltimore.  Interestingly though, one study (Boushey and Weller 2008) found that as 
income increased, the foreclosure rates also increased in that area.  The authors 
explained this phenomenon by pointing out that those with higher (increasing) incomes 
often take on more financial responsibilities because they believe they can afford more, 
which can inadvertently increase the chance of foreclosure (Boushey and Weller 2008).  
Another study also reported that subprime loans are just as likely to foreclose in all 
neighborhoods and not just low-income neighborhoods.  But they also concluded that 
since there is a very high concentration of subprime loans in low-income 
neighborhoods, the increasing growths in the minority areas are the real concern 
(Bunce et al. 2001).  The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC; 2003) 
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actually found that income had a “small impact on the level of subprime lending in 
census tracts” (p. 33). 
 Despite Boushey and Weller’s (2008) interesting findings regarding income, most 
studies report a correlation between low-income and increased foreclosure rates 
(Gruenstein and Herbert 2000; Newman and Wyly 2004; Immergluck and Smith 2006a; 
Grover et al. 2008).  For example, a study (Gruenstein and Herbert 2000) conducted in 
the Atlanta Metro area found subprime lending was the strongest in low- and very low-
income neighborhoods.  In fact, the study reported that subprime originations in the 
Atlanta Metro area increased to 238 percent in low-income tracts, but increased to 440 
percent in very low-income tracts (Gruenstein and Herbert 2000).   
 Moderate- to low-income borrowers are often faced with other unexpected 
expenses that increase their likelihood of foreclosure.  For example, if low-income 
individuals are faced with a drop in income or other expenses relating to family, health, 
and employment, these borrowers have more difficulties of being able to pay for their 
mortgage (Quercia, Cowan, and Moreno 2005).  A study conducted by Quercia, and 
associates (2005) on the effectiveness of a foreclosure prevention program reported 
that since the enactment of the program in 1991, approximately 35 percent of the 
borrowers had reported a cut in their pay or income as a reason for them defaulting on 
their mortgage.  In fact, this could be what Ambrose and Capone (1998) refer to as a 
trigger-event.  As discussed earlier, trigger-event defaulters often default and 
subsequently foreclose because of an event that is out of their control.  Undoubtedly, a 
cut in pay or the loss of one’s job is a trigger-event.  However, research indicates that 
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looking at trigger-event defaulters, low-income groups often have more of a difficult time 
gaining wealth and therefore they will work harder to protect the wealth they have, such 
as home equity; the same goes for high-income groups (Ambrose and Capone 1998).  
Thus, if mortgages have a low LTV ratio and a trigger event occurs, both low-income 
and high-income groups have roughly the same reduced chance of foreclosing (5 
percent - 6 percent) and a higher probability of reinstatement (6 percent - 7 percent).  
So, the trigger-event significantly effects whether a foreclosure or reinstatement occurs, 
no matter the income group (Ambrose and Capone 1998).   
 The “correlates of neighborhood foreclosure activity suggests that there is a 
strong relationship” (Kaplan and Sommers 2009:112) with household income.  These 
researchers found that the majority of foreclosures occurred in block groups with a 
median income between $20,000 and $30,000.  In fact, while the foreclosure rate 
dropped significantly for higher income neighborhoods, as one would suspect, lower 
income neighborhoods also had fewer foreclosures.  The authors attributed this to the 
fact that the majority of lower income neighborhoods have a higher proportion of renters 
who cannot have their property foreclosed on, but rather only evicted, and therefore are 
at less risk of foreclosure.  However, they conclude that there is not necessarily the 
relationship between foreclosures and household income, but rather it is the prevalence 
of subprime loans that explains foreclosures (Kaplan and Sommers 2009).   
 All in all, low-income areas and/or households are considered to be higher risk 
when it comes to having mortgage loans, and often this is because of negative credit 
history.  Thus, mortgage companies grant subprime loans to these individuals with a 
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higher level of risk.  Low-income individuals and families are seen as being a high risk, 
and thus they are prime candidates for receiving subprime loans to gain 
homeownership.  These conclusions are consistent with the National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition’s 2003 study on discrimination and unequal access to affordable 
loans.   
Age Factors 
 
 There are mixed results on whether younger or older borrowers are at more of a 
risk of their home being foreclosed due to subprime lending.  For instance, one study 
discovered that borrowers that were 65 years of age or older were three times more 
likely than borrowers who were less than 35 years of age of holding a subprime loan 
(Lax et al. 2004).  Demographically, the AARP reported that older minority and female 
borrowers were more likely to have a subprime mortgage than older non-minority and 
male borrowers.  In fact, older females had 45 percent of the subprime mortgages and 
only 28 percent of the prime mortgages.  Also, as previously mentioned, older African-
American and Hispanic borrowers had a higher percent of subprime mortgages than 
they did prime mortgages (Walters and Hermanson 2001).  Just as important, a study 
conducted on subprime lending in ten large metropolitan areas found that abusive, 
subprime lenders do in fact target elderly populations, taking advantage of the fact they 
often have substantial amounts of equity but often have minimal access to immediate 
cash (NCRC 2003).   
 When looking at foreclosures and age, some research indicates that elderly 
women are especially vulnerable to foreclosures (Immergluck and Smith 2005).  Yet, 
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another study concluded that many neighborhoods with higher proportions of elderly 
women were actually less likely to foreclose (Kaplan and Sommers 2009).  In truth, 
some researchers indicate that younger borrowers have a higher chance of foreclosure.  
Using national data, Anderson and VanderHoff (1999) revealed that younger borrowers 
had a higher default probability.  Furthermore, Ambrose and Capone (1998) imply that it 
is expected that younger homeowners might have fewer resources to use if they are at 
risk of a foreclosure, and therefore they are more susceptible to foreclosure.  However, 
they also claim that younger homeowners, as opposed to older homeowners, may have 
a higher chance of reemployment and thus could have the means to get their 
foreclosure turned around.  In contrast, a study of foreclosures in two Minnesota 
counties found that young homeowners often have less stable employment and less 
wealth than older mortgage borrowers and thus have a higher chance of foreclosure 
(Grover et al. 2008).   Yet, other research has reported that the age of the borrower was 
not a significant predictor of foreclosure (Delgadillo and Gallagher 2006).  
 The previous research on foreclosures in America support the claim that 
subprime lending occurs more in predominately minority or racial neighborhoods, low to 
moderately-low neighborhoods, and either young homeowners and elderly 
homeowners.  It is apparent then that there is widespread price discrimination in 
subprime versus prime mortgage lending in America.  Most of the research to date has 
focused on large metropolitan areas throughout the United States that have had high 
foreclosure rates for some time.  However, other research suggests that some of the 
largest disparities in mortgage lending practices exist in the smallest metropolitan areas 
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in the U.S. (Bradford 2002), and thus, foreclosures could also be very common in these 
smaller, less populated areas.   
Impact of Unemployment 
 
 Undoubtedly, subprime loans are more common in neighborhoods with higher 
proportions of racial or minority households, lower levels of household income, and 
younger and older individuals and/or households, which subsequently increase the 
chance of foreclosure.  Although there is a positive relationship between subprime 
lending and foreclosures, a characteristic of economic instability– unemployment – 
which is not directly related to the practice of subprime lending, can also increase 
foreclosures and thus deserves some discussion.  In truth, rising levels of 
unemployment contributed to the new wave of foreclosures.  Naturally, mortgage 
borrowers who are unemployed for long periods of time have more difficult time paying 
their home mortgage, and even if mortgage companies assist in reducing their monthly 
mortgage payment, these individuals still cannot afford their mortgage and risk 
foreclosure (Immergluck 2009).  Indeed, Kaplan and Sommers (2009) found a positive 
correlation between unemployment and foreclosures.  Yet, other research concluded 
higher rates of unemployment actually resulted in higher rates of mortgage 
reinstatement after default rather than foreclosure (Ambrose and Capone 1998).  The 
authors point out the fact that during periods of economic instability, in this case high 
rates of unemployment, local and state governments might pressure mortgage lenders 
to grant borrowers greater leniency during tough times (Ambrose and Capone 1998).  
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Similarly to the previously discussed sociodemographic characteristics, the effect of 
unemployment on foreclosures also has mixed results.    
 Subprime lenders have primarily targeted minority, lower income, and the 
younger and older households.  Furthermore, households that go into foreclosure are 
most likely to be households with subprime loans, as oppose to prime loans, and thus, 
research has found a relationship between subprime loans and foreclosures.  Also, 
unemployment has shown to have a significant negative effect on foreclosures because 
homeowners that become unemployed have fewer means of paying for their home 
mortgage.  According to social disorganization theory, residential mobility or instability 
increases the chance of crime and delinquency because there is a lack of informal 
social control among neighbors to reduce crime and disorder.  Therefore, social 
disorganization theory and the concept of collective efficacy are useful to understand 
the effect that foreclosures have on crime and disorder, if any at all.   
Foreclosures and Crime 
 
There has been very little research on the correlation between neighborhoods 
with high rates of foreclosures and crime and delinquency.  Although foreclosures cause 
many other problems within communities and families, for instance displacement, more 
specifically, crime may be a leading concern for those closely affected by foreclosures.  
Residents in neighborhoods are concerned about foreclosures because they can 
jeopardize the security and safety of the neighborhood (Immergluck and Smith 2006b).  
Low-income neighborhoods typically have always had higher rates of foreclosures and 
crime.  Thus, the research that has analyzed the correlation between the two has 
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focused exclusively on low-income neighborhoods.  One study (Immergluck and Smith 
2006b) that measured the impact of foreclosures on crime argued that in low-income 
areas a sizable number of foreclosures are expected to leave buildings vacant for an 
extended period of time.  In fact, they argued that neighborhood crime was affected 
through this “long-term vacancy and abandonment” (p. 854).  The authors found that the 
foreclosure rate was a statistically significant predictor of violent crime, but not property 
crime (Immergluck and Smith 2006b).   
Furthermore, research (Skogan 1992) on abandoned structures (buildings and 
homes) presents an abundance of negative consequences that abandoned homes can 
have on the community.  Although less serious, they can harbor trash, animals, such as 
rats, and squatters.  Even more serious, however, abandoned homes can be a safe 
haven for criminals.  They can be places to buy and sale illegal drugs or a hangout for 
predators in the area.  Just as important, homes that are abandoned can lead to 
vandalism and the stealing of building components, such as wiring.  The author finally 
concluded that abandoned and boarded up structures can indirectly reduce collective 
concern of neighborhood crime among neighborhood residents (Skogan 1992).   
With this increased concern of foreclosures and crime, an entire issue of 
Geography & Public Safety (2008) was dedicated to this matter.  A handful of articles 
was published that discussed this phenomenon in greater detail.  Wilson and Paulsen 
claim that foreclosures are in “middle-class or revitalized neighborhoods that were 
fueled by the housing boom of the last decade and not in socially disorganized or 
otherwise destitute neighborhoods” (2008:1).  Also, another study from North Carolina 
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reported that entire neighborhoods were starting to show signs of blight and disorder, 
resembling inner-city disadvantaged neighborhoods (Bess 2008).  These 
neighborhoods are faced with crimes such as vagrancy, drugs, arson, vandalism, theft, 
and prostitution (Wilson and Paulsen 2008).  Furthermore, there has been an increase 
in juvenile delinquency because vacant houses attract juveniles as a welcoming 
hangout.  Just as important, violent crime and property crime have increased since the 
foreclosure rates have increased (Bess 2008).  Foreclosures not only affect those who 
are displaced, but also the residing residents because of a decrease in property values 
as well as an increase in pubic disorder and crime (Brown 2008).  With that said, 
residents who still reside in these abandoned neighborhoods have an increased risk of 
robbery and burglary (Wilson and Paulsen 2008); thus, these findings demonstrate the 
impact that foreclosures have on everyone in the community.   
Despite an entire issue being devoted to discuss the problematic correlation 
between foreclosures and crime, none of the articles utilized social disorganization 
theory.  In fact, the only theory used to explain the correlation between foreclosures and 
crime is Wilson and Kelling’s broken windows theory (1982).  Broken windows theory 
argues that physical and social disorder in a neighborhood is a precursor to crime.  
Although physical and social disorder can indeed lead to crime, they leave out an 
important factor that can either increase or decrease crime in neighborhoods with 
disorder – informal social controls and social cohesion/ties.  Strong informal social 
controls and social cohesion and/or ties within a neighborhood can help deter crime, 
while having weak informal controls and social cohesion and/or ties can foster crime in 
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a neighborhood (Sampson 1987; Sampson and Groves 1989; Bursik and Grasmick 
1993a).   
Social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay 1942) fills in this gap of research 
on disorganized neighborhoods, and prior research has found that vacant houses do in 
fact increase crime (Boyle and Hassett-Walker 2008).  What’s more, prior research 
argues that not all socially disorganized neighborhoods are the same (Kingston et al. 
2009) and perhaps different structural characteristics impact various neighborhoods in 
different ways.  So, different structural characteristics might be important to incorporate 
in studying diverse areas that are thought to be socially disorganized.  Foreclosures 
should undoubtedly be used as an indicator of residential instability/mobility, and 
subsequently indicate how a neighborhood is socially disorganized.  Also, different 
neighborhoods might tolerate or react to different levels of crime and disorder.  Those 
who impose social order in poor neighborhoods could be substantively different in more 
affluent neighborhoods (Capowich 2003).  Consequently, research that tests social 
disorganization theory should include additional indicators of disorganization, such as 
foreclosures, and also look at diverse neighborhoods’, such as those with middle- and 
upper-income households.   
Therefore, the purpose of the following study is to fill a void in the research on 
social disorganization theory by incorporating middle- and upper-income neighborhoods 
into the analysis, rather than looking only at lower-income neighborhoods.  As 
presented above, with the increase in foreclosures, houses are being left vacant, and 
neighborhoods are showing signs of disorder and decay, with increases in criminal and 
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delinquent behavior.  The following chapter presents the methodology of the current 
study on social disorganization and foreclosures.  Using a multi-stage process of data 
collection – geographical mapping and unobtrusive field observations – I locate the 
neighborhoods of interest as well as measure neighborhood collective efficacy by 
conducting canvasses within the neighborhoods to locate indicators of social 
disorganization.      
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
  
 
 
Most of the research on social disorganization has focused on extreme acts of 
delinquency and crime.  Many researchers measure violent crimes in socially 
disadvantaged neighborhoods (Oh 2005; Kingston et al. 2009).  These neighborhoods 
often are characterized by high rates of poverty, racial and ethnic heterogeneity, and 
female-headed households.  In addition, violent crimes are commonly defined as 
homicide, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery.  This approach to measuring crime is 
typical because in neighborhoods with high poverty rates violent crime is also more 
common (Sampson et al. 1997).  However, violent crimes are not that common in 
middle- to upper-income level neighborhoods.  In my analysis, I focus on crimes 
commonly found in middle- and upper- income areas.  These crimes involve property 
crimes, such as residential burglary, which have been identified as being criminal acts 
that typically occur in areas with foreclosures.    
In my research, I compare the association between physical disorder (i.e. vacant, 
foreclosed homes) and crime in Orange County suburbs.  Suburbs have been defined in 
many different ways.  Yet, a basic definition that attempts to encompass various 
definitions of suburbs states that suburbs are a “residential environment on the outskirts 
of larger cities, occupied primarily by families of similar class and race, with plenty of 
trees and grass” (Nicolaides and Wiese 2006:7).  The theory of social disorganization 
argues that residential mobility increases crime, and thus with permanent residential 
mobility (i.e., residents moving out of neighborhoods and no one moving back in for 
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extended periods of time), the likelihood of crime in these areas would increase.  There 
are fewer residents present in neighborhoods with high foreclosures, hence fewer 
people to exhibit informal social control.  These expectations are supported by Skogan 
(1992) and Boyle and Hassett-Walker (2008) who found that vacant houses significantly 
increase the chance of disorder and crime.  It is also difficult to form social ties in 
neighborhoods with high turnover rates or in situations where vacant houses surround 
current residents.  
Wilson and Paulsen (2008:1) argued that recent foreclosure trends are in 
“middle-class or revitalized neighborhoods that were fueled by the housing boom of the 
last decade and not in socially disorganized or otherwise destitute neighborhoods.”  As 
such, it is important to ascertain if social disorganization and patterns of crime impacts 
suburban neighborhoods.  A study that looked at foreclosures in Charlotte, North 
Carolina reported that entire neighborhoods were starting to show signs of blight and 
disorder, resembling inner-city disadvantaged neighborhoods (Bess 2008).  These 
neighborhoods are faced with crimes such as vagrancy, drugs, arson, vandalism, theft, 
and prostitution (Wilson and Paulsen 2008).  Because past research has found a 
significant increase in foreclosures in middle- and upper-income areas, it is important to 
understand if social disorganization can in fact occur in these neighborhoods in patterns 
that parallel extant research for low-income neighborhoods.  However, many of the 
structural factors commonly used to measure social disorganization in the past are not 
necessarily relevant to understanding the effect foreclosures have on crime in middle- 
and upper-income level neighborhoods.  Therefore, a comparison of middle- and upper-
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income neighborhoods with higher rates of foreclosures is important for law 
enforcement and it can offer important policy implications in handling foreclosures, 
crime, and possibly even lending practices as well.   
Past researchers have argued that higher rates of residential mobility inhibit the 
formation of social networks and reduce community ties among neighbors (Kingston et 
al. 2009).  These social ties are what Bursik and Grasmick (1993a) refer to as informal 
ties or the private and parochial systems of social order.  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the private system is based on intimate, informal groups, such as the family, 
while the parochial system of control is maintained through acquaintances and ties to 
local institutions, such as churches, schools, and stores (Bursik and Grasmick 1993a).  
This approach, using informal ties from the private and parochial systems as a 
measurement of collective efficacy, is the most common form of measurement found in 
previous research.  Even more, taking from Newman’s (1972) theory of defensible 
space, researchers have not measured collective efficacy using the physical 
characteristics of a neighborhood, such as a gated neighborhood, a neighborhood with 
a homeowner’s association (HOA), and a neighborhood with fenced yards.  
Nonetheless, all of these characteristics have been shown to impact residents’ ability to 
shape social ties and therefore impact the levels of collective efficacy within a 
neighborhood.   
It is expected that residents within neighborhoods with certain physical 
characteristics (e.g., non-gated neighborhood, no HOA, no fencing, etc.) may feel less 
secure, and thus have less neighborhood collective efficacy because of weakened 
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social ties that typically bind neighborhood residents together as a community.  Also, a 
neighborhood could have a high rate of vacant, foreclosed homes, but if residents feel a 
sense of security and stronger social ties because of neighborhood characteristics, then 
crimes may not be a problem.  Yet, with a lack of strong indicators of neighborhood 
collective efficacy, criminal acts, such as property crimes, are expected to have 
increased in these high foreclosure areas.  However, it is expected that if a 
neighborhood has high foreclosures and strong indicators of collective efficacy, crime 
will be reduced in these neighborhoods, which has been found with previous research 
(Sampson 1997; Sampson et al. 1997; Morenoff et al. 2001).    
To fully understand the impact that foreclosures have on crime in Orange 
County, I used a dual-stage method of data collection.  First I mapped foreclosures and 
crime using geographical information systems software to identify specific 
neighborhoods.  Then, I conducted field observations by canvassing neighborhoods that 
had both high rates of foreclosures and crime, as well as high rates of foreclosures but 
low rates of crime, to visually document levels of disorder within these neighborhoods.  
Skogan (1992) used this method in studying physical and social disorder to provide a 
deeper insight and understanding of neighborhood decay.  This part of the data 
collection method is used to tap into the collective efficacy of these neighborhoods – it is 
expected that neighborhoods with high foreclosures and high crime will have fewer 
indicators of neighborhood collective efficacy than neighborhoods with high foreclosures 
and low crime.   
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The data for my research were collected in the fall, spring, and summer 
semesters of 2010-2011.  In order to perform the first step of data collection, the 
mapping method, there was a two-step process of gathering the information I needed to 
analyze foreclosures and crime in Orange County, Florida.  First, I obtained crime data 
for residential units from Orange County Sheriff’s Office’s crime analysis unit.  
According to the crime analyst supervisor for Orange County Sheriff’s Office, Sheena 
Lovette, a common crime occurring in areas with foreclosures is residential burglary.  
Burglary is defined by the Uniform Crime Report as the “unlawful entry of a structure to 
commit a felony or theft,” including residential and commercial properties.  Residential 
burglary refers to housing structures, such as single-family residences, duplexes, and 
multifamily residences (Clontz n.d.).   I obtained addresses of residential burglary data 
from January 31, 2005 to December 31, 2009 (separated by year) that was responded 
to by Orange County Sheriff’s Office.  Since I used Orange County data only, any 
neighborhoods that lie outside of Orange County Sheriff’s Office’s jurisdiction are not 
included in my final sample.  
The second step of data collection obtained foreclosures information.  To gather 
foreclosure information for my research, I analyzed foreclosed homes in Orange 
County, Florida.  The term foreclosure is very broad and often loosely applied.  In fact, it 
can be exceptionally difficult to identify which properties are at risk of, or actually in 
foreclosure, sold in foreclosure auctions, or real estate owned (REO) (Newman 2010).  
Research has used various categories of foreclosures, such as defaults and pre-
foreclosures.  In my analysis, however, I used the real estate owned (REO) addresses 
59 
to examine the relationship between foreclosures and residential burglary in Orange 
County.  Using REO addresses provides a stronger data set because these are homes 
that have gone through the entire foreclosure process.  For instance, research that uses 
defaults or pre-foreclosures might not be as accurate of a measure because defaults 
and pre-foreclosures could be reinstated and therefore not actually resulting in a 
foreclosure.  So, using REO addresses provides the most accurate, and valid measure.  
 To obtain the REO addresses, I requested the assistance of the Orlando 
Regional Realtor Association.  The statistician for the association, Mike Blinn, assisted 
me in locating foreclosed addresses of homes that went into REO status.  The 
association uses a program called MLXchange, which offers listings for realtors to 
locate and track homes for sale for clients.  A search was conducted to locate 
addresses in Orange County that were listed as “sold,” “pending,” “withdrawn,” “active,” 
and “expired” as REO homes, ranging from the dates of January 1, 2005 to December 
31, 2009.  The data offers information such as the address, the city, the list price (and 
sold price if home was sold), the property style (condominium, townhouse, single family 
home, duplex, and manufactured/mobile home), the year the home was listed, as well 
as other information regarding the property.   
After gathering the relevant information (e.g., addresses) on residential burglary 
and foreclosures in Orange County, Florida, the data was mapped using geographical 
information systems software, ArcGIS, produced by ESRI.  Using boundary lines of 
neighborhoods obtained from the Orange County Property Appraisers Office, I 
determined in which neighborhoods residential burglaries and foreclosures were 
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concentrated.  I have five years (2005-2009) of data on foreclosures and residential 
burglary to map the trends and changes, if any at all, on the location of crimes and 
foreclosures within the various neighborhoods.  During the years of interest for my 
research, the year 2005 is when foreclosures were low, and the year 2009 is when the 
foreclosures were at their highest.  Thus, mapping the five different years offered a 
visual understanding of the changes in location of residential burglaries and 
foreclosures.  
Because I am interested in the examining neighborhoods with high foreclosures 
and high residential burglaries compared to neighborhoods with high foreclosures and 
low residential burglaries, I located which census tracts are either middle- or upper-
income areas with high foreclosures.  I determined the income level of the census tracts 
using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) for the years 2005-2009.  The 
ASC has data for each tract’s median household income in dollars.  To determine 
whether the tract is considered low-, moderate-, middle-, or upper-income, I used the 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) information to determine 
what income amount coincides with a tracts income level.  I used the Orange County 
Property Appraiser’s neighborhood information to locate the number of households in 
each neighborhood to determine foreclosure and residential burglary rates in each 
neighborhood.  This allowed me to compare the neighborhoods, which all vary in size, 
to each other.  In total, the FFIEC Census data revealed 193 tracts in Orange County, 
Florida.  The number of homes that occupy a specific tract in Orange County ranged 
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from a low of 22 homes, to as many as 5099 homes.  The population also varied from 
48 to almost 25,000 residents per tract.   
 Finally, I conducted in-depth, unobtrusive field observations to gather data for the 
second stage of collection.  This data collection process was used by Skogan (1992) 
and proved to offer findings that other methods could not.  Also, Taylor et al. (1984) 
canvassed neighborhoods to take photographs and written documentation about the 
physical characteristics of neighborhoods and their ability to form social ties and reduce 
crime.  My research used similar methods and conducted field observations by 
canvassing areas that were found to have high foreclosures and high residential 
burglaries, as well as those with high foreclosures and low residential burglaries.  My 
canvasses were conducted on two separate days, one a weekday and the other a 
weekend, to identify the different levels of activity on a ‘work/school’ day and an ‘off’ 
day.  My canvasses only took place during the day however, and thus could be a 
limitation because I am not able to measure activity within the neighborhoods in the late 
afternoon or evening time when people are off work.  
 Initially I canvassed the actual neighborhood (see Appendix B) to document 
certain characteristics of the neighborhood that can affect social ties among residents.  
For instance, a sense of neighborhood security can increase if the neighborhood’s 
entrance is gated and if there is a HOA present, which has an effect on social ties 
among residents.  Also, neighborhood activity, such as being outside, walking down the 
streets, children playing, etc., can also indicate whether neighbors feel safe to be 
outside and active.  These characteristics were used as indicators of collective efficacy.  
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Characteristics of the neighborhoods, as well as the condition of homes, both vacant 
and occupied, and any signs of disorder, were also documented in detail.   
 Moreover, because of the importance expressed by social disorganization 
researchers such as Bursik and Grasmick (1993a) on parochial systems of social 
control, observing and documenting the surrounding areas of the neighborhoods is 
imperative (see Appendix C).  Local institutions, commercial businesses, and leisure 
outlets that are available to residents can increase interaction and ties among residents.  
Visual observations focused on various physical characteristics such as the presence of 
stores and what types of stores, the presence of community churches, presence of 
parks, as well as schools around the neighborhood.  The condition of these institutions 
was also documented.  Physical activity surrounding the neighborhood was also 
documented.  Physical activity included foot and bike traffic on sidewalks, vehicle traffic 
on the roads near the neighborhood, and activity at local parks.  High levels of 
involvement outside of the home and in the surrounding area indicate that residents feel 
more secure, and thus have stronger social ties.  Thus, these characteristics are also 
used as indicators of collective efficacy. 
 The neighborhoods that were canvassed and documented were identified from 
the ArcGIS mapping results.  As previously mentioned, the definition of what constitutes 
“high” and “low” residential burglaries relies on the results of the mapping method.  
Therefore, the mapping results serve as a sampling method to locate the 
neighborhoods of interest.  My field observations provided a visual representation of the 
condition of the neighborhoods and an understanding of the neighborhood’s collective 
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efficacy measured by specific indicators.  I am interested in finding out why 
neighborhoods that are characterized by high foreclosures can differ on having low or 
high residential burglary rates.  As social disorganization theory suggests, 
neighborhoods with high foreclosures should also have high crime (e.g., residential 
burglary), but why do areas with high foreclosures have low residential burglary?  The 
idea of neighborhood collective efficacy, measured by field observations of the 
neighborhoods of interest and the physical structure characteristics surrounding these 
neighborhoods, should give insight into this phenomenon.   
In this chapter, I outlined the methods used to examine the relationship between 
residential burglary and foreclosures using the premise of social disorganization theory.  
My research occurs in stages that are ultimately combined to get a full picture of the 
relationship between residential burglaries and foreclosures.  As indicated previously, 
the first stage was mapping the residential burglaries and foreclosures to locate the 
neighborhoods characterized by high foreclosures and high residential burglaries, and 
expected anomalies, such as neighborhoods with high foreclosures but low residential 
burglaries.  Secondly, I conducted drive-bys and canvassed these different 
neighborhoods with foreclosed residences, using the guide of a checklist and taking 
field notes.  I also examined the immediate surroundings of the neighborhoods to 
document the availability of community involvement and any physical activity that could 
demonstrate a higher level of collective efficacy.  My field observations provide a more 
in-depth analysis for my research.  Ultimately, I am exploring whether there is an 
increase in residential burglary as foreclosures, a characteristic of social disorganization 
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theory, also increase.  In addition, I am investigating whether neighborhoods with high 
foreclosures and high residential burglaries have less collective efficacy as measured 
by physical and social indicators, compared to neighborhoods with high foreclosures but 
low residential burglaries.  In the following chapters I provide an overview of 
foreclosures and residential burglaries in Orange County for the years 2005-2009, 
present selected notes from my field research, and discuss the findings of my research.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS 
 
 
 
 As stated previously, my research is seeking to explore whether social 
disorganization theory, as measured by foreclosures, can explain residential burglaries 
in middle- and upper-income neighborhoods in Orange County, Florida.  Therefore, I 
had to locate neighborhoods with high foreclosure for 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 
2009, and also had to find their residential burglary count for the given years.  I defined 
the neighborhoods based on the Orange County Property Appraisers Office definition 
and received the boundary lines for mapping the neighborhoods from the appraisers 
office as well. I then mapped the addresses to locate neighborhoods by foreclosures 
and crime.  The foreclosure neighborhoods are presented in Figures 1-5, while the 
residential burglary neighborhoods are presented in Figures 6-10, using ArcGIS 
mapping.  A major argument of my research is that as foreclosures increased between 
2005-2009, which is an indicator that these neighborhoods are socially disorganized, 
then the crime, measured by residential burglary, within these neighborhoods should 
also increase.   
 First, I recorded the neighborhoods with a total foreclosure of 8 or more for the 
last year, 2009.  The foreclosure count for 2009 ranged from 0 to 108.  I decided to 
have a cutoff point of 8 foreclosures because of the distribution of foreclosures within 
the neighborhoods.  As the foreclosures went below 8, the number of neighborhoods 
increased dramatically and the majority of the neighborhoods had less than 8 
foreclosures.  
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Figure 1: Foreclosure Neighborhoods by Count, 2005 
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Figure 2: Foreclosures Neighborhoods by Count, 2006 
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Figure 3: Foreclosure Neighborhoods by Count, 2007 
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Figure 4: Foreclosure Neighborhoods by Count, 2008 
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Figure 5: Foreclosure Neighborhoods by Count, 2009 
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Figure 6: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2005 
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Figure 7: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2006 
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Figure 8: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2007 
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Figure 9: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2008 
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Figure 10: Residential Burglary Neighborhoods by Count, 2009
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Therefore, the foreclosure data had a positively skewed distribution of foreclosures.  
The cutoff point then was decided by the tail end of the distribution.  Moreover, some of 
the neighborhoods with foreclosures ranging from 8-108 for 2009 had a total residential 
burglary count for years 2005-2009 of 0.  It is important to remember that my data is 
limited to Orange County and not other police agencies.  As a result, any 
neighborhoods with a residential burglary count of 0 for all years were once again not 
included in the final sample. 
Foreclosures and Residential Burglary in 2005-2009 
 
 Table 1 shows the results of the change in neighborhoods during 2005-2009.  
The neighborhoods are in order of highest foreclosure count for 2009.  The table is of 
the descriptive statistics for foreclosures and residential burglary in neighborhoods with 
more than 8 foreclosures.  With that said, the main purpose for analysis of this section is 
to see whether the neighborhoods with an increase in foreclosures in 2005-2009 also 
increase in residential burglary.  All of the foreclosures are increasing with every year, 
but it is the residential burglary count that fluctuates. Some of these neighborhoods did 
in fact support social disorganization theory.  However, many did not, with either 
remaining stable in residential burglaries, having just a slight fluctuation, or some even 
decreasing in residential burglaries as foreclosures increased.  Yet, these 
neighborhoods are still of interest for the neighborhood field observation step of the 
research because perhaps these neighborhoods maintained low counts of residential 
burglary because they had higher collective efficacy. 
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Table 1: Foreclosures and Residential Burglary Counts, 2005-2009 
 
 
    
 
 
Foreclosures 
        
     Crime 
         
Neighborhood Income  ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09  ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
Hawthorne Village 
Condos 
MI 
 
0 0 0 9 78 
 
18 3 7 28 13 
Sanctuary at Bay  
Hill Condos 
U 
 
0 0 0 6 54 
 
5 0 4 3 8 
Audubon Villas at 
Hunters Creek Con. 
U 
 
0 0 1 3 42 
 
5 2 6 3 4 
Summerport 
PH 5 
U 
 
0 0 1 10 41 
 
0 2 2 1 2 
Villanova at Hunters 
Creek Condos 
U 
 
0 0 5 26 41 
 
2 2 3 5 2 
Sand Lake Private 
Residences Condos 
U 
 
0 0 2 20 40 
 
4 4 5 12 6 
Palms Villa Residences 
Condos 
MI 
 
0 0 0 9 38 
 
6 2 0 0 2 
Crest at Waterford 
Lakes Condos 
U 
 
0 0 1 10 37 
 
0 6 2 2 16 
Capri at Hunters Creek 
Condos 
U 
 
0 0 1 2 36 
 
1 2 3 4 4 
Plantation Park Private 
Residences 
MI 
 
0 0 0 1 31 
 
3 8 0 2 2 
Bella Terra  
Condos 
MI 
 
0 0 4 11 31 
 
6 6 0 2 1 
Orangewood  
NBHD 2 
MI 
 
0 0 0 5 31 
 
20 11 8 10 24 
Los  
Terranos 
MI 
 
0 0 0 2 27 
 
0 2 0 2 1 
Eagle Creek  
PH 1 A 
U 
 
0 0 2 6 27 
 
3 3 7 5 4 
Sandhill  
Preserve 
MI 
 
0 0 1 15 26 
 
3 2 3 5 2 
Waterford Trail PH 2 
East Village 
U 
 
0 0 0 10 23 
 
0 4 5 3 7 
La Cascada  
PH 1 
MI 
 
0 0 1 7 20 
 
1 5 4 9 4 
Spring Isle  
UT 1 
U 
 
0 0 0 3 19 
 
0 1 3 2 2 
Wyndham Lakes ESTS 
UT 1 
MI 
 
0 0 0 7 19 
 
0 2 5 14 15 
Cedar Bend at Meadow 
Woods PH1 
MI 
 
0 0 0 9 18 
 
5 2 5 3 4 
Island Cove Villas  
PH 3 
MI 
 
0 0 1 8 18 
 
4 5 4 1 1 
Signature Lakes – 
Parcel 1 C 
U 
 
0 0 1 2 18 
 
0 3 2 3 3 
Mirabella 
Condos 
MI 
 
0 0 0 1 17 
 
2 10 1 5 2 
              
78 
 
 
    
 
 
Foreclosures 
        
     Crime 
         
Neighborhood Income  ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09  ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
Windrose at 
Southmeadow UT 2 
MI 
 
0 0 1 2 17 
 
0 2 3 1 5 
Lakes of Windermere 
PH 2A 
MI 
 
0 0 0 5 17 
 
0 0 0 3 0 
Parkview Village  
Condos 
U 
 
0 0 0 2 16 
 
1 2 2 7 13 
Heather Glen at 
Meadow Woods 
MI 
 
0 0 0 9 15 
 
2 4 4 12 7 
Sandpoint at Meadow 
Woods 
MI 
 
0 0 4 9 15  2 4 3 8 7 
Island 
Walk 
MI 
 
0 0 0 8 13 
 
2 3 5 4 3 
Timber  
Isle 
U 
 
0 0 1 6 13 
 
2 2 3 3 3 
Huntcliff 
Park 
MI 
 
0 0 0 7 13 
 
3 1 2 3 5 
Avalon Lakes PH 3 
VLG(S) A & B 
U 
 
0 0 0 3 13 
 
0 2 5 6 2 
Timber Pointe  
PH 1 
U 
 
0 0 1 3 13 
 
0 0 1 0 1 
Stoneybook Hills  
UT 1 
U 
 
0 0 0 2 13 
 
0 3 2 1 3 
Londonderry Hills  
Sec 2 
MI 
 
0 1 0 3 13 
 
10 23 12 33 10 
Tudor Grove at Timber 
Springs 
U 
 
0 0 1 9 13 
 
1 2 1 1 2 
Moss Park  
Commons 
U 
 
0 0 0 0 12 
 
0 0 0 1 0 
Heritage Estates  
Condos 
U 
 
0 0 2 2 12 
 
0 1 1 1 5 
Sanctuary 
 
U 
 
0 0 0 3 11 
 
5 4 7 2 3 
Surrey  
Ridge 
MI 
 
0 0 0 4 11 
 
4 2 4 2 5 
Discovery Palms  
Condos 
MI 
 
0 2 2 6 11 
 
0 3 1 2 1 
Whisper Lakes  
UT 4 
U 
 
0 0 0 3 11 
 
0 0 0 1 0 
Cape ORL ESTS  
UT 4 
MI 
 
0 0 0 7 11 
 
5 4 7 7 4 
Lakes of Windermere 
PH 1 
MI 
 
0 0 1 7 11 
 
1 0 2 7 1 
Keystone 
Sub 
MI 
 
0 0 1 7 11 
 
3 5 0 2 3 
Meadow  
Creek 
MI 
 
0 0 0 3 10 
 
2 5 2 2 4 
Avalon Park  
Village 5 
U 
 
0 0 2 5 10 
 
1 2 0 3 4 
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Foreclosures 
        
     Crime 
         
Neighborhood Income  ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09  ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
Chatham Place at  
Arbor Meadows 
MI 
 
0 0 0 0 10 
 
0 0 1 2 4 
Las Palmas at Sand 
Lake Condos 
MI 
 
0 0 1 2 10 
 
6 1 14 4 4 
Quail Hollow at  
Rio Pinar 
MI 
 
0 0 0 2 10 
 
3 3 2 5 8 
Chickasaw  
Place 
MI 
 
0 0 0 0 10 
 
1 1 5 3 5 
Prosper Colony  
BLK E 
MI 
 
0 0 0 10 10 
 
5 8 5 15 10 
Beaconhill 
 
MI 
 
0 0 0 3 10 
 
5 6 10 10 11 
Cypress Lakes 
PH 1 
MI 
 
0 0 2 3 10 
 
0 0 0 1 1 
Islebrook 
Ph 1 
MI 
 
0 0 2 7 10 
 
1 6 4 0 15 
Island Cove Villas 
PH 2 
MI 
 
0 0 0 2 10 
 
0 1 1 3 3 
Waterford Trails 
PH 1 
U 
 
0 0 0 7 9 
 
3 2 2 6 6 
Robinson Hills  
UT 1 
MI 
 
0 0 1 3 9 
 
2 1 5 4 7 
Heritage Bay 
PH 2 
U 
 
0 0 0 3 9 
 
0 0 1 1 0 
Avalon Park 
Village 3 
U 
 
0 0 0 2 9 
 
1 1 1 2 1 
Signature Lakes 
Parcel 1A 
U 
 
0 0 0 4 9 
 
0 1 0 4 1 
Silver Ridge 
PH 2 
MI 
 
0 0 1 3 9 
 
12 12 13 12 15 
La Cascada  
PH 1C 
MI 
 
0 0 0 2 9 
 
0 1 5 5 3 
Avalon Park South 
PH 1 
U 
 
0 0 1 2 9 
 
0 0 1 0 2 
Meadow Woods  
Village 10 
MI 
 
0 0 0 2 9 
 
1 2 1 5 3 
Heritage Bay Dr 
Phillips FL 
U 
 
0 0 0 2 9 
 
1 0 0 0 0 
Frisco Bay 
UT 1 
U 
 
0 0 0 0 9 
 
2 3 2 2 1 
Avalon Park South 
PH 3 
U 
 
0 0 0 4 9 
 
2 0 1 2 4 
Creekside Villas at  
Meadow Woods 
MI 
 
0 0 0 2 9 
 
1 0 7 1 5 
Hunters Creek 
TR 525 
MI 
 
0 0 1 4 9 
 
1 0 2 2 0 
Plaza De Las 
Fuentes Condos 
MI 
 
2 0 0 0 9 
 
0 0 1 2 0 
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Foreclosures 
        
     Crime 
         
Neighborhood Income  ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09  ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 
Lakes of Windermere 
Peachtree 
MI 
 
0 0 3 4 9 
 
0 0 1 1 1 
Rosewood 
UT 1 
MI 
 
0 0 0 0 9 
 
0 0 1 10 12 
Stonebridge 
PH 1 
MI 
 
0 0 0 0 9 
 
1 6 9 11 4 
Sky Lake South 
UT 3 
MI 
 
0 0 0 2 9 
 
0 1 2 0 3 
Avalon Park 
Village 6 
U 
 
0 0 1 2 9 
 
1 2 1 0 4 
Green Briar 
Village 
MI 
 
0 0 0 1 8 
 
1 1 2 2 2 
Sky Lake South 
UT 1 
MI  
 
0 0 0 0 8 
 
3 4 3 5 7 
Newbury  
Park 
MI 
 
0 0 0 3 8 
 
0 2 1 0 2 
Reserve at Pershing  
Oaks Condos 
MI 
 
0 0 0 0 8 
 
1 2 0 2 0 
Beacon Park 
PH 2 
MI 
 
0 0 0 2 8 
 
0 0 7 3 2 
Avalon Park South 
PH 2 
U 
 
0 0 2 6 8 
 
0 1 3 2 2 
Southchase PH 1B 
Village 1 & 3 
U 
 
0 0 0 3 8 
 
6 4 2 8 3 
Cedar Bend at  
Meadow Woods PH 2 
MI 
 
0 0 2 2 8 
 
0 3 4 2 0 
 
 
 
As Table 1 indicates, some of the increases in residential burglaries within these 
neighborhoods coincide clearly with the increase in foreclosures.  For example, the 
neighborhood titled Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos had a residential burglary count 
for 2005-2009 of 0, 6, 2, 2, and 16, while the foreclosures in this neighborhood went 
from 0, 0, 1, 10, and 37 for the same years.  Thus, there was a drastic increase in both 
foreclosures and residential burglaries for 2009.  Another example is Parkview Village 
Condos.  The residential burglary count for residential burglaries significantly increased 
in 2009 while the foreclosure count also increased (2005-2009 residential burglary 
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count: 1, 2, 2, 7, and 13; foreclosure count: 0, 0, 0, 2, and 16).  Yet, not all of the 
neighborhoods with an increase in residential burglaries that also coincided with an 
increase in foreclosures were such a drastic change.  For instance, Windrose at 
Southmeadow UT 2 increased in residential burglary count for 2005-2009 from 0, 2, 3, 
1, to 5, while the foreclosures in this neighborhood for those years went from 0, 0, 1, 2, 
to 17.  As a result, there was not a sizeable increase in 2009 for residential burglary 
even though the foreclosures increased considerably, but the increase in residential 
burglary was still very apparent. 
However, just because there was an increase in residential burglary, it is difficult 
to directly attribute it to the increase in foreclosures.  Some of the neighborhoods had a 
high residential burglary count in the early years, but then decreased in the middle, and 
ultimately increased in the latter years around 2009; yet, foreclosures only increased in 
the latter years.  For instance, Orangewood NBHD 2 had a large fluctuation in 
residential burglary count; from 2005-2009, the residential burglary count went from 20, 
11, 8, 10, and 24, while the foreclosure count for the respective years was 0, 0, 0, 5, 
and 31.  So, while it looks like the residential burglary count increased with the 
foreclosure count, the fact that 2005 had a residential burglary count of 20, but 0 
foreclosures, makes it questionable on whether residential burglaries in fact increased 
due to an increase in foreclosures.  Another example is the neighborhood titled 
Waterford Trail PH 2 East Village; the residential burglary count for this neighborhood 
for the years of 2005-2009 was 0, 4, 5, 3, and 7, while the foreclosure count for the 
same years was 0, 0, 0, 10, and 23.  The residential burglary count for 2009 did in fact 
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increase when foreclosures significantly increased in this neighborhood, yet the 
residential burglary count was higher in years 2006 and 2007 when there were 0 
foreclosures, and decreased slightly when foreclosures increased in 2008.    
 Just as important, many of the neighborhoods seemed to have maintained 
stability among the residential burglary count throughout the years of 2005-2009 while 
there was still an obvious increase in foreclosures.  As mentioned previously, it may be 
because the neighborhoods had higher collective efficacy and therefore were able to 
impose informal social controls among the residences, and outsiders, of these 
neighborhoods.  One of the most obvious neighborhoods that remained stable even 
though there was a substantial increase in foreclosures in 2009 was Summerport PH 5.  
As presented in Table 1, this neighborhood’s residential burglary count went from 0, 2, 
2, 1, and 2, while the foreclosures went from 0, 0, 1, 10, and 41 for the years of 2005-
2009.  Interestingly, although this neighborhood experienced a drastic increase in 
foreclosures in 2009, the residential burglary count remained stable (Note: This 
neighborhood’s characteristics are discussed later with the findings of the neighborhood 
canvassing).  Another neighborhood that displayed stability during an increase in 
foreclosures was Moss Park Commons.  In 2005-2009, the residential burglary count for 
this neighborhood went from 0, 0, 0, 1, to 0, while the neighborhood had 0 foreclosures 
for 2005-2008, and then it jumped to 12 in 2009.   
 Even more, while some neighborhoods seemed to maintain stability in residential 
burglaries, other neighborhoods actually appeared to have a slight decrease in 
residential burglary count, or a residential burglary count with an unusual pattern for the 
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years of 2005-2009.  For example, one neighborhood presented in Table 1, Sanctuary, 
had an unusual pattern of residential burglaries during the years of interest.  In fact, the 
residential burglary count fluctuated from 5 in 2005, 4 in 2006, increased to 7 in 2007, 
decreased to 2 in 2008, and slightly increased to 3 in 2009.  The foreclosures recorded 
in this neighborhood for 2005-2007 were 0, 3 in 2008, and 11 in 2009.  Therefore, while 
the foreclosures increased during the 5 years, the residential burglary count peaked in 
2007, when foreclosures were 0, but actually decreased in 2008 and 2009 when the 
foreclosures were increasing.  Additionally, Las Palmas at Sand Lake Condos had a 
more drastic change in residential burglary count.  The residential burglary count in this 
neighborhood was 6, 1, 14, 4, and 4, for 2005-2009, while the foreclosure count was 0 
in 2005 and 2006, 1 in 2007, 2 in 2008, and jumped to 10 in 2009.  Interestingly, when 
the residential burglary count was at its highest in 2007 (n=14), the foreclosure count 
was only at 1, and when the foreclosure count was at its highest in 2009 (n=10), the 
residential burglary count reduced significantly to only 4.  To gauge the level of 
collective efficacy and how it may have played a role in whether residential burglary 
increased, decreased, or remained stable in neighborhoods where foreclosures 
increased, the method of neighborhood canvassing was used to locate certain 
indicators of collective efficacy.  The following section presents the findings of some of 
the neighborhoods that were presented in Table 1.  
Neighborhood Canvassing 
 
 After compiling all foreclosures for the years 2005-2009, I located the 
neighborhoods with high foreclosures that were used to conduct the field observations.  
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These neighborhoods ranged from having 0 foreclosures to 136 foreclosures within the 
5-year span.  In fact, the majority of the neighborhoods in Orange County had 0 
foreclosures.  As the number of foreclosures increased per neighborhood, the amount 
of neighborhoods decreased, as one would expect.  The cut-off for what constituted 
high foreclosures was 20.  This amount of foreclosures was chosen as a cut-off point 
because there was a natural break in the data.  As the numbers in foreclosures 
decreased below 20, the amount of these neighborhoods drastically increased, once 
again forming a positively skewed distribution.  Therefore, the neighborhoods that fell at 
the tail end, or the extreme cases, were used for this part of the analysis.  Using a cut-
off of 20 total foreclosures for 2005-2009 produced a total of 52 neighborhoods within 
Orange County.   
 Although the initial analysis of neighborhoods with high foreclosure rendered a 
total of 52 different neighborhoods, the sample size further reduced because of other 
factors.  For instance, after locating these neighborhoods and then locating the total 
residential burglaries within these specific neighborhoods, 17 of the neighborhoods had 
a residential burglary count of 0.  As previously discussed, these neighborhoods were 
located outside of Orange County jurisdiction and therefore were dropped out of my 
analysis.  Furthermore, 4 other neighborhoods were not included in my final analysis 
because although they had 20 or more foreclosures, they were not located in middle- or 
upper-income tracts.  Lastly, one other neighborhood was also eliminated from the 
sample because actually locating the neighborhood posed many difficulties.  The 
neighborhood was located near SeaWorld and most of the area included in the 
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neighborhood was businesses and other tourist attractions.  In the end, the total number 
of neighborhoods used to conduct the field research portion of this research was 30 
(n=30).  After these 30 neighborhoods with high foreclosures were located, I then 
located the residential burglary within these neighborhoods by mapping them in ArcGIS.  
These results are presented in Figure 3. 
 The canvassing took place over the course of six days – four days of weekday 
field observations and two days of weekend observations.  It was important to visit the 
neighborhoods on a weekday and a weekend because the activity could be very 
different depending on work and school schedules.  The weekdays of neighborhood 
observations took place on May 12 (Thursday), May 13 (Friday), May 17 (Tuesday), and 
May 18 (Wednesday) in the year 2011.  The weekend drive-bys took place on June 4 
and June 18, both on Saturdays in 2011.  For the weekday neighborhood canvassing, 
the public school system for Orange County was still in session, and I feel that was 
important because the data could have been skewed if school was out for the summer 
session since there could have been more activity within the neighborhoods.  However, 
the same neighborhoods were also visited on a weekend day to observe the activity 
within the neighborhoods on a non-work/non-school day.  The average time spent 
canvassing each neighborhood ranged from 15-30 minutes, depending on the size of 
the neighborhood.  Once again, these neighborhoods all had high foreclosures (20 or 
more for the combined years of 2005-2009), but some had higher numbers of 
foreclosures while others had fewer.   
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Figure 11: Total Foreclosures and Residential Burglary by Count, 5 Years Combined
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The argument is that neighborhoods that have high foreclosures but less 
residential burglary will exhibit stronger indicators of collective efficacy because they are 
able to enforce informal social controls and maintain a sense of security (Morenoff et al. 
2001).  All of this was based on the condition, activity, and other attributes of the 
neighborhood.  My research located indicators of collective efficacy by conducting 
unobtrusive field observations, or neighborhood canvasses.  In particular, I focused on 
visible physical and social characteristics of neighborhoods as indicators of collective 
efficacy.  For example, some indicators were: was the neighborhood gated, was the 
perimeter fenced, was there an HOA or was it deed restricted?  I measured the amount 
of foot and vehicle activity as well as outside residential activity within the neighborhood.  
I also looked at the condition of homes, vacant, foreclosed, and occupied, as well as 
any other signs of disorder.   
 The following presents an overview of the thirty neighborhoods which were 
observed to locate indicators or characteristics of collective efficacy.  The original field 
notes were more explicit, but I am discussing the main components of the canvasses to 
offer snapshots of the neighborhoods to help the reader visualize the characteristics of 
the neighborhoods.  To do so, I combined the foreclosure and residential burglary rates 
for the years 2005-2009. Just as important, the rates presented for the following 
neighborhoods are per 100 homes, also making it a percentage of the total number of 
homes that was threatened by both foreclosures and residential burglaries.  The 
neighborhoods’ foreclosure and residential burglary rates are presented in Table 2.  A 
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more detailed table of the neighborhood canvasses is presented in the Appendix. Also, 
a map of the top 30 neighborhoods that were canvassed is presented in Figure 12. 
Table 2: Top 30 Neighborhoods’ Foreclosure and Residential Burglary Rates 
 
 Neighborhood 
Name 
Fore. 
Count 
R.B.* 
Count 
Tract/ 
Income 
Fore.  
Rate 
R.B.* 
Rate 
1 Hawthorne Village Condos 87 69 170.08/MI 23.8 18.9 
2 Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos 72 14 170.07/U 23.1 4.5 
3 Sand Lake Private Residences Condos 62 31 171.07/U 14.8 7.4 
4 Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos 60 20 148.13/U 19.7 6.6 
5 Summerport PH5 52 7 171.05/U 16.4 2.2 
6 Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos 48 31 167.19/U 17.3 11.2 
7 Palms Villa Residencecs Condos 47 12 170.08/MI 24.4 6.2 
8 Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos 46 20 170.07/U 13.0 5.7 
9 Bella Terra Condos 46 15 152.01/MI 12.7 4.2 
10 Sandhill Preserve 42 15 168.05/MI 28.0 10.0 
11 Capri at Hunters Creek Condos 39 14 170.07/U 15.6 5.6 
12 Eagle Creek PH 1A 35 22 167.04/U 7.3 4.6 
13 Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village 33 19 167.19/U 10.1 5.8 
14 Plantation Park Private Residences Con. 32 15 170.05/MI 9.9 4.6 
15 Los Terranos 29 5 ** 26.9 4.6 
16 Sandpoint at Meadow Woods 28 24 168.05/MI 20.6 17.6 
17 La Cascada PH 1 28 23 168.05/MI 13.9 11.4 
18 Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1 27 19 168.05/MI 15.8 11.1 
19 Island Cove Villas PH 3 27 15 168.05/MI 15.4 8.6 
20 Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1 26 36 168.05/MI 6.5 9.0 
21 Heather Glen at Meadow Woods 24 29 168.05/MI 13.3 16.1 
22 Tudor Grove at Timber Springs 23 7 167.19/U 17.4 5.3 
23 Spring Isle UT 1 22 8 167.19/U 7.3 2.7 
24 Lakes of Windermere PH 2A 22 3 171.03/U 10.7 1.5 
25 Island Walk 21 17 168.05/MI 11.1 8.9 
26 Discovery Palms Condos 21 7 170.05/MI 6.3 2.1 
27 Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C 21 7 171.05/U 6.5 2.2 
28 Timber Isle 20 13 167.19/U 10.5 6.8 
29 Huntcliff Park 20 14 168.05/MI 9.9 6.9 
30 Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2 20 11 168.05/MI 18.3 10.1 
       
 Rates are per 100 homes; also a % 
Table is in order of highest to lowest foreclosures 
 
 *Residential Burglary 
**135.06,135.07,167.11/MO/MI/MI 
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Figure 12: Map of Top 30 Neighborhoods
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Field Observations of the Thirty Neighborhoods 
 
Hawthorne Village Condos 
Foreclosure Rate: 23.8  
Residential Burglary Rate: 18.9 
 Hawthorne Village Condos lie in Census tract 170.08, which is considered a 
middle-income tract.  According to the American Community Survey (2005-2009), the 
racial/ethnic composition of the tract is as follows: 33.5 % white; 10% Black/African 
American; 46% Hispanic; and 7.8% Asian.  The neighborhood is located in a fairly busy 
area, near SeaWorld in Orlando.  The several roads nearby are heavily trafficked, with a 
newer shopping plaza nearby, and a Publix Shopping Center as the closest store.  
There is one entrance and exit into the condominium complex and it is gated, with 47 
separate buildings with approximately 365 individual condos.  Also, there is a Home 
Owners’ Association (HOA) for the complex, which is typical for condos, and it is 
responsible for lawn maintenance.  Therefore, the grass is not personally maintained by 
residents.  The perimeter of the neighborhood is partly fenced, and there are speed 
bumps located in the neighborhood.  The condos were in fairly good condition; they 
were older (built in 1985) but seemed to be well maintained.  Within the neighborhood 
there are two public pools, two tennis courts, and a small park/playground.  Moreover, 
as Table 1 indicates, Hawthorne Village Condos’ foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 
0, 0, 0, 9, and 78.  The residential burglary count for the same years was 18, 3, 7, 28, 
and 13, which indicates that while the neighborhood did show an increase in residential 
burglaries as foreclosures increased, residential burglaries actually decreased by 
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almost half in 2009 even though the foreclosures skyrocketed in the same year.  
Therefore, there is no support for the basic argument of social disorganization theory.   
Canvass 1 - May 13, 2011, 2:15 pm 
 Upon arrival at Hawthorne Village Condos, the entrance and exit gates were 
open.  In fact, it appeared that the gates continuously stay open, or at least during the 
day time.  The neighborhood was fairly quiet in activity, and the parking lot was about a 
quarter filled with cars; however, it was a weekday and residents were probably at work, 
school, or out for the day.  During the time spent canvassing the neighborhood, there 
were three vehicles going through the neighborhood, two people recorded as foot traffic, 
and one person who was outside.  Furthermore, as discussed above, the complex has 
two public pools, both of which were vacant during this canvass.  The two tennis courts 
and one park/playground were also vacant, once again supporting the finding that the 
neighborhood activity on this day was fairly minimal.  There were no visible signs 
indicating a ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ residence, but this can be difficult sometimes to 
measure in neighborhoods with condominiums because they did not normally display 
these signs in a yard like a single-family neighborhood would.  However, there were 
visible vacancies or foreclosures in the complex (n=3), which were identified by seeing 
empty condos through windows or lockboxes (which are placed on secured foreclosures 
by mortgage contracting companies).  Also, there were signs of some physical disorder 
within the neighborhood – blinds ripped, screens ripped or pulled out, and boarded 
windows (approximately three visible windows boarded).  In addition, even though the 
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premise is maintained by grounds keepers since it is an HOA community, compared to 
other neighborhoods and surrounding areas, the grass was overgrown at this canvass.    
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 1:00 pm 
 Upon second arrival at Hawthorne Village Condos, the entrance and exit gates 
were once again open.  This canvass took place on a Saturday, and the activity on this 
weekend increased slightly compared to the first canvass discussed above.  The 
parking lot was approximately half full of vehicles, and the car traffic within the 
neighborhood had a count of two.  The count of the foot traffic was five, and the count of 
people outside was three.  Despite this increase in activity, there was still no one 
located at the pools, the tennis courts, or the park/playground.   
 As both of the neighborhood canvasses illustrated, Hawthorne Village Condos 
did exhibit signs of physical disorder which is a strong indicator of a lower level of 
collective efficacy (Skogan 1992).  Even though the activity did increase in the 
neighborhood on the weekend, the activity was still fairly low, indicating lower social 
disorder (Woldoff 2002).  Also, the visible vacancies or foreclosures, the physical signs 
of disorder (boarded windows), the gates left open, the grass overgrown, the perimeter 
only partly fenced, and the surrounding heavily trafficked, busy area, are all strong 
indicators of an area exhibiting lower levels of collective efficacy.  Thus, the lower 
collective efficacy among this neighborhood could explain the relationship between the 
overall high foreclosure and high residential burglary rates compared to other 
neighborhoods.  
Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos 
Foreclosure Rate: 23.1 
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Residential Burglary Rate: 4.5 
 Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos is located within Census tract 170.07, which 
is an upper-income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 49.1% 
white; 9.5% Black/African American; 29.8% Hispanic; and 9.4% Asian.  This 
condominium complex is located within Hunters Creek, which is a fairly large 
neighborhood of other smaller neighborhoods, some being single-family neighborhoods 
while others are condos/townhomes, such as Villanova.  Hunters Creek in general, and 
Villanova in particular, is located within a fairly busy, reasonably new area. The area 
has newer shopping and plazas, with a Target Supermarket, a Publix, and an Office 
Depot located nearby.  Also, there are several golf courses located nearby, which 
seems to be common in Hunters Creek.  Sunchild Academy, a child care facility, is also 
located near the neighborhood.  There is a main entrance and exit located in the front of 
the neighborhood with two gates for entrance and exit of the neighborhood, and another 
gate located on the side of the neighborhood.   
 Villanova was built in 2001 with 26 separate buildings with multiple townhomes 
located in each.  Each building ranges from two to three stories.  In total there are 
slightly more than 300 individual condos/townhomes.  In addition, each townhome has 
its own personal garage.  There is a Home Owners’ Association for the neighborhood, 
which as mentioned earlier, is typical of condos/townhomes, and the HOA handles all 
maintenance and yard care.  Therefore the grounds are nicely kept and very eye-
appealing.  Even more, the entire perimeter of the neighborhood is fenced.  The 
neighborhood does not have a park or playground, or a tennis or basketball court 
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located on the premise; however, there is a community pool.  As Table 1 points out, the 
foreclosure count for Villanova in the years of 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 5, 26, and 41.  The 
residential burglary count for 2005-2009 was 2, 2, 3, 5, and 2.  For the most part, the 
residential burglary count remained fairly stable, with a small decrease between 2008 
and 2009; yet, the foreclosure count increased considerably in 2008 and then again in 
2009.  Therefore, it does not appear that residential burglaries in this neighborhood 
were hugely affected by the large increase in foreclosures.  
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 2:00 pm 
 Upon arriving at Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos, the main entrance and exit 
gates mentioned above were open.  The neighborhood’s side gate, however, was 
closed.  The neighborhood was somewhat quiet with approximately a half full parking 
lot, as would be expected on a weekday since people are typically either at work, 
school, or out-and-about in the afternoon.  While conducting the observations and 
canvass of the neighborhood, I counted four vehicles either coming or going within the 
neighborhood, three people outside walking (either to/from car, or on sidewalk), and one 
person located directly outside of a condos.  There were no people located at the pool 
within the neighborhood.   
 Furthermore, there were no visible ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs, but as 
mentioned in the discussion on Hawthorne Village Condos, this can be difficult 
sometimes because condos and/or townhomes do not always display these signs, such 
as in a front yard, as a residential neighborhood would.  Just as important, during the 
course of the canvass, I could not visibly see any signs of foreclosures or vacancies.  
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However, because the neighborhood is HOA maintained, as well as being a 
condos/townhome, the grounds maintenance workers obviously take very good care of 
the neighborhood.  Specifically, they maintain the grounds (grass, shrubs), and 
therefore identifying a foreclosure or vacancy by that measurement is difficult.  With that 
said, they do a very good job of keeping the grounds in order because the 
neighborhood undoubtedly has foreclosures (total rate for 2005-2009 was 23.1, fifth 
largest), but visibly seeing these was nearly impossible.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 12:30 pm 
 During the second canvass, which took place on a Saturday, there were 
approximately five walkers and bikers located directly outside of the neighborhood on 
the sidewalk.  During the first canvass, the front gates were open; however, upon 
arriving the second time, both main gates were closed.  I gained access by following 
another vehicle in.  Just as interesting, the side gate, which was closed for the first 
canvass, was not open.  The parking lot had about the same amount of vehicles, or 
perhaps even fewer vehicles present.  The vehicle traffic counted though was seven on 
this canvass, as compared to four on the first canvass.  Therefore, there was a slight 
increase in vehicle activity on the weekend canvass.  The foot traffic count though was 
only one on this visit (it was three on the weekday canvass), while the number of people 
located outside of the housing remained constant at one.  There was other activity on 
this day, with movers and a moving truck parked within the neighborhood.  The pool 
was in fact occupied during this canvass with three people.  Finally, there was 
neighborhood security present driving in a golf cart. 
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 The results from both of the canvasses, coupled with the foreclosure and 
residential burglary rates for 2005-2009, presented some interesting findings in regard 
to Villanova’s level of collective efficacy and social disorganization.  Even though the 
neighborhood has the fifth highest rate in foreclosures for all years, there are certain 
characteristics of the neighborhood that can help explain why the residential burglary 
rate was considerably lower.  Although the activity within the neighborhood was not 
relatively high compared to other neighborhoods, there was a moderate level of activity.  
Also, the neighborhood was fully fenced, located in an upper-income, newer built area, 
had an obvious presence of a security guard, and did in fact close the entrance and exit 
gates, as opposed to leaving them open all the time.  So, there appears to be support 
for the defensible space theory (Newman 1972) with the perimeter being fenced and the 
gates closed much of the time.  Also, since the neighborhood is clustered closely 
together with townhomes also supports Newman’s theory of defensible space.  In 
addition, an increased feeling of collective efficacy among the residents could result 
because of the presence of a security guard.  These physical and social characteristics 
are strong indicators of collective efficacy which can help explain the lower residential 
burglary rate in the neighborhood.   
Sand Lake Private Residences Condos 
Foreclosures Rate: 14.8 
Residential Burglary Rate: 7.4 
 Sand Lake Private Residences Condos lie in Census tract 171.07, which is an 
upper-income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this neighborhood is as follows: 
69.9% white; 2.8% Black/African American; 10.9% Hispanic; and 13.5% Asian.  The 
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neighborhood is close to a busy interstate, I4, near the Dr. Phillips area, a higher 
income, and more affluent suburb.  There is a Wal-Mart Supercenter nearby, which 
appears to be one of the main shopping areas for the neighborhood.  There is one 
entrance and/or exit for the neighborhood, and it is gated. The neighborhood is 
comprised of 16 separate, three story buildings with slightly more than 400 total condos.  
The neighborhood has a club house/office located near the front of the neighborhood.  
Similar to the two previous neighborhoods, there is also a HOA that is responsible for 
maintaining the grounds, such as lawn care, and therefore they are nicely kept and 
none of the residents are responsible for the yard maintenance.  The condos, although 
built in 1994, were well kept, in a somewhat secluded, wooded area off of the main 
road.  All of the porches attached to each condo were screened in.   
 The perimeter of the neighborhood is partly fenced with a wooded area and 
water surrounding other parts of the neighborhood.  The entire neighborhood is fairly 
large and spread out.  There is a pool, tennis and basketball court, and park/playground 
located within the neighborhood.  According to Table 1, Sand Lake Private Residences 
had a foreclosure count of 0, 0, 2, 20, and 40 for the years of 2005-2009, and a 
residential burglary count of 4, 4, 5, 12, and 6 for the same years.  So, there does 
appear to be an increase in residential burglaries as foreclosures increase, with a 
drastic increase in 2008, but then residential burglaries actually decreases in 2009, 
although the foreclosures in the neighborhood doubled.  With that said, it cannot be 
concluded with certainty that there is a relationship between foreclosures and residential 
burglary.  Perhaps foreclosures are not a good indicator of social disorganization within 
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more affluent neighborhoods.  Either way, no certainty can be made on whether this 
neighborhood could be considered socially disorganized. 
Canvass 1 – May 13, 2011, 3:15 pm 
 Upon arrival at Sand Lake Private Residences Condos, the one gated 
entrance/exit was open, allowing for easy access into the neighborhood.  The parking 
lot appeared to be about half full of parked vehicles, which has been consistent with 
other neighborhoods and weekday canvassing.  There were also grounds maintenance 
men present who maintaining the grass and bushes.  Along with the grounds keepers 
present, there was activity within the neighborhood.  For instance, during the canvass I 
counted nine vehicles, which were coded as car traffic, six people coded as foot traffic, 
and three people were coded as being outside.  However, there was no one located at 
the pool, tennis or basketball courts, or park/playground.  Just as important, there were 
no visible ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs, nor any visible signs of vacancies or 
foreclosures; yet, an explanation for this was discussed in previous neighborhoods, 
which could explain this finding, especially since this neighborhood has a foreclosure 
count of 62 and a rate of 14.8 for all five years.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 2:00 pm 
 Same as the first canvass, the one gated entrance/exit into the neighborhood 
was open.   In fact, according to an individual who maintains foreclosed homes for 
mortgage companies, and who has assisted in the maintenance of a handful of condos 
in this exact neighborhood, every time he worked in the neighborhood the gate has 
been open.  Thus, it appears that although there is a security defense measure, a gate, 
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it is rarely ever used to its full potential.  Similar to the first canvass, the parking lot was 
only about half full and the activity within the neighborhood was about the same.  For 
instance, the car traffic count was eight, the foot traffic count was five, and the number 
of people located outside was six, which includes a father playing with his kids near 
their condos.  Also, there were two people at the pool and two youths playing basketball 
at the hoops.  There was also a garage sale going on while I canvassed the 
neighborhood as well.   
 According to the discussion above, Sand Lake Private Residences Condos has 
strong indicators of a lower level of collective efficacy compared to other neighborhoods 
with lower residential burglaries, such as Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos.  For 
instance, although Sand Lake was also gated, the gate seemed to remain open most of 
the time, if not all of the time.  Just as important, this neighborhood is located off of a 
major interstate, which can invite potential criminals because of its easy accessibility.  
The neighborhood is also not fully fenced (Newman 1972), although it is fairly secluded 
with woods and water surrounding other parts.  These structural characteristics are 
indicators of lower collective efficacy within the neighborhood which could help explain 
the higher residential burglary rate.  Even though the activity within the neighborhood 
was fairly concentrated, the layout of the neighborhood could still reduce collective 
efficacy, supporting the relationship between higher foreclosures and higher residential 
burglary within Sand Lake Private Residences Condos.   
Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos 
Foreclosure Rate: 19.7 
Residential Burglary Rate: 6.6 
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 Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos lies in Census tract 148.13, which is considered an 
upper-income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of the tract is as follows: 61.3% 
white; 7.1% Black/African American; 16.2% Hispanic; and 14% Asian.  Similar to the 
previous neighborhood, this neighborhood is located close to I4, and is situated in the 
Dr. Phillips area.  There are a lot of commercial businesses nearby, all of which are 
newer and in very nice condition.  For example, Ruth’s Chris, a highly acclaimed 
steakhouse is located directly around the corner from Sanctuary at Bay Hill.  Also, there 
is a newer Publix shopping plaza nearby, which appears to be the primary means of 
shopping for the residents.  Directly down the street from the neighborhood is also the 
Dr. Phillips Orange County Library.  Also, right next door is the Dr. Phillips YMCA, with a 
large park, pool, and gym.  There is one entrance/exit into this somewhat large 
neighborhood which is gated.  There are a total of 38 separate buildings with a little 
more than 300 condos/townhomes in the entire neighborhood.  The condos were built in 
1996.   
 Just as important, the neighborhood is partly fenced with bricking and chain link 
fencing and wooded areas around other parts.  Several other neighborhoods are 
located nearby.  There are speed bumps throughout the neighborhood.  Once again, as 
with most condos/townhomes, there is a HOA present in the neighborhood.  However, 
with Sanctuary at Bay Hill, residents are responsible for the maintenance of their own 
yards, which has resulted in taller grass (compared to other neighborhoods), weeds, 
and dead grass, and also mounds of mulch in some yards.  So, there were definite 
signs of physical disorder with the lack of yard maintenance for some of the residences 
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of the condos/townhomes.  Despite that, the majority of the condos/townhomes 
themselves appeared to be in nice condition, with no noticeable debris in the 
neighborhood.   What’s more, there is a community pool, a tennis and basketball court, 
and three parks/playgrounds located within the neighborhood, as well as a community 
center/office located near the front of the neighborhood.  As Table 1 shows, Sanctuary 
at Bay Hill’s foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 0, 6, and 54, while the residential 
burglary count for 2005-2009 was 5, 0, 4, 3, and 8.  Accordingly, there does appear to 
be an increase in residential burglaries in 2009, when the foreclosure count also 
increased.  Although this increase does not appear to be drastic, it nonetheless is an 
increase and supports the theory’s hypothesis that as foreclosures increase (residential 
instability/mobility), which is an indicator of social disorganization, residential burglary 
will also increase.  
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 11:30 am 
 Upon arrival at Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos, the gate entering the neighborhood 
was open.  Located near the gate were grounds keepers or lawn maintenance workers 
who were landscaping the area.  The level of vehicle activity in the neighborhood this 
day was fairly active, with eleven vehicles reportedly coming and going.  Yet, there were 
not many vehicles parked outside of each condos/townhome.  This could be explained 
by the fact that it was a weekday and residents could be at work, school, or doing other 
daily activities; plus, there were garages at each condos/townhome and the vehicle 
could have been parked inside, making it not visible during the canvass.  Despite the 
numerous vehicle traffic, there was not much foot traffic or people outside on this day.  
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In fact, there was only one woman going to check her mail at the community mailboxes, 
and another woman walking within the neighborhood.  There was another person who 
was outside of his/her condos/townhome.   
 Furthermore, there were several people located at the community center for a 
function.  On this day there was no one at the pool, the parks/playgrounds, or the tennis 
and basketball courts.  Interestingly, the three parks/playgrounds were actually taped off 
for some reason, perhaps for maintenance on the equipment.  There were no visible 
‘For Sale’ signs, nor were there any visible signs of foreclosures and/or vacancies.  
There were two visible ‘For Rent’ signs though.  However, because some of the yards 
were unkempt, these condos/townhomes could have been in foreclosure or vacant, but 
without any other signs of such (e.g., lock boxes on the front door), it cannot be 
concluded with any certainty.  Yet, we know there have been, and most likely are, 
foreclosures located within this neighborhood since it had a total foreclosure rate of 19.7 
(or about 20% of all homes in the neighborhood have been, or are, in foreclosure) for 
the years of 2005-5009, placing it seventh on the list of highest foreclosure rate.    
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 1:30 pm 
 Upon second arrival at Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos, which took place on a 
Saturday, the entrance’s gate was closed.  I gained access into the neighborhood by 
following another vehicle through the gate.  The neighborhood’s activity was about the 
same, if not more, than the first canvass.  For instance, the vehicle traffic count was 
eight, the foot traffic count was three, and the count of outside people was five, some of 
which were residents mowing their yards.  Plus, there were two people located at the 
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pool, and two children playing in one of the parks in the neighborhood; there was no 
one at the tennis or basketball courts though.  The neighborhood appeared to be about 
half full with residents’ vehicles parked outside the condos/townhomes.  Once again, 
some of the yards were still poorly maintained.  The Dr. Phillips YMCA located nearby 
was very busy this day, with a field/activity day going on for children.   
 As a result of both of the neighborhood canvasses, this neighborhood did exhibit 
signs of physical disorder, which are strong indicators of a low level of collective efficacy 
(Taylor 1984; Skogan 1992).  This could help to explain the high level of residential 
burglaries.  As mentioned previously, this neighborhood ranks seventh in foreclosure 
rates and in the middle of the list in residential burglary rates.  Thus, although this 
neighborhood ranks fifteenth out of the total thirty neighborhoods in residential 
burglaries, it still has a higher residential burglary rate than half of the other 
neighborhoods.  Although this neighborhood is located in an upper-income tract located 
within the Dr. Phillips area, which is considered to be more affluent, and the higher 
levels of traffic/activity within the neighborhood, there were physical signs of disorder 
which appear to be stronger indicators of lower collective efficacy.  For example, 
numerous yards were poorly maintained.  Also, the fact that the gate at the entrance of 
the neighborhood does not stay closed could result in residents feeling less safe and 
allow potential criminals an easy access and exit into the neighborhood.  Additionally, 
there were visible signs of residential instability with the ‘For Rent’ signs found within the 
neighborhood.  All of this taken together, it does appear that there are strong indicators 
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supporting a lower level of collective efficacy, which could help explain the relationship 
between foreclosures and residential burglary.   
Summerport PH5 
Foreclosure Rate: 16.4 
Residential Burglary Rate: 2.2 
 The Summerport PH5 neighborhood lies in Census tract 171.05, which is 
considered an upper-income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as 
follows: 75.3% white; 5.8% Black/African American; 10.8% Hispanic; and 6.8% Asian.  
The neighborhood is located in the town of Windermere, Florida, in a fairly new and nice 
neighborhood.  The area is more secluded with a golf course and a public park next to it 
and across the street.  Around the corner there are shopping plazas with a Publix 
grocery store located within.  Yet, located directly outside one of the entrances of the 
neighborhood is a smaller shopping plaza that has several vacant store fronts.  There 
are three entrances/exits for the neighborhood, none of which are gated.  As the name 
of the neighborhood suggests, there are multiple phases, or PH’s to this neighborhood.  
Thus, when conducting the neighborhood canvasses, I made an effort to stay within 
PH5 only.  Of particular concern to this research is PH5 only, because this phase had 
the highest foreclosures, or at least twenty or more foreclosures to have made the list.  
In fact, two phases to Summerport, PH1 and PH2, which are directly connected to PH5, 
have less than ten foreclosures and residential burglaries for the five years.   
 The multiple entrances and the various recreations of the neighborhood are 
shared throughout the neighborhood.  With that said, the neighborhood has one 
community/neighborhood pool, two tennis courts and a basketball court, and three 
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parks/playgrounds.  The houses (approximately 300) in the neighborhood were built in 
the mid 2000s, during the construction boom.  There is a Home Owner’s Association 
present, which regulates the types of fencing the residents can use, but each resident is 
still responsible for his/her personal yards.  Some of the yards are fenced, but the 
majority are not.  Even more, the residential structures throughout the neighborhood 
vary, from one to two-story homes as well as townhomes.  The neighborhood is partly 
fenced with wooded areas surrounding other parts.  The neighborhood also has areas 
that resemble small parks with benches and grills, and also has many sidewalks and 
walk/bike paths located within.    
 Just as interesting, as Table 1 suggests, Summerport PH5 remained stable in the 
residential burglary count even though the foreclosures increased over the five years.  
For instance, the foreclosures for 2005-2009 went from 0, 0, 1, 10, to 41, while the 
residential burglary count in the same years held fairly steady from 0, 2, 2, 1, and 2.  
Thus, although the foreclosure count increased dramatically in 2009, the residential 
burglary in the area did not change.  So, the assertion that as foreclosures increase and 
a neighborhood becomes socially disorganized, residential burglary will also increase, 
was not supported in this neighborhood.   
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 12:15 pm 
 Upon arrival at the neighborhood, there was a ‘No Soliciting’ sign posted at the 
entrance.  Also, it appeared that the neighborhood did not have much outside, 
residential activity.  Additionally, it was obvious that the neighborhood grounds, those in 
which the HOA maintain, are very nicely kept with the grass and shrubs nicely 
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manicured.  Numerous personal yards were also nicely kept; yet, many other yards 
were not, with overgrown and/or dead grass, and a lot of weeds.  A lot of these yards 
were of homes that were visibly occupied, while others were obvious foreclosures.   
 Just as important, the various traffic recorded within the neighborhood ranged, 
from twelve counted as vehicle traffic, three people counted as foot traffic, and two 
people located outside of their home.  Of those counted as foot traffic, there were two 
people walking for exercise and one person walking his/her dog.  Even more, there was 
no one located at the community pool or at the tennis and basketball courts.  Yet, there 
was a mother and child playing in the park located within the neighborhood.  There were 
visible ‘For Sale’ and ‘For Rent’ signs posted at homes throughout the neighborhood.  
Just as important, there were visible signs of vacancies and/or foreclosures.  There 
were identified by having overgrown yards while the home was obviously empty (can 
visually see in the window that the home was vacant), and also having lock changes 
and lock boxes on the front doors which are indicative that a property preservation 
company, hired by mortgage companies, has secured the home.  Besides the many 
yards that were overgrown, there did not appear to be other visible signs of disorder 
(i.e., the streets and yards did not have debris).   
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 11:15 am   
 Upon second arrival at Summerport PH5, lawn maintenance workers were 
present to maintain the neighborhood’s grounds.  This canvass took place on a 
Saturday and therefore there was more activity recorded.  For instance, there was a 
garage sale going on, which undoubtedly increased the traffic count for the 
107 
neighborhood.  The vehicle traffic count was twenty-three, almost double from what it 
was on the first canvass.  However, this is expected because there typically is more 
activity within a neighborhood on a weekend in which residents are home and more 
mobile, as opposed to at work.  The foot traffic count was two people, both of which 
were residents walking their dogs.  The number of people located outside also 
increased on this day, with a count of ten, ranging from residents working on their yards, 
getting the mail, etc.  There was still no one located at the community pool, at the tennis 
and basketball courts, and on this day, no one at the various parks/playgrounds.  
Moreover, although the neighborhood did not appear to have signs of physical disorder, 
such as trash and/or debris, there were trash cans, recycling bins, and trash bags 
located at the end of driveways.  Yet, this could have been because trash and recycling 
day was either this day or the day before and the cans and bins had not been brought in 
yet.  Once again, some of the yards were poorly maintained, some of which were 
obvious vacancies or foreclosures, while others were obviously occupied.   
 As both of the neighborhood canvasses illustrated, it appeared that this 
neighborhood has compelling indicators supporting the claim that it had higher level of 
collective efficacy.  Interestingly, it ranked eleventh highest in foreclosures, but only 
ranked twenty-fifth highest in residential burglaries.  Although this neighborhood was not 
gated, it was a large neighborhood with only three entrances and exits and was 
surrounded by either fence, golf course, and wooded areas, all of which could decrease 
the chance of an ‘easy out’ for criminals.  Furthermore, the neighborhood was located in 
a more secluded and rural area (Putnam 2007) and higher-income area, which could 
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decrease criminal activity.  There were also high levels of activity which is a strong 
indicator of lower social disorder (Woldoff 2002) resulting in a more collective efficacy.  
Although the foot traffic and number of people recorded outside was not significantly 
high, the vehicle traffic recorded on both days of canvassing for Summerport PH5 was 
the highest compared to all of the neighborhoods used in the study.  Just as important, 
the fact that the neighborhood appeared to be relatively new seemed be an indicator of 
more collective efficacy.  In the end, although there were some signs of physical 
disorder (i.e., vacant/foreclosed homes and unkempt yards), it appeared that the other 
indicators found in the neighborhood were stronger in increasing collective efficacy. 
Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos 
Foreclosure Rate: 17.3 
Residential Burglary Rate: 11.2 
 
 Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos is located in Census tract 167.19, which is 
considered to be an upper-income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as 
follows: 53.8% white; 8.3 Black/African American; 28% Hispanic; and 7.3% Asian.  
These condos are located in a fairly busy residential and commercial area, with a lot of 
shopping and traffic.  Directly across the street from the neighborhood is a shopping 
plaza with a Winn Dixie store, but on a commercial street around the corner is more 
shopping, such as a shopping mall and a Home Depot.  There is only one entrance/exit 
into the neighborhood and it is not gated.  Posted at the entrance is a sign warning that 
there is video surveillance of the entrance and exit.  There is a Home Owner’s 
Association (HOA), which once again, is common in condos.  Therefore, the grounds 
(grass and shrubs) and buildings are maintained by the maintenance crew of the 
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neighborhood.  Thus, the residences of the condos are not responsible for the 
maintenance of the yards.   
 Located near the entrance is a community area, with an office and community 
pool for the residents of the condos.  There is no tennis or basketball court or 
park/playground located within the neighborhood.  In addition, there is a fence 
surrounding most of the perimeter of the neighborhood, with a heavily wooded area 
separating the neighborhood from another residential neighborhood where there is no 
fence.  Even more, there are a total of 14 different, multi-story buildings, with roughly 
275 individual condos located in each.  The condos were built in 1998.  The overall 
appearance of the condos appeared to be very well taken care of and maintained. 
Lastly, all of the condos have personal balconies, with the bottom floor balconies being 
exposed, or not enclosed with screens.      
 As Table 1 indicates, Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos supported the claim of 
social disorganization that as residential instability/mobility, or foreclosures, increased, 
residential burglaries would also increase.  For example, the foreclosures for 2005-2009 
were as follows: 0, 0, 1, 10, and 37; while the residential burglaries in the same years 
were as follows: 0, 6, 2, 2, and 16.  There was a large increase in 2009 when both 
foreclosures skyrocketed and reported residential burglary increased.   
Canvass 1 – May 12, 2011, 11:45 am 
 Upon arrival at the neighborhood, the parking lot throughout the neighborhood 
was approximately half full of vehicles.  Similar with the above discussions, many of the 
residents could have been at work, out, or at school.  With that said, many of the 
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vehicles that were parked in the neighborhood had college/university parking permits, 
so it was apparent that many of the residents in this particular neighborhood were 
college students.  The condos were not located far from the University of Central 
Florida’s campus, so this makes sense.  There was minimal activity within the 
neighborhood on this day.  For example, there were only three vehicles recorded as car 
traffic, zero people recorded as foot traffic, and one person, a young woman outside 
washing her car, recorded as outside activity on the day of the first neighborhood 
canvass.  Additionally, there was no one located at the neighborhood pool.  There were 
no visible ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs, but as mentioned above, this is common in 
condominium neighborhoods in which they do not always have a yard to display the 
sign.  There were not any visible vacancies or foreclosures either, but these could have 
been difficult to identify because of the multi-story arrangement of the condos.   
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 12:55 pm 
 The second canvass also took place on a Saturday, when there would typically 
be more activity than a weekday.  In fact, there was more recorded activity when this 
canvass took place.  For instance, there were seven vehicles recorded that day as car 
traffic, two people considered foot traffic (both of which appeared to be heading to the 
community pool), and six people were located outside, some of which were people 
moving in/out because they had a U-Haul truck.  The pool located in the neighborhood 
also had several people occupying it.  On this day of canvassing there was also an 
Orange County Sheriff’s Office vehicle parked on the premise.  It is not clear if the 
officer lived in the neighborhood or whether just parked there, visiting.  The various 
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dumpsters located in the neighborhood also appeared to be fairly full with personal 
belongings (e.g., dresser, mattresses, and personal trash), which was not seen the first 
time canvassing.  However, it should be pointed out that since the neighborhood seems 
to be occupied by many college students, this time of the year typically reveals a large 
transformation in residential living.  For example, the spring semester of college is over, 
and many students have either graduated and moving out, or new students moving in.  
This is supported by the U-Haul truck present and the overabundance of personals 
located in the dumpsters.   
 Since this is primarily a student-occupied neighborhood, where students 
frequently move in and out, could explain the higher residential burglary rate because 
this is a form of residential mobility itself (11.2; ranking fifth largest rate).  Undoubtedly, 
it is difficult to form bonds with people who are moving in and out constantly (Shaw and 
McKay 1942), which could be reflected by the higher residential burglary rate.  Another 
indicator of lower collective efficacy was the fact that the neighborhood was not gated 
and was located in a heavily populated area.  Although there was some outside activity 
within the neighborhood, ranging from car and foot traffic to people located outside, 
there was still not a large amount compared to other neighborhoods, which is an 
indicator of having lower collective efficacy.  As mentioned previously, the ground floor 
condos had balconies which were not enclosed, and therefore could be inviting to 
criminals, especially those committing residential burglary because it does not create a 
defensible space (Newman 1972).  All in all, with a rate of 17.3 per 100 units over the 
five years resulting in a foreclosure (ranking tenth in the sample), there is evidence from 
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the neighborhood canvasses that there is lower collective efficacy based on strong 
structural indicators of physical and social disorder.   
Palms Villa Residences Condos 
Foreclosure Rate: 24.2 
Residential Burglary Rate: 6.2 
 Palms Villa Residences Condos lie within Census tract 170.08, which is 
considered a middle-income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as 
follows: 33.5% white; 10% Black/African American; 46% Hispanic; and 7.8% Asian.  
The complex is located in a fairly quiet area, with other condos across the street and an 
elementary school (Waterbridge Elementary School) and county park next door (Lester 
Mandell Park).  There is a Costco store located less than half a mile away as well.  
Further down the main road (Central Florida PKWY) of the condos the activity increases 
and is a fairly busy commercial and residential area; however, at this end of the main 
road there is less activity and the neighborhood is more isolated.  There are two 
entrances/exits to the neighborhood and both are gated.  Just as important, the 
neighborhood is fully fenced, with seven large, three-story buildings containing almost 
200 privately owned condos that were built in 2003.  A community center/office is 
located at the front entrance of the condos.  The neighborhood does have a Home 
Owners’ Association which handles all maintenance of Palms Villa Residences Condos.  
Thus, the residents do not maintain any grass themselves, and the grounds are in very 
nice condition.  The condos themselves are newer and also in very nice condition.  The 
complex has a community pool located within, but no tennis or basketball courts or 
playgrounds.   
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According to Table 1, the foreclosure count for the years of 2005-2009 were as 
follow: 0, 0, 0, 9, and 38; while the residential burglary count for the same years was 6, 
2, 0, 0, and 2.  Therefore, while there was an increase in foreclosures between 2007-
2009, there was not such an increase in residential burglary during the same years.  In 
fact, it appears that when foreclosures were at their lowest in this neighborhood, 
residential burglaries was at its highest, and when foreclosures increased, residential 
burglaries actually decreased or remained stable.  Thus, the expectation that as 
foreclosures increase, the neighborhood becomes more socially disorganized, and 
therefore crime, such as residential burglaries, increases, is not met with this 
neighborhood.   
Canvass 1 – May 13, 2011, 2:00 pm 
 Upon arrival at Palms Villa Residences Condos, both of the entrance/exit gates 
were closed.  I was unable to gain access by following in, and therefore my canvass 
took place directly outside of the neighborhood in front of the condos’ office.  Here I 
could visually see inside part of the complex as well as all vehicle activity entering 
and/or leaving the neighborhood.  Posted on the gates was a ‘No Trespassing’ sign.  It 
was very evident that the neighborhood went to great measures to prevent easy access 
into the neighborhood.   Although I could not gain access into the neighborhood, I could 
visually see that the parking lot was approximately half full of vehicles.  Also, the 
neighborhood appeared to be fairly quiet, with minimal activity.  This is to be expected 
though, considered that this is a weekday and many people could either be at work or 
school.   
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 While observing the neighborhood, I did count four vehicles coming and/or going.  
However, I could not visually see any foot traffic or people outside from where I was 
posted.  Also, there was no one located at the pool, which I could visually see.  
Unfortunately, since I could not gain access into the complex, I could not see if there 
were any ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ condos, nor could I visually see any signs of vacancies 
or foreclosures.  However, similar to other condos, it would be expected to be difficult to 
observe any because the premises is maintained by the HOA and many times condos 
do not allow residents to display signs indicating a unit is ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent.’  As 
mentioned earlier, there is a county park located next door, Lester Mandell Park, and 
there was one person at the park on this day – a woman laying or sleeping on a table.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 12:45 pm 
 On the second canvass of the neighborhood both gates were once again closed 
and unfortunately I could not gain access.  Because this canvass took place on a 
weekend, the activity at the neighborhood did increase.  For example, the counted 
vehicle traffic either coming or leaving the neighborhood was five.  Once again, I was 
unable to visually observe any foot traffic, but I was able to observe four people outside.  
Even more, there were three residents at the pool on this Saturday.  Besides this 
activity, the neighborhood still appeared to be fairly quiet.  Lastly, there was a man 
playing soccer at the park across the street.   
 Although this neighborhood did not increase in residential burlgary when 
foreclosures increased, there were certain indicators found during the canvasses that 
help to explain this phenomenon.  The fact that the neighborhood is gated and locked 
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could decrease the chance of criminals entering and committing burglaries.  Just as 
important, the complex was fenced around the entire property, and thus could act as a 
deterrent to criminals.  Having these barriers and the complex being closely clustered 
lends support to Newman’s (1972) defensible space theory.  The fact that the 
neighborhood was gated, in nice condition, fully fenced, ‘No Trespassing’ signs present, 
and located in a quiet, isolated area, were strong indicators of a higher level of collective 
efficacy.  These indicators can help in explaining the lower residential burglary rate in 
the neighborhood (sixteenth largest), even though the foreclosure rate was high (third 
largest).   
Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos 
Foreclosure Rate: 13.0 
Residential Burglary Rate: 5.7 
 Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos are located within Census tract 170.07, 
which is considered an upper-income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of the tract is 
as follows: 49.1% white; 9.5% Black/African American; 29.8% Hispanic; and 9.4% 
Asian.  Similar to a previously discussed neighborhood, Villanova, Audubon Villas is 
located within a larger neighborhood called Hunters Creek.  Therefore, there are many 
different residential neighborhoods located nearby, as well as a golf course and a Super 
Target store.  Also, a very busy road, Orange Blossom Trail, is located nearby, 
increasing the traffic in the surrounding area.  Audubon Villas, however, is not located 
directly off the busy road and is fairly quiet.  There is one entrance/exit into the 
neighborhood and it is gated.  There are sixteen different buildings that were built in 
1997, which contain roughly 350 private condos, and the neighborhood is partly fenced.  
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There is a golf course and other residential neighborhoods backing up to the 
neighborhood.   
 Even more, there is a Home Owners’ Association for the neighborhood which 
handles the grounds maintenance; thus, the yards are nicely maintained and residents 
are not themselves responsible for the maintenance.  The condos are in nice condition.  
Audubon Villas has a community pool and a tennis and a basketball court located 
within.  There is no park or playground located within the neighborhood however.  
Moreover, as Table 1 indicates, Audubon Villas’ foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0, 
0, 1, 3, and 42, while the residential burglary count for the same years was 5, 2, 6, 3, 
and 4.  As these findings suggest, the residential burglary count remained fairly stable 
over the five years, despite the drastic increase in foreclosures in the latter years, 
specifically 2009.  As a result, the assertion that as foreclosures increase, residential 
burglaries would also increase because it becomes socially disorganized is not 
supported for this neighborhood.   
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 2:20 pm 
 Upon arrival at Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos, the entrance and/or 
exit gate was open so I was able to gain access easily.  The neighborhood was fairly 
quiet with not much activity.  This is to be expected on a weekday since many residents 
are most likely working or at school.  The grounds were nicely kept and maintained.  
During the duration of the neighborhood canvass there were three vehicles recorded as 
vehicle traffic, zero people recorded as foot traffic, and two people located outside.  
There was also no one located at the community pool or the tennis and basketball 
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courts within the neighborhood.  At the end of the canvass though there was a school 
bus letting students off right outside of the neighborhood and many were entering the 
neighborhood, indicating that they most likely lived within this neighborhood.  Similar to 
previous findings, there were no visible signs indicating ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ condos, 
and there were no visible signs of vacancies or foreclosures; however, because the 
neighborhood consists of condos, we know that they are less likely to display these 
signs and the grass is maintained by the HOA and therefore no visible signs of physical 
disorder, indicating that a property is possibly vacant or foreclosed.  With that said, 
there were no other visible signs of physical disorder (e.g., no trash or debris within the 
neighborhood, no boarded windows, etc.).   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 11:45 am  
 Upon second arrival at Audubon Villas, the gate at the entrance/exit of the 
neighborhood was once again open.  Although this canvass took place on a Saturday, 
the level of activity did not notably increase.  For example, the vehicle traffic count was 
three, same as the first canvass, there was still no recorded foot traffic, and the number 
of people outside was still two.  There was no one at the tennis or basketball courts 
once again, but there was a large amount of people located at the community pool.  It 
appeared that there was a party and there was at least ten or more people there.  Even 
more, the parking lot was more than half full, which is expected on a weekend when 
less people are either at school or work.  During this canvass, a Florida State Trooper’s 
vehicle was parked in the parking lot.  There were also visible student parking permits 
for the local university, University of Central Florida, indicating that some of the 
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residents in this neighborhood were students.  There was a runner on the outside 
sidewalk of the neighborhood, and the car traffic this day seemed to be more 
congested.  Lastly, there were golfers present on the golf course next to the 
neighborhood.  
 As the results of two canvasses suggest, there were certain indicators of 
collective efficacy within the neighborhood that assist in explaining the overall 
residential burglary.  As previously mentioned, this neighborhood lies in the middle of all 
neighborhoods for both foreclosure and residential burglary rates (foreclosure rate: 
13.0, ranking 17th; residential burglary rate: 5.7, ranking 18th).   Besides the pool party 
on the second day of canvassing, the neighborhood activity was fairly low.  In truth, if 
residents do not feel their neighborhood is safe then they may be less likely to be 
outside and engage in interaction.  As a result, they may be less likely to act as informal 
agents of social control.  Moreover, although the neighborhood is gated, the gate on 
both canvasses was open and therefore does not serve as a barrier or defensible space 
(Newman 1972) to possibly deter criminals.  The neighborhood is not completely 
surrounded with a fence either, which would also act as a possible barrier and deterrent 
of criminals.   
 Although there was a State Trooper living in the neighborhood, he/she might not 
have been present during the years of the study, 2005-2009, and therefore did not help 
to reduce criminal activity within the neighborhood.  Lastly, similar to a previously 
discussed neighborhood, Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos, Audubon Villas also had 
visible residents who were younger, which was concluded by university parking permits 
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located on vehicles.  Both of these neighborhoods had higher foreclosures and higher 
counts of residential burglary.  All in all, the physical and social characteristics were 
strong indicators that this neighborhood had a lower level of collective efficacy.   
Bella Terra Condos 
Foreclosure Rate: 12.7 
Residential Burglary Rate: 4.2 
 Bella Terra Condos lie within Census tract 152.01, which is considered a middle-
income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 57.2% white; 
24.6% Black/African American; 10.7% Hispanic; and 5.5% Asian.  The surrounding area 
of the neighborhood appeared to be older, but Bella Terra Condos are newer condos.  
In fact, this neighborhood was the furthest north neighborhood visited for this research, 
in the city of Maitland, Florida.  The neighborhood is located off a fairly busy road and 
also near a busy highway.  The condos themselves are pushed back a little off the road, 
and there is a La Petite daycare nearby.  There are two entrances/exits located at the 
front of the property, both of which are gated.  In total, there are 14 individual buildings 
with around 360 condos in entire complex that were built in 2000.  There is a Home 
Owners’ Association that maintains the yard and general upkeep on the structures.  
Thus, individual residents are not responsible for the maintenance of any grass.  There 
is a fence surrounding the entire premises of the property.   
 Outside of the neighborhood, much of the condominium complex is surrounded 
by woods and to the south there is a residential neighborhood.  Within the neighborhood 
there is a community pool, a tennis court, and a park/playground.  Just as important, 
according to Table 1, the foreclosures increased from 0, 0, 4, 11, to 31 in the years of 
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2005-2009.  What’s more, the residential burglary count for the same years actually 
decreased as the foreclosures increased: 6, 6, 0, 2, and 1.  As a result, this specific 
neighborhood did not follow social disorganization theory’s argument that as a 
neighborhood becomes more disorganized then crime, measured by residential 
burglary, will increase. Interestingly, the neighborhood falls around the middle in ranking 
of foreclosure and residential burglary rates, ranking eighteenth and twenty-third 
respectively, so a further understanding of what makes this neighborhood different from 
those with high foreclosures/high residential burglaries and high foreclosures/low 
residential burglaries is warranted.  
Canvass 1 – May 13, 2011, 12:20 pm 
 Upon arrival at Bella Terra Condos, one of the entrance/exit gates was left open 
while the other gate was closed.  Also, located at the gates was a sign posted indicating 
that there is camera surveillance for the neighborhood and a neighborhood watch.  The 
neighborhood was fairly quiet and the parking lot was rather empty; yet, this is to be 
expected since this day was a weekday and many residents could either be at work or 
school.  The condos were in nice condition and the grass/shrubs were nicely 
maintained.  During the duration of the canvass, the vehicle traffic count was eight, 
there was zero foot traffic, and there were two people recorded as being outside, one of 
which was a man working on his car.  There was also a grounds/maintenance man out 
walking the property.  There were two people at the pool, but no one at the tennis court 
or park/playground within the neighborhood.  Also consistent with other condominium 
complexes, there were zero visible ‘For Sale’ and ‘For Rent’ signs, nor were there any 
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visual signs of vacancies or foreclosures.  Just as important, the neighborhood 
mentioned previously that Bella Terra is adjacent to appeared to be an older 
neighborhood and many of the houses seem to show signs of more physical disorder.  
Despite that, the entire surrounding neighborhood of Bella Terra had fewer foreclosures 
and residential burglaries, so any spillover from another neighborhood would not 
probably affect Bella Terra’s residential burglaries.     
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 12:15 pm 
 Upon second arrival at Bella Terra Condos on a Saturday, both of the entrance 
and exit gates were closed.  I was able to gain access however by following another 
driver in.  There was slightly more activity on this day, but the neighborhood was still 
somewhat quiet.  The vehicle traffic count on this day was nine, there was once again 
zero foot traffic within the neighborhood, and there were four people counted outside of 
their residences.  There was also a mother and several children walking up the flights of 
stairs to their condos.  There were four people at the pool, but no one at the tennis court 
of park/playground.  The parking lot appeared to be about half full as well.  In all, during 
both canvasses the neighborhood did not exhibit any visual signs of physical disorder. 
 As both of the neighborhood canvasses illustrate, Bella Terra Condos did not 
exhibit any obvious signs of physical disorder, which is a clear indicator of higher 
collective efficacy.  There was also a moderate level of foot traffic and number of people 
outside that show a lack of social disorder (Woldoff 2002) and serve as indicators for 
higher collective efficacy.  The neighborhood was also gated, with one entrance’s gate 
remaining closed and one remaining open.  The neighborhood was fully fenced and at 
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least half of it was surrounded by a wooded area.  There were no strong indicators 
found within this neighborhood that would support a low level of collective efficacy.   
 The structures themselves were also in good condition and the grounds were 
nicely maintained.  The neighborhood displayed signs indicating there were video 
surveillance and a neighborhood watch present in the neighborhood, both of which 
could increase a sense of safety within the neighborhood and possibly deter a criminal.  
All of these indicators can help to explain why Bella Terra Condos were ranked 23rd 
(residential burglary rate: 4.2 per 100 condos).  While there were some indicators that 
would suggest this neighborhood having less collective efficacy, there were additional 
stronger indicators supporting a higher level of collective efficacy.  Undoubtedly, these 
indicators of collective efficacy could reduce criminal behavior (Sampson et al. 1997). 
Sandhill Preserve 
Foreclosure Rate: 28.0 
Residential Burglary Rate: 10.0 
 Sandhill Preserve lies in Census tract 168.05, which is considered a middle-
income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10% 
Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian.  Sandhill Preserve is a smaller 
neighborhood located within Arbor Meadows, a larger subdivision with multiple 
neighborhoods.  It is located at the end of the larger neighborhood.  Also, this area is 
located off of a busy state road.  Near the very front of the larger neighborhood, newer 
commercial shopping is present with a Publix Shopping Center as the main shopping for 
Sandhill Preserve.  There is one entrance and/or exit into the neighborhood and it is 
gated.  The neighborhood consists of approximately 150 newer (built in the mid 2000s, 
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mostly, if not all, in 2005), one to two-story residential homes and is a smaller 
neighborhood.   
 There is a Home Owners’ Association (HOA) present and it enforces guidelines 
on privacy fences, and in this case, there are no privacy fences allowed.  Residents are 
responsible for their own yard maintenance, however.  There is a fence surrounding 
part of the perimeter of the neighborhood, with ponds and wooded areas surrounding 
the remaining parts.  There is no neighborhood pool, tennis or basketball court, or a 
park/playground, but there are privately owned pools in the neighborhood.  
Furthermore, as Table 1 indicates, Sandhill Preserve’s foreclosure count was 0, 0, 1, 
15, and 26 for the years of 2005-2009, while the residential burglary count was 3, 2, 3, 
5, and 2 for the years of 2005-2009.  Therefore, as foreclosures increased in the five 
years, the residential burglary count in the neighborhood actually remained fairly stable.  
This does not support the hypothesis that high foreclosures will cause a neighborhood 
to be socially disorganized and thus will result in an increase in residential burglaries.   
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 3:00 pm 
 Upon arrival at Sandhill Preserve, the entrance and exit gate was closed, but I 
was able to gain access by following another vehicle in.  At the entrance there was a 
‘Neighborhood Watch’ and a ‘Deed Restricted’ sign posted.  The neighborhood was 
fairly quiet on this day, with a vehicle traffic count of seven, a foot traffic count of zero, 
and the number of people outside of zero.  As mentioned previously, there is no 
community pool, sporting courts, or park/playground, so no measurement could be 
made.  Interestingly though, there were no visible ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs present 
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in the neighborhood.  There were approximately two visible homes that were either 
vacant or in foreclosure though, based on the appearance of the yard and/or lock 
changes and lock boxes present on the front door of the homes.  Most of the homes 
and yards appeared to be well taken care of, but there are some yards that were not 
taken care of very well, both occupied and vacant.  Even more, there was some yard 
debris visible at some residences, which is a sign of physical disorder. 
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 11:00 am 
 Upon second arrival of Sandhill Preserve, the gate was once again locked, but I 
was able to gain access by following another vehicle in.  This canvass took place on a 
Saturday, and as would be expected, the activity within the neighborhood did increase 
moderately.  The vehicle traffic count was five, slightly lower than the first canvass, but 
the foot traffic count was three and the number of people located outside was two.  
There was a yard maintenance company present working on a resident’s yard.  Also, 
there were several vehicles parked on the road on this day.  Yet, the sidewalk directly 
outside of the neighborhood was unoccupied.  Similar to the first canvass, there were 
yards that were not well maintained and some trash in backyards.   
 As the results from the two canvasses demonstrated above, there were some 
obvious signs of physical disorder.  For instance, the observable vacancies or 
foreclosures, the unmaintained yards, and yard debris were all signs of physical 
disorder (Skogan 1992).  The neighborhood did not exhibit much activity, which is an 
indicator of less collective efficacy within the neighborhood (Woldoff 2002).  Also, none 
of the yards were privately fenced which could act as a barrier or cause others to view it 
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as a defensible space (Newman 1972) and assist in deterring crime.  All of these 
characteristics would support claim that the neighborhood has a higher residential 
burglary rate.  Interestingly however, there were some neighborhood characteristics 
which would decrease crime, or residential burglaries, in a neighborhood.  For example, 
the fact that the neighborhood is more secluded and lies at the end of a larger 
neighborhood, the neighborhood is comparatively small, it is gated and the gate 
remained closed, and the signs posted at the entrance warning that there is a 
neighborhood watch and it is a deed restricted neighborhood are indicators of a higher 
collective efficacy.  Therefore, it does appear that this neighborhood is taking steps in 
the right direction to reduce residential burglary; however, the other indicators seem to 
be stronger and override the other neighborhood characteristics. 
Capri at Hunters Creek Condos 
Foreclosure Rate: 15.6 
Residential Burglary Rate: 5.6 
 Capri at Hunters Creek Condos lie in Census tract 170.07, which is considered 
an upper-income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 49.1% 
white; 9.5% Black/African American; 29.8% Hispanic; and 9.4% Asian.  The 
neighborhood of Capri lies within a larger neighborhood, Hunters Creek, same as two 
previously discussed neighborhoods.  Also, similar to the other neighborhoods in 
Hunters Creek, the neighborhood is off of a very busy road, and a Target Supermarket 
is nearby and a golf course is next door.  Plus, there is a La Petite daycare in close 
proximity.  In fact, Capri Condos did seem much nicer and more expensive based solely 
on appearance than both Villanova and Audubon Condos, although they were built in 
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1998.  There are two gated entrance/exits into the neighborhood, each positioned on a 
different road.  Moreover, there are 12 buildings with condos located in each (n=250), 
as well as 11 smaller buildings containing private parking garages for the residents.  
Since this is a condominium complex, there is a Home Owners’ Association, which 
maintains the premises and especially the grass; therefore, residents are not 
responsible for any yard care.   
 There are speed bumps throughout the neighborhood and the neighborhood’s 
perimeter is mostly fenced, except for the side of the neighborhood that is near a very 
busy road, in which a pond acts as a barrier.  There is a community pool inside the 
neighborhood, but there is not a tennis or basketball court or park/playground.  Plus, all 
of the condos have balconies, and the balconies on the bottom floor are fully enclosed 
with screens.  According to Table 1, Capri at Hunters Creek Condos’ foreclosure count 
for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 1, 2, and 36.  Just as important, the residential burglary count 
for the neighborhood for 2005-2009 was 1, 2, 3, 4, and 4, showing a slight increase in 
residential burglaries as foreclosures also increased.  Granted, the increase in 
residential burglaries was not a large increase like the foreclosure increase was, but 
unquestionably the residential burglaries did increase in the same years the 
foreclosures increased.  So, the argument was supported with this neighborhood: as 
foreclosures increased, which is an indicator of being socially disorganized, so did 
residential burglary. 
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 2:45 pm 
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 Upon arrival at Capri at Hunters Creek Condos, the two gates entering and 
exiting the neighborhood were closed and I could not gain access.  However, I was able 
to conduct some of the canvass from outside of the neighborhood.  From my position 
outside of the neighborhood, it did appear that the neighborhood was kept in very nice 
condition with no debris or trash around the premises.  Also, I counted two vehicles 
coming/going from the neighborhood, which was counted as vehicle traffic.  I was 
unable to see any foot traffic and therefore the count was zero, but I was able to see 
two people outside of their condos.  I was also unable to see if anyone was located at 
the pool on this day.  Yet, just from making a scan throughout the neighborhood, it 
seemed that the parking lot was approximately half, or less full, and appeared 
somewhat quiet on this weekday.  Lastly, since I was unable to gain access, I could not 
observe a ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ condos, nor could I observe any visible signs of 
vacancies or foreclosures.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 11:50 am 
 Upon second arrival at Capri at Hunters Creek Condos, both gates were open, 
so I was able to enter the neighborhood and conduct a more detailed canvass.  This 
canvass took place on a Saturday, and the activity on this day increased slightly 
compared to the first canvass on a weekday.  For instance, the vehicle traffic count was 
six, the foot traffic count was one, and there were five people located outside.  However, 
there was no one located at the community pool on this day.  I could not see any ‘For 
Sale’ signs, but there were two ‘For Rent’ condos visible.  I also could not visibly see 
any vacancies or foreclosures, but once again, that is normal for condos, especially 
128 
since they maintain the structures and the grounds, so they hamper the ability to 
observe these from a neighborhood canvass.  The activity on the outside of the 
neighborhood was fairly busy, both vehicle traffic and foot traffic.  The golf course next 
door was very active as well, both of which were an increase from the first 
neighborhood canvass. 
 All in all, there are certain characteristics of the neighborhood that support the 
argument that it has a higher amount of collective efficacy, which could result in a lower 
residential burglary rate (Sampson et al. 1997).  For instance, it does seem that the 
gates stay closed the majority of the week, especially on weekdays when residents are 
less likely to be home and more vulnerable to being victimized during a burglary.  This 
undeniably could reduce criminal activity by creating a sense of a defensible space 
(Newman 1972).  Also, the neighborhood was very well maintained and appeared more 
costly which could increase which are positive indicators of collective efficacy (Skogan 
1992).  Just as important, the neighborhood’s perimeter was mostly fenced, and the 
bottom floor balconies were enclosed, which can act as a barrier to would-be criminals.  
Thus, compared to other neighborhoods with high foreclosures and higher residential 
burglaries, Capri at Hunters Creek Condos seemed has many strong indicators of 
higher collective efficacy. 
Eagle Creek PH 1A 
Foreclosure Rate: 7.3 
Residential Burglary Rate: 4.6 
 Eagle Creek PH 1A lies in Census tract 167.04, which is considered an upper-
income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 60% white; 10% 
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Black/African American; 26% Hispanic; and 6.4% Asian.  The neighborhood is located 
in a rather rural, but developing area, in the southern part of the county.  There is a lot 
of new construction on the main road, and the road itself at the time of this research 
was under construction.  Compared to other neighborhoods, there is less traffic near 
this neighborhood and a lot more undeveloped land.  There is a Publix shopping plaza, 
which is about nine minutes from the neighborhood but appears to be the closest 
grocery store.  Eagle Creek PH 1A is a golf course community, with one entrance and 
exit that is gated with a fulltime guard.  There is a Home Owners’ Association for Eagle 
Creek which enforces guidelines for the neighborhood but residents still maintain their 
personal yards.  The neighborhood is not fenced and can be accessed from the road, 
but it does lie further off of the main road.  The community golf course separates the 
neighborhood from the main road.  It is very obvious that the neighborhood has not 
finished construction, with many empty lots and more room to expand and build houses.  
In total, there are approximately 480 homes with additional addresses of empty lots.  In 
fact, many of the homes were built in 2006 and after, but some homes were built as 
recent at 2010.   
Just as important, Eagle Creek does have four other phases; however, PH 1A is 
of importance for this study because it contained higher foreclosures and residential 
burglaries.  Three of the other phases that are directly linked to this phase had less than 
five foreclosures and residential burglaries (several had zero) for the five years of 
interest.  Thus, there is a large difference between this section of Eagle Creek, Ph 1A, 
and the other three sections.  There is a community center that also acts at the main 
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headquarters for the golf club, as well as a restaurant.  Further down the road, within 
another phase, there is a community pool, but no tennis or basketball court and no 
park/playground located within the neighborhood.  Moreover, as Table 1 indicates, for 
the years of 2005-2009, Eagle Creek PH 1A had a foreclosure count of 0, 0, 2, 6, and 
27.  The residential burglary count for 2005-2009 was 3, 3, 7, 5, and 4.  Interestingly 
then, as the foreclosures in Eagle Creek PH 1A increased, the residential burglary count 
remained somewhat stable.  In fact, in 2007 when foreclosures reached 2, residential 
burglaries in the neighborhood reached its highest at 7, and then as foreclosures 
increased in 2008 and 2009, reported residential burglaries actually decreased.  
Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported for this neighborhood.  Just as interesting, 
when taking into account the number of residences present in this neighborhood, the 
foreclosure rate is tied for rank at #24 and the residential burglary rate is tied for rank at 
#21, placing this neighborhood fairly low on both foreclosures and residential burglaries 
for the five years.   
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 4:00 pm 
 Upon arrival at Eagle Creek PH 1A, the gate was closed and the guard was 
present.  I was unable to gain access because the guard would not allow me to enter 
without having a purpose, besides wanting to observe the neighborhood.  Therefore, I 
was unfortunately unable to collect much data about the neighborhood.  From my 
vantage point though, I did count six vehicles both coming and going at the gate.  In 
addition, I observed several people on the golf course.  The golf course and the grounds 
at the front of the neighborhood were nicely manicured and maintained.  From the road 
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it was also visible that many of the houses in the neighborhood were fenced.  I also 
used Google Earth to get a better visual representation of the neighborhood and found 
that none of the houses were privately fenced.  So, not only was the neighborhood itself 
not fenced, personal residences were not fenced, probably due to HOA guidelines of 
the neighborhood.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 9:40 am 
 Upon second arrival at Eagle Creek PH 1A, there was once again a guard at the 
main entrance into the neighborhood.  However, this time the guard let me past the 
main entrance and to enter the neighborhood.  Unfortunately, this only brought me to 
the community center/golf club.  There was another gate to enter the actual residential 
neighborhood of PH 1A, and this gate was closed.  I did make a vehicle count of five 
during this partial canvass though.  I was unable to get a count for foot traffic and 
people outside in the neighborhood itself, but there were people at the community 
center/golf club and people playing golf.  The community pool was located behind 
another closed gate that went into a different phase, so I was unable to gain a count of 
people who were possibly at the pool.  Interestingly though, some of the other phases in 
Eagle Creek were not gated and these had townhomes built in them.  The gated phases 
were one to two story homes, much larger, and appeared much nicer and more 
expensive.  So it appears that the neighborhood was divided somewhat economically – 
the gated areas were more expensive homes, and the non-gated were less expensive, 
but still very nice and new, townhomes.  However, these phases, as mentioned above, 
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still had fewer foreclosures and residential burglaries, compared to the more expensive, 
gated phase.   
 Although I was unable to gain all of the information I wanted on the neighborhood 
to further understand the level of collective efficacy, there was still some very interesting 
findings.  Even though the neighborhood’s residential burglary count did not increase 
when the foreclosures increased, the neighborhood also only had a residential burglary 
rate of 4.6, tying it for the rank of 21st for 2005-2009.  Interestingly though, there were 
obvious characteristics that this neighborhood would have lower collective efficacy, and 
therefore may not be able to enforce informal social controls and reduce criminal 
activity.  First, the neighborhood is not fenced around the perimeter, which could allow 
easy access into the neighborhood to commit criminal acts.  Even more, none of the 
residences have privacy fences that could act as a barrier, or resemble a defensible 
space (Newman 1972; Brower et al. 1983), yet again, possibly allowing criminals an 
easy access into homes.   
 Another important factor supporting the claim that Eagle Creek PH 1A should 
have lower collective efficacy is the abundance of empty lots within the neighborhood 
which are strong indicators of low collective efficacy (Skogan 1992).  Empty residential 
lots are a sign of disorder, similar to vacant, foreclosed, or abandoned structures.  Not 
only can it reduce the amount of residents to act as informal social control agents, but it 
also illustrates that the neighborhood is struggling financially and is an obvious sign of 
disorder.  However, there is a gate with a guard, as well as other gates entering 
different phases of Eagle Creek, which help to prevent would-be criminals from entering 
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the neighborhood and committing a crime such as residential burglary.  Therefore, 
despite the numerous characteristics that are indicators of a decrease in collective 
efficacy, the ruralness (defined as an isolated area by Taylor, Twiff, and Mohan 2010) of 
the neighborhood and the fact that it was located further off the road are strong 
indicators that the collective efficacy was higher.  This finding is supported by other 
research that has also found that rural communities have a higher level of collective 
efficacy (Putnam 2007; Taylor et al. 2010).  The fact that it is also gated and has a 
guard present to act as an agent of social control is additional indicators of an increase 
in collective efficacy.  These positive indicators seem may overshadow all of the other 
structural characteristics that could result in higher residential burglaries.  Another 
possible explanation is that a section of this neighborhood is located next to Orlando 
Police Department’s jurisdiction.  This could cause a lower residential burglary rate 
reported by the Sheriff’s office because some of the burglaries could have been handled 
by the municipal police department. 
Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village 
Foreclosure Rate: 10.1 
Residential Burglary Rate: 5.8 
 
 Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village lies within Census tract 167.19, which is 
considered an upper-income level tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as 
follows: 53.8% white; 8.3% Black/African American; 28% Hispanic; and 6.4% Asian.  
The neighborhood rests in a more secluded area, surrounded by other residences, both 
single-family units and mobile homes.  The elementary school for the neighborhood also 
backs right up to it.  There are other phases of the neighborhood, so some of the 
134 
findings may incorporate parts of these phases.  However, I attempted to only focus on 
the roads included in PH 2 East Village of Waterford Trails.  One of the phases, PH 1, 
did actually have a rather high foreclosure and residential burglary count – 16 
foreclosures and 19 residential burglaries – but did not have a high enough count to 
make the list.  There are three entrances/exits into this neighborhood, and two of the 
entrances/exits are in other phases, none of which are gated.  Yet, the main 
entrance/exit into the neighborhood (also the largest) is in the phase of interest.   
 There is a Home Owners’ Association (HOA) present for the neighborhood which 
regulates residents’ control over certain aspects of their home, such as the type of 
fencing.  The perimeter of the neighborhood is partially fenced with wooded areas on 
other parts.  The neighborhood is in fair condition, with somewhat newer homes, but not 
as new of homes as other neighborhoods in the adjacent areas.  The roughly 325 
homes vary from one to two-story and most were built around 2005 or a little later, 
during the time of the housing boom.  Within the neighborhood there is a community 
pool, a tennis and basketball court, and a park/playground.  According to Table 1, the 
foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 0, 10, and 23.  In contrast, the residential 
burglary count for the same years was 0, 4, 5, 3, and 7, respectively.  With that said, 
there was a slight increase in residential burglaries when foreclosures were at their 
highest in 2009.  The argument, therefore, was supported – as foreclosures increased 
in this neighborhood and the neighborhood became more socially disorganized, 
residential burglaries also increased because of a lack of residents to enforce informal 
social controls.   
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Canvass 1 – May 12, 2011, 11:00 am 
 Upon arrival at Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village, and as mentioned above, I 
noticed that the neighborhood is not gated, but has a brick wall running along the front 
of the neighborhood.  The neighborhood had a fair amount of activity on this day, with 
many cars parked in driveways and on the road.  In fact, during the canvass, the vehicle 
traffic count was nine, the foot traffic was three, and the number of people located 
outside of their home was three.  These people ranged from doing yard work to washing 
vehicles.  There were two people at the neighborhood pool, and one gentleman on the 
tennis court, but the basketball and park/playground were vacant.  Also, although there 
is a neighborhood HOA, it was very apparent that residents were responsible for the 
maintenance of their own yards.  In fact, many of the yards, approximately half, were 
unkempt, overgrown, lots of weeds, and some contained trash or debris.  It was very 
obvious that the lack of yard care was a sign of physical disorder.   
 Additionally, most of the residential homes were not privately fenced.  During the 
canvass, I observed around 12 homes with ‘For Sale’ signs, and approximately 2 with 
‘For Rent’ signs.  Just as important, I could visibly identify at least five vacancies or 
foreclosures, if not more, based on the appearance of an overgrown yard and a house 
being empty and/or lock boxes present or changed locks (there are standard locks that 
mortgage contractors use to secure homes and they are also required to post signs in 
the window after inspection and changing of locks/securing).  Many of the yards though 
that were unkempt were not yards of vacant or foreclosed homes, but yards of homes 
with residents living in them.  The neighborhood was quite large with multiple phases to 
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the neighborhood.  In truth, in some areas of the neighborhood there was new 
construction going on and model homes present for prospective buyers to tour.   
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 2:00 pm 
 Upon second arrival at Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village on a Saturday, the 
activity within the neighborhood was similar to the first canvass.  For example, the 
vehicle traffic count was also nine, the foot traffic count was also three (one of which 
was a dog walker), but the number of people outside did increase to six (one of which 
was a resident mowing his/her lawn).  There were three people at the community pool 
and no one at the tennis or basketball court, or the park/playground.  Interestingly then, 
there was not a significant increase in outside activity on a weekend compared to a 
weekday, but both canvasses appeared to have a decent amount of activity no matter 
the day/time.  Same as the first canvass, at least half or more of the yards were not well 
taken care of, and many of these yards belonged to occupied residences.  There was 
also visible trash or debris, some in back yards of homes and some at the end of 
driveways as if waiting for trash day.   
 The results of both canvasses found strong indicators that support the argument 
that this neighborhood has less collective efficacy.  Some indicators were the 
appearance of physical disorder and the lack of barriers to prevent criminals from 
gaining access into the neighborhood and residences.  Although there was a bit of 
activity witnessed during both canvasses, which could shows that residents feel 
somewhat safe, the physical decay of yards, both occupied and vacant, was a common 
theme throughout the neighborhood.  Just as important, the fact that the neighborhood 
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was not gated, most of the neighborhood perimeter was not fenced, and most of the 
private residences did not have personal fences, are strong indicators of lowering 
collective efficacy.  In fact, it suggests that there is a lack of a barrier that can act as a 
defensible space (Newman 1972) to prevent or deter criminals from gaining access into 
a structure.  Interestingly then, some of the findings from the canvass would show that 
the neighborhood does have collective efficacy, while other stronger indicators show 
that because of the physical disorder and decay, the collective efficacy among residents 
is reduced, which could result in more crime such as residential burglary.   
Plantation Park Private Residences Condos 
Foreclosure Rate: 9.9 
Residential Burglary Rate: 4.6 
 Plantation Park Private Residences Condos lie in Census tract 170.05, which is 
considered a middle-income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as 
follows: 64.8% white; 6% Black/African American; 18.2% Hispanic; and 6.6% Asian.  
The neighborhood is located off of a very busy road where tourism is prominent.  There 
are other condos located nearby, and Plantation Park Condos advertises that they are a 
luxury condos.  There are two entrance and/or exits into the complex, both located at 
the very front of the neighborhood and it is gated.  Moreover, there are 12 buildings with 
over 300 privately owned condos, ranging from two to three-stories.  There is a Home 
Owners’ Association present for the neighborhood, which handles the maintenance of 
the buildings and the surrounding premises.  Yet again then, the residents are not 
responsible for the yard care themselves.  The perimeter of the condominium complex 
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is partly fenced; it is fenced along the most of the front near the road but a landscaping 
birm as well, but then around the sides there are bushes and a wooded area.   
 Some of the residences have personal detached garages, while others do not.  
The neighborhood has a community pool, tennis court, and park/playground.  The 
condos were built in 1996, and although they are well maintained, it was obvious that 
they were somewhat older compared to the other neighborhoods and condos in this 
study.  Furthermore, as Table 1 shows, the foreclosures for Plantation Park from 2005-
2009 ranged from 0, 0, 0, 1, to 31, while the residential burglary count for 2005-2009 
ranged from 3, 8, 0, 2, to 2.  Therefore, as foreclosures increased, and drastically 
increased in 2009, the residential burglary count remained stable, or even decreased, 
considering it peaked at eight residential burglaries in 2006.  The evidence does not 
lend strong support for this neighborhood being socially disorganized.   
Canvass 1 – May 17, 2011, 1:25 pm 
 Upon arrival at Plantation Park Private Residences Condos, both gates located 
at the front of the neighborhood were closed.  I was able to gain access though using a 
‘dummy’ code.  The area surrounding the neighborhood, as mentioned above, is a fairly 
busy tourist and commercial area, and on this day, it was definitely active.  Also as 
mentioned in the above discussion, the condos advertise as being luxury condos.  
Although they were well maintained, they did not appear to be luxury condos, at least 
compared to other condos nearby.  On this weekday, the activity in the neighborhood 
was quiet and the parking lot appeared about half full.  As for the activity in the 
neighborhood, there was a vehicle traffic count of four, foot traffic count of one, and only 
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one person recorded as being outside.  There were two people located at the 
community pool, but no one at the tennis court or park/playground.  Just as important, 
there were no visible signs of any ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ condos, nor were there any 
visible signs of vacancies or foreclosures.  Then again, this is expected for 
condominium complexes and strict HOA guidelines.  Obviously, the grounds, grass, 
trees, shrubs, etc., were well maintained because they are professionally done through 
the HOA.  During the canvass, there did appear to be some physical disorder though; 
some of the blinds in the private residences were in disarray, mostly ripped and/or 
severely damaged.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 1:50 pm 
 Upon second arrival at Plantation Park Private Residences Condos, both gates 
were once again closed.  Luckily, I was able to gain access using a ‘dummy’ code 
again.  The activity in the surrounding area was even busier on this day.  For the most 
part, there was more activity in the neighborhood on this Saturday, and around half or 
more of the parking lot was full with vehicles.  During the canvass, I counted five for 
vehicle traffic, zero for foot traffic, and five people outside of their residences.  Even 
more, there were five or more people at the community pool, but no one at the tennis 
court or park/playground.  There was also more signs of physical disorder on this 
canvass; there was a large amount of trash outside of one of the dumpster within the 
neighborhood.   
 The results of both neighborhood canvasses do somewhat support the 
contention that there is collective efficacy among neighbors.  The main neighborhood 
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indicator is the fact the Plantation Park is gated and the gates remained closed.  This 
undoubtedly forms a barrier or defensible space (Newman 1972) and can also prevent 
criminals from gaining access into the neighborhood.  Also, the fact that there was 
activity in the neighborhood, vehicle traffic, people outside, and people at the pool, 
shows a reduction is social disorder (Woldoff 2002); it also shows that residents may 
feel safe since they are outside which can increase collective efficacy.  Yet, there were 
also characteristics that support having a lower level of collective efficacy.  There were 
definite signs of physical disorder, such as the blinds in some condos being in disarray 
and the excess of trash at the dumpsters.  Also, there was not much foot traffic within 
the neighborhood.  These are all good indicators of why this neighborhood falls around 
the middle of ranks in residential burglary.  While there are strong indicators of more 
collective efficacy, there are also other indicators which can reduce it.   
Los Terranos 
Foreclosure Rate: 26.9 
Residential Burglary Rate: 4.6 
 Los Terranos lies in three different Census tracts: 135.06, 135.07, and 167.11, 
which are considered moderate, middle, and middle-income tracts.  The racial/ethnic 
composition of the three tracts are as follows: 41.6% white; 7.1% Black/African 
American; 49.9% Hispanic; and .7% Asian (135.06); 37.2% white; 10% Black/African 
American; 48.2% Hispanic; and 3.3% Asian (135.07); and 43.1% white; 4.9% 
Black/African American; 39.4% Hispanic; and 6.4% Asian (167.11).  There is a busy, 
six-lane road located nearby with a lot of commercial buildings, new shopping, and a 
Super Wal-Mart. The City of Orlando’s Police Department is also located close by and 
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although this neighborhood lies within Orange County Sheriff’s office jurisdiction, it is 
situated next to Orlando Police Department’s jurisdiction.  Yet, the neighborhood itself is 
more rural and more of an industrial area, with homes (slightly more than 100) mixed in 
with industrial businesses.  Interestingly, locating Los Terranos proved to be difficult.  
There is not a designated neighborhood called Los Terranos, with a sign or an obvious 
perimeter.  The neighborhood is more spread out, and many of the homes and 
businesses are situated on larger lots, similar to many other neighborhoods in the area.  
Of the businesses located in Los Terranos, there are construction companies, several 
churches, an auto body business, and a phone company, to name a few.  There is no 
Home Owners’ Association present for the neighborhood, and therefore, all residents 
are responsible for the maintenance of their own property.   
 What’s more, since this is not a typical neighborhood, there is no community 
pool, sporting courts, or park/playground within the neighborhood.  Also, there is no 
fence surrounding the neighborhood, because once again, locating the boundary of the 
neighborhood was quite difficult.   The homes in the neighborhood varied a lot as well, 
from single and double-wide mobile homes, to one to two story newer constructed 
homes.  The year the homes were built ranged significantly as well, from being built in 
the 1930s all the way into the 2000s.  Plus, as mentioned above, Los Terranos lies in 
three different Census tracts, both moderate and middle-income level tracts, and this 
was evident based on the appearance of many of the homes.  Some are more rundown 
and dilapidated, while others are better maintained and more presentable.  In addition, 
as Table 1 indicates, the foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 0, 2, and 27.  The 
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residential burglary count, in contrast, was 0, 2, 0, 2, and 1 for the same years.  With 
that said, as foreclosures jumped in 2009, residential burglaries in Los Terranos 
remained stable and very minimal.  Thus, it does not appear that the neighborhood 
became socially disorganized, based on the residential burglary count, when 
foreclosures increased.  
Canvass 1 – May 12, 2011, 1:00 pm 
 Upon arrival at Los Terranos, it was apparent that this neighborhood was more 
laid back and slow paced, with less traffic, both vehicle and foot, and minimal people 
outside.  In fact, during the canvass, there were only three vehicles counted as vehicle 
traffic, and no one on foot or outside of his/her home.  Also, some of the yards appeared 
to be more unkempt and in worse condition.  The same goes for some of the homes.  
Some homes were in nice condition and well maintained, while other homes were more 
dilapidated and cluttered.  There was yard debris at some homes as well.  Some of the 
houses had privacy fences, but that lots were larger and so there was a lot of land and 
wooded area between private residences.  I did not see any ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ 
signs; I did have a difficult time identifying possible vacancies and foreclosures.  Even 
more, there was an industrial park near the homes and warehouses used for storage or 
business fronts.   There are other neighborhoods nearby that appear to be more 
rundown and older as well.  Despite all of the other neighborhoods nearby 
(approximately 20 surrounding Los Terranos), only one has more foreclosures than Los 
Terranos, and of the areas covered by the Orange County Sheriff’s Office, a handful 
have more residential burglaries.  So, it does appear that the areas surrounding this 
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neighborhood also have high foreclosures and residential burglaries, but not enough to 
make the sample for the current research.  Accordingly, this neighborhood was very 
different than all of the other neighborhoods in the study.   
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 9:30 am 
 Upon second arrival at Los Terranos, the activity around the neighborhood did 
improve.  On this Saturday, the vehicle count was four, the foot traffic was four, one of 
which was a dog walker, and the number of people outside was five.  Also, there was a 
garage sale underway in the neighborhood.  Some of the yards were still overgrown and 
unkempt, and there were still some signs of physical decay, such as debris and trash in 
some of the yards.  Without a doubt though, this neighborhood is an anomaly and far 
different than any of the other neighborhoods.  Why there were only five reported 
residential burglaries in 2005-2009 is really unknown.   
There are some conclusions that can be made from the canvassing however.  
First, the fact that there are many commercial and industrial businesses located in the 
neighborhood could decrease the number of residential burglaries because there are 
less residences in this neighborhood; however, the rates obviously take this into 
consideration and the results are still surprising.  Also, there are many other 
neighborhoods surrounding Los Terranos and perhaps residential burglaries are more 
dispersed throughout the various neighborhoods and not so concentrated in Los 
Terranos only.  Lastly, the ruralness of the neighborhood is a strong indicator of higher 
collective efficacy, as Putnam (2007) and Taylor et al. (2010) also found.   
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Despite these characteristics, there are also many characteristics that would 
support having lower collective efficacy and therefore one would expect there to be a 
higher residential burglary rate in the neighborhood.  For instance, this neighborhood is 
comprised of both moderate and middle-income levels, and many of the houses are 
more decayed than most of the houses in other neighborhoods (Skogan 1992).  Also, 
there was not a large amount of activity within the neighborhood, which is an indicator of 
having less collective efficacy.  Perhaps there is less collective efficacy but some other 
variable explains why the residential burglary rate is so low for this neighborhood 
despite the high foreclosure rate.  One possible explanation is the fact that this 
neighborhood is located directly next to Orlando Police Department’s jurisdiction, as 
discussed previously.  This could cause a lower residential burglary rate reported by the 
Sheriff’s office because some of the burglaries could have been handled by the 
municipal police department.  However, that is not the scope of the current research to 
investigate.   
Sandpoint at Meadow Woods 
Foreclosure Rate: 20.6 
Residential Burglary Rate: 17.6 
 Sandpoint at Meadow Woods lies in Census tract 168.05, which is a middle-
income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10% 
Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian.  The neighborhood is located 
in a quiet area with other residential neighborhoods.  There are approximately 136 
residences in the neighborhood, all of which are two stories built in 1998 and connected 
to each other by a small structure, most likely a utility room.  The neighborhood is not 
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gated, with only one entrance/exit.  There is a mobile guard office located at the 
entrance, but it is unoccupied.  Moreover, there is a sign at the entrance indicating that 
there is video surveillance for the neighborhood.  There is a Home Owners’ Association 
for the neighborhood which maintains the residents’ grass in the front yard only 
(residents are still responsible for maintaining the backyards).  Most of the perimeter is 
fenced, except for a section near the back of the neighborhood in which is backs up to a 
pond.  In fact, all of the personal yards are also fully fenced (HOA guidelines).  There is 
a community pool in the neighborhood, but no sporting courts or park/playground.  Also, 
there are speed bumps throughout the neighborhood and signs displayed that you are 
not allowed to park on the street between 12:00 am and 6:00 am (HOA guidelines).  As 
Table 1 illustrates, foreclosures in the neighborhood for 2005-2009 were 0, 0, 4, 9, and 
15, while the residential burglary count for the same years was 2, 4, 3, 8, and 7.  Thus, 
residential burglaries in the neighborhood did actually increase in the latter years when 
foreclosures increased.  So, there is support for the hypothesis that foreclosures caused 
this neighborhood to become socially disorganized and in effect, residential burglaries 
increased.   
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 2:40 pm 
 Upon arrival at Sandpoint at Meadow Woods, the yards appeared to be very well 
maintained and the streets were very clean.  Perhaps the HOA placed very strict 
guidelines and rules for residents and it helped to maintain a very clean and presentable 
neighborhood.  It is was quiet on this day, with only one recorded vehicle traffic, zero 
recorded foot traffic, and two people located outside.  There was no one at the 
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community pool, but almost every household has a private pool as well.  During the 
canvass, I located at least two ‘For Sale’ signs and one ‘For Rent’ sign, and there were 
approximately three visible vacancies or foreclosures.  All in all, the neighborhood’s 
activity was minimal and there were not many residents according to the field 
observation.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 11:20 am 
 Upon second arrival at Sandpoint at Meadow Woods, many of the same findings 
were observed.  This time, however, the vehicle count was three, the foot traffic count 
was one, and the number of people located outside was two.  Also, the community pool 
was closed for construction on this day.  Yet, I once again observed the same ‘For Sale’ 
and ‘For Rent’ signs and the visible vacancies or foreclosures.  Moreover, the 
neighborhood was quiet and still in very nice condition, and the guard office was still 
unoccupied.  In fact, it appeared that the guard office was just the structure and no one 
had occupied it for some time.   
 All in all, this neighborhood ranked 6th in foreclosure rates and 2nd in residential 
burglary rates for the five years, resulting in a high foreclosure/high crime relationship.  
So, does this neighborhood have lower collective efficacy which helps to explain this 
phenomenon? Some of the findings do support that.  For instance, there is no gate or 
guard occupying the office, so those two cannot act as deterrents.  Also, there was 
minimal activity on both days of the canvassing, making it appear that residents may not 
feel as safe outside of their home.  However, there are many other indicators that could 
increase the level of collective efficacy within the neighborhood.  For example, there is a 
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sign posted at the entrance indicating there is video surveillance which could deter 
criminals.  Also, every home is fenced (Brower et al. 1983), which displays to possible 
criminals that this is a defensible space (Newman 1972) and may keep criminals out.  
Lastly, the neighborhood was very well taken care of, with the houses in exceptional 
condition and the yards very well maintained which shows a lack of physical disorder 
(Skogan 1992).   
 So, what other explanations are there for the neighborhood’s higher residential 
burglary rate?  One last explanation, spillover from surrounding neighborhoods, holds 
some credence.  For instance, the various neighborhoods surrounding Sandpoint have 
foreclosures ranging from five up to nineteen, and a residential burglary count ranging 
from four to twenty-three.  Thus, it does appear that this neighborhood has a moderate 
level of collective efficacy based on various physical and social indicators even though it 
has high foreclosures, and that the spillover from surrounding neighborhoods may help 
to explain the higher rate of residential burglaries.   
La Cascada PH 1 
Foreclosure Rate: 13.9 
Residential Burglary Rate: 11.4 
 La Cascada PH 1 lies in Census tract 168.05, which is a middle-income tract.  
The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10% Black/African 
American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian.  This neighborhood is surrounded by cow 
pastures, off the side of a busy state road.  In other words, La Cascada PH 1 is in the 
middle of nowhere.  Basically, the neighborhood is surrounded by open fields and 
woods.  There are three entrances/exits into the neighborhood, none of which are 
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gated.  Also, as the neighborhood’s name implies, there are several phases to La 
Cascada; of interest to this research is PH 1, but there is also PH 1B and PH 1C.  Some 
of the entrances/exits into the neighborhood are in the different phases, and PH 1 
actually lies more in the middle of the other two phases.  Therefore, I did try to limit my 
canvass to PH 1 only (PH 1B had eight foreclosures and eleven residential burglaries; 
PH 1C had eleven foreclosures and fourteen residential burglaries).   
 Furthermore, there is a Home Owners’ Association (HOA) which enforces rules 
and guidelines, such as the type of fencing residents can use.  However, each resident 
is responsible for the maintenance of their own yard.  There is no fence surrounding the 
perimeter of the neighborhood, but instead open land and some wooded areas, as 
mentioned above.  The roughly 200 homes in the neighborhood are in fairly good 
condition, ranging from townhomes to one and two-story homes.  The homes were built 
in the mid 2000s, about 2005, during the construction boom.  There is a community pool 
and park/playground in the neighborhood, but no sporting courts.  Interestingly, as 
Table 1 explains, the foreclosures in the neighborhood for 2005-2009 increased from 0, 
0, 1, 7, and 20, while the residential burglary count in the neighborhood for the same 
years fluctuated from 1, 5, 4, 9, and 4.  Thus, as the foreclosures in La Cascada PH 1 
increased, residential burglaries actually increased in 2008 and then decreased in 2009 
when foreclosures were at their highest.  As a result, it does not appear that this 
neighborhood fits social disorganization theory’s basic argument – as an area becomes 
more socially disorganized (e.g., increase in residential instability/mobility, or 
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foreclosures in the case of this research), crime (e.g., residential burglaries) will 
increase.   
Canvass 1 – May 19, 2011, 1:45 pm 
 Upon arrival at La Cascada PH 1, there were flags along the road leading up to 
the neighborhood advertising the home builder’s name, as well as signs indicating they 
are now leasing homes.  Even more, there was a sign for Beacon Park, which appeared 
to be part of the larger neighborhood of La Cascada.  Also, there was a ‘Private 
Property’ sign displayed at the entrance of the neighborhood.  The neighborhood was 
rather quiet with not much outside activity, with approximately half or fewer vehicles 
parked in driveways and some parked on the street.  In fact, there were four vehicles in 
the neighborhood and were recorded as vehicle traffic.  There was also one person 
recorded as foot traffic, and four people outside, some of which were doing yard work.  
The community pool was occupied by five people, some of which were children, and no 
one was at the park/playground.  Some of the private yards in the neighborhood were 
fenced, but most were not.  Furthermore, some of the yards were not well maintained 
and some contained debris or trash.  Some of these yards belonged to occupied homes 
while some did not.  During the canvass, I located around eight visible ‘For Sale’ signs 
and three visible ‘For Rent’ signs, and there were around four visible homes either 
vacant or in foreclosure.  Lastly, there were two patrol vehicles in the neighborhood that 
appeared to belong to residents, both were police for the local city police department.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 10:00 am 
150 
 Upon second arrival at La Cascada PH 1, there were mowers present 
maintaining the neighborhood’s boundary.  On this Saturday, the activity was once 
again quiet, with only one recorded vehicle as vehicle traffic, two people recorded as 
foot traffic, and three people located outside.  Also, there was only one person at the 
community pool on this day and no one at the park/playground once again.  Perhaps 
the activity was lower during this canvass because the canvass took place in the early 
morning and people were not out and mobile yet.  Once again, numerous yards were 
unkempt and not well maintained, and there was visible trash and yard debris.  Finally, 
the two police patrol vehicles were present during this canvass as well.   
 Although residential burglary in each individual year did not increase as 
foreclosures increased, the total residential burglary rate for 2005-2009 places this 
neighborhood in fourth out of the thirty neighborhoods in this study.  So, the canvasses 
were relevant in locating certain indicators that would clarify if collective efficacy 
explains this phenomenon.   Despite the fact that the neighborhood is located in a more 
rural area (Putnam 2007), surrounded by open pastures and woods, and is more 
difficult to access, as well as the two police patrols living in the neighborhood, other 
indicators of this neighborhood would suggest lower collective efficacy which explains 
the higher total residential burglary count.  For instance, of the three entrances/exits, 
none of them are gated to help reduce residential burglaries.   
 What’s more, the perimeter of the neighborhood is not fenced (Newman 1972), 
which could act as a barrier and deterrent for criminals.  There were not many personal 
yards that were fenced either (Brower et al. 1983), which also can act as a barrier and 
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deterrent.  There were also signs of physical disorder or decay.  There were obvious 
vacancies and foreclosures, and many of the yards were not well maintained, even the 
ones that were currently occupied (Skogan 1992).  In addition, the trash and/or yard 
debris is a sign of disorder and can reduce collective efficacy among residents.  Also, 
there was less activity in this neighborhood on both days of the canvass compared to 
other neighborhoods with less residential burglaries, which are all strong indicators of 
lower collective efficacy.   
Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1 
Foreclosure Rate: 15.8 
Residential Burglary Rate: 11.1 
 Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1 lies in Census tract 168.05, which is 
considered a middle-income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as 
follows: 23.3% white; 10% Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian.  
The neighborhood is located in a larger neighborhood, Meadow Woods, close to a 
previously discussed neighborhood, Sandpoint.  This neighborhood is situated in a quiet 
area surrounded by many other neighborhoods, and there is a shopping plaza with a 
Publix Shopping store located close by.  There is a second phase to the neighborhood, 
PH 2, which is intertwined within Cedar Bend (PH 2 had a total foreclosure count of 12, 
and a residential burglary count of 9).  I attempted to minimize as much of my 
observations to PH 1 only.  There is one entrance and/or exit into the neighborhood, 
and it is gated.  There are approximately 170, one to two-story residences located in PH 
1, and most of the homes were built in 2005, during the housing boom.   
152 
 There is a Home Owners’ Association present, but the residents are still 
responsible for the preservation of their own yards.  The HOA does enforce strict 
guidelines on the type of fencing residents can use though.  With that said, most of the 
yards are not fenced, and the perimeter of the neighborhood is partially fenced.  There 
is fencing along the front and sides, separating it from the road and other 
neighborhoods, but no fence in the rear where there are ponds and a wooded area.  
There is a community pool and a park/playground located within the neighborhood, but 
no tennis or basketball courts.  More importantly, according to Table 1, as foreclosures 
increased in 2005-2009 from 0, 0, 0, 9, and 18, the residential burglary count actually 
remained stable, at 5, 2, 5, 3, and 4.  Thus, the hypothesis that as foreclosures increase 
the neighborhood becomes more socially disorganized and then crime (e.g., residential 
burglary) will increase, was not supported.   
Canvass 1 – May 19, 2011, 11:35 am 
 Upon arrival at Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1, the entrance and exit gates 
were both closed.  I was able to gain access though by following another vehicle in.  
Posted at the entrance was a ‘Deed Restricted’ sign, as well as a brick wall running 
along the front of the neighborhood.  As would be expected on a weekday morning, the 
neighborhood was mostly quiet, with about half of the driveways with parked cars.  Just 
as important, a member of the Orange County Sheriff’s Office had his/her vehicle 
parked in a driveway.  There were also some cars parked on the street, although there 
were signs posted against doing so.  There was in fact some activity in the 
neighborhood, albeit not as much as other neighborhoods.  The vehicle traffic count 
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was six, the foot traffic count was seven, and the number of people outside was zero.  
Moreover, there was no one located at the community pool or park/playground.  During 
the canvass, I did not locate any ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs, but I did locate 
approximately five homes that were vacant or in foreclosure, based on unkempt yards 
and visible empty homes.  Many yards were very well maintained, but some yards were 
not; some of these yards belonged to vacant or foreclosed homes, but some unkempt 
yards were in fact currently occupied.  There was some trash and/or debris located in 
yards and along streets.  There were also many garbage cans located at the end of 
driveways, but it was apparent that it was trash pickup day.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 10:20 am 
 Upon second arrival at Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1, the entrance and 
exit gates were once again closed, and I was able to gain access once again.  For a 
weekend, the traffic activity for the neighborhood was fairly minimal.  For example, the 
vehicle and foot traffic count were both two, but the number of people outside increased 
to six.  These were either people doing yard work or working on their vehicles.  No one 
was at the pool or park/playground on this day either.  Interestingly though, at the time 
of this canvass, there was a sign posted at the pool that the pool was closed.  Once 
again, there were a few cars parked on the street, even though there are obvious signs 
posted against doing so.  On this day of canvassing, I also located another police patrol 
vehicle parked at a residence; this time is was a city police department vehicle.  
Therefore, there are at least two police officers living in the neighborhood.  Yet again, 
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there were yards that were unkempt, overgrown, and contained debris, as well as 
visible vacancies and/or foreclosures.   
 All in all, as both of the neighborhood canvasses demonstrate, Cedar Bend at 
Meadow Woods PH 1 exhibited some signs of physical disorder which are indicators of 
low collective efficacy (Skogan 1992).  Overgrown, unkempt yards, trash and debris in 
the neighborhood, and obvious vacancies and/or foreclosures were all signs of physical 
disorder.  The neighborhood also showed signs of social disorder, such as parking on 
the street even though there are obvious signs against doing so.  Other observations 
that support the neighborhood having lower collective efficacy are the fact that the 
perimeter of the neighborhood is not fully fenced and most of the yards are not privately 
fenced (Newman 1972; Brower et al. 1983).  Also, compared to other neighborhoods in 
the study, the activity within the neighborhood on both days of observations was 
minimal.  All of these are strong indicators of low collective efficacy.     
 However, there were other indicators within the neighborhood of more collective 
efficacy.  For instance, the fact that the neighborhood is gated, and it is closed most, if 
not all of the time, makes it more difficult for would-be criminals to gain access.  Also, 
the presence of two police officers living in the neighborhood could act as a deterrent.  
Yet, these police officers might not have been present in the years of 2005-2009, so 
they would not have acted as a deterrent for the years of this research.  When taking all 
of these factors into consideration, it is obvious why this neighborhood has a higher rate 
of residential burglary.  While the neighborhood is taking steps to increase collective 
efficacy, there are also other considerable characteristics of the neighborhood that are 
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stronger and suppress these which results in a low to moderate level of collective 
efficacy.     
Island Cove Villas PH 3 
Foreclosure Rate: 15.4 
Residential Burglary Rate: 8.6 
 Island Cove Villas PH 3 lies in Census tract 168.05, which is a middle-income 
tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10% 
Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian.  The neighborhood is situated 
off of a busy road with other residential neighborhoods and shopping plazas.  There is a 
Publix Shopping plaza, a Walgreens, and a new CVS located nearby.  There is one 
entrance/exit into the neighborhood and it is not gated.  The neighborhood is comprised 
of approximately 37 separate buildings, with about 175 different residences in one to 
two-story townhomes.  The townhomes were built in the mid 1990s, between 1994 and 
1995.  There is a Home Owners’ Association present that is responsible for all of the 
maintenance and enforces the rules and regulations of the residents.  With that said, the 
HOA is responsible for the maintenance of the lawns, and therefore residents are not 
responsible for maintaining the grass.   
 What’s more, the perimeter of the neighborhood is partially fenced, but there are 
also ponds and other wooded areas surrounding the neighborhood.  There are speed 
bumps throughout the neighborhood.  There is a community pool, but no a tennis or 
basketball court or park/playground.  None of the yards are privately fenced either.  As 
the neighborhood’s name suggests, there are other phases to Island Cove Villas.  
However, the other phases are not directly connected together, but actually have 
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separate entrances and roads off the major road.  Therefore, none of the findings and 
observations incorporate the other phases of the neighborhoods.  Furthermore, as 
Table 1 indicates, Island Cove Villas PH 3’s foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 
1, 8, and 18.  The residential burglary count was 4, 5, 4, 1, and 1.  Thus, as foreclosures 
increased in the neighborhood, residential burglary actually decreased.  
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 2:50 pm 
 Upon arrival at Island Cove Villas PH 3, there was a ‘Neighborhood Watch’ and 
‘No Solicitor’ sign posted at the entrance.  The neighborhood is fairly small and well 
taken care of.  As mentioned above, the HOA maintains the yards and they were nicely 
kept.  There were three vehicles recorded as vehicle traffic, one person recorded as foot 
traffic (a dog walker), and one person located outside (working on his/her vehicle).   
Also, there were three people located at the community pool.  During the canvass, I did 
not locate any ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ homes.  On this day, I did not locate any 
vacancies or foreclosures, but as mentioned in previous discussions, this can be difficult 
in condos and townhome neighborhoods when an HOA maintains the lawn.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 3:00 pm 
 Upon second arrival at Island Cove Villas PH 3, some of the activity increased.  
For instance, the vehicle traffic count was three, the foot traffic count was one, but the 
number of people located outside increased to nine, some of which were children 
playing.  This is somewhat to be expected since this canvass took place on a weekend.  
There was also a garage sale in progress during this canvass which can undoubtedly 
increase the overall activity within the neighborhood.  There was no one at the 
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community pool on this day though.  Even more, during this canvass, I was able to 
indentify approximately four vacancies or foreclosures based on the presence of 
changed locks and lock boxes at the front doors of some townhomes.   
 As the results of both canvassing reveal, this neighborhood did have less 
physical disorder than previous neighborhoods which is a strong indicator of collective 
efficacy (Skogan 1992).  The fact that the HOA maintained the lawns really helps on the 
appearance of a neighborhood, and can increase resident’s collective efficacy.  
Moreover, it was a smaller neighborhood and residents could more easily be acquainted 
with one another which can reduce social disorder (Woldoff 2002).  The ‘Neighborhood 
Watch’ and ‘No Solicitor’ sign could also act as a deterrent for possible criminals.  
However, there were other characteristics of the neighborhood that could decrease the 
collective efficacy and increase crime, such as residential burglary.  For example, the 
neighborhood is not gated, the homes are not privately fenced, and the neighborhood’s 
perimeter is not entirely fenced (Newman 1972; Brower et al. 1983).  There were also 
visible vacancies and foreclosures in the neighborhood that could decrease collective 
efficacy because there is less neighbors to bond with and act as informal agents of 
control.  Perhaps this is why this neighborhood is ranked 11th in residential burglary 
rate.   
Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1 
Foreclosure Rate: 6.5 
Residential Burglary Rate: 9.0 
 
 Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1 lies in Census tract 168.05, which is a middle-
income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10% 
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Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian.  Wyndham Lakes Estates UT 1 
is located further down on a residential road off of a main road (Rhode Island Woods 
Circle), with many neighborhoods along the way.  The neighborhood is definitely more 
secluded, or ‘off the beaten path,’ compared to the many neighborhoods that are 
located closer to the main entrance road.  Even more, Wyndham Lakes Estates has 
smaller neighborhoods located within, with some being attached directly and others 
located off the main road (Wyndham Lakes Blvd).  Wyndham Lakes Blvd and the 
neighborhoods located off of it were nicely maintained, with sidewalks and a brick wall 
separating the main road from the neighborhoods.  Most of the area surrounding this 
neighborhood, as well as others nearby, backs up to a heavily wooded area.  Wyndham 
Lakes ESTS itself has three entrances and exits for the neighborhood; one 
entrance/exit on the north side of the neighborhood and two entrance/exits on the south 
side.  None of the three entrance or exits are gated.  Lastly, the 400 homes in the 
neighborhood were built in the mid to late 2000s, mostly from 2006-2008.   
 There is a Home Owners’ Association for the neighborhood.  It appeared that the 
HOA enforced guidelines in regard to the type of fencing the residences could install 
around their homes.  Some of the residential homes were in fact privately fenced, but 
the majority were not and either backed up to a wooded area or a pond.  However, all 
residences are responsible for the maintenance of their own yards.  The perimeter of 
the neighborhood was partly fenced, only with the brick wall located in the front of the 
neighborhood.  Within the neighborhood, some residents have personal pools, but there 
is not a community pool, tennis court and basketball court, or park/playground located 
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inside the neighborhood.  However, there is a community center near the neighborhood 
with a large pool, four tennis courts, and a basketball court.   
 According to the property appraiser’s office, there are three sections to Wyndham 
Lakes Estates (UT 1, UT 2, and UT 4).  In fact, these ‘units’ are all attached, but are 
comprised of certain streets/addresses within Wyndham Lake Estates.  Yet, the 
information on foreclosures and residential burglaries is only for UT 1, and so when 
conducting the neighborhood canvasses, I limited my observations and notes to only 
the streets and addresses that were given for this unit.  Interestingly, one of the streets 
located in Wyndham Lakes Estates UT 1 is a dead-end street with houses with a much 
larger value than the other houses located on other streets within the same unit.  This 
one street however, is still located within the same Census tract, which is considered 
middle-income.  Just as important, the foreclosure count for Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 
1 for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 0, 7, and 19, while the residential burglary count for the same 
years was 0, 2, 5, 14, and 15.  Therefore, there was an increase in residential burglaries 
in this neighborhood as foreclosures increased, indicating that this neighborhood did 
become more disorganized as foreclosures, one ecological characteristic, increased.   
Canvass 1 – May 19, 2011, 12:25 pm 
 Upon arriving at Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1, the first location canvassed was 
the dead-end road with newer and more expensive homes.  The street is not long, and 
has only one entrance and exit, with no gate.  There were approximately 10-15 homes 
located off this one street, with many empty lots.  It was very obvious that this area had 
slowed, or even stopped, construction due to the economy.  This street, as well as the 
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others located in UT 1, were surrounded by many ponds and wooded areas.  Just as 
important, the different entrance/exits to the various streets within the neighborhood 
also had posted signs indicating the neighborhood was deed restricted and had an 
active neighborhood watch.  The other streets within this unit, which were located a 
short distance down the main road, were also newer constructed homes, just smaller 
than the homes discussed above.   
 While conducting the first neighborhood canvass, five vehicles were recorded as 
car traffic, two people were recorded as foot traffic, and there were two people who 
were located outside.  Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the residents in the 
neighborhood are responsible for the maintenance of their own yards, and some of the 
yards of homes that were in fact occupied were poorly maintained.  Also, there were 
some obvious signs of vacancies or foreclosures, strictly measured by the visibility of 
abandoned of homes (grass in yards very overgrown), and visible signs of changed 
locks and lock boxes on the front doors of some homes.  However, there were no visible 
‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs located at the homes within this neighborhood.  Just as 
important, there was an Orange County Sheriff’s Office vehicle parked at one of the 
homes during the canvass.   As mentioned above, there was a community center 
located near the neighborhood that offered various recreational activities.  On this day 
though, the community center, the pool, and the various courts appeared empty (some 
vehicles but no visible activity).  In all, the neighborhood was fairly quiet, with not much 
activity or cars parked outside; although, the canvass did take place on a weekday, 
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around lunch time, where many residences could be working or out for the day which 
can explain this observation.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 10:15 am 
 The second canvass of the neighborhood took place on a Saturday, and one 
would assume that the activity within and around the neighborhood should increase.  
However, there was not a substantial increase in activity from the first canvass that took 
place on a Thursday and the second canvass, which took place on Saturday.  The car 
traffic count was only one, while the foot traffic was recorded as four, and there were 
two people outside during the canvass.  Thus, there was a fluctuation in activity among 
all three, with car traffic decreasing from five to one, foot traffic slightly increasing from 
three to four, and the number of people recorded outside stayed the same on both days, 
at two.  Nonetheless, there was an increase in activity around the surrounding area, 
with more foot activity, such as dog walkers, using the sidewalks located on the outside 
of the neighborhood.  There was also more people at the community center.  
Additionally, there were people at the basketball court and people at the pool.   
 Even though this neighborhood had one of the lowest foreclosure rates for the 
five years (6.5 per 100 houses), the total residential burglary rate was still 9.0.  
Therefore, the residential burglary rate for this neighborhood ranked as #9 for all thirty 
neighborhoods.  Moreover, even though the outside of the neighborhood was nicely 
maintained, with sidewalks, a community center, and a brick wall, there were other 
indicators indicating a lower level of collective efficacy within the neighborhood.  This is 
supported by the level of activity recorded on the two days of canvassing.  Also, none of 
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the neighborhood’s entrances/exits were gated, and therefore there was no barrier to 
prevent or reduce residential burglaries.  Most of the houses were not privately fenced 
either (Brower et al. 1983), which can also reduce or prevent crime, especially 
residential burglary.  Although the neighborhood had posted signs indicating a 
‘Neighborhood Watch,’ it is not clear when the neighborhood administered a 
neighborhood watch, and whether that was implemented after 2009 when residential 
burglaries increased substantially.  Also, as mentioned previously, a Sheriff’s officer was 
a resident in the neighborhood, but it is not apparent on when he/she became a resident 
of the neighborhood either.  Once again, this could have been after 2009.  If both of the 
‘Neighborhood Watch’ and Sheriff’s officer were present in the neighborhood during the 
years of 2005-2009, it is apparent that neither were good indicators of an increased 
amount of collective efficacy and thus could not reduce residential burglary.   
Heather Glen at Meadow Woods 
Foreclosure Rate: 13.3 
Residential Burglary Rate: 16.1 
 Heather Glen at Meadow Woods lies in Census tract 168.05, which is considered 
a middle-income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% 
white; 10% Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian.  The neighborhood 
is the third and final neighborhood in this research that lies in the larger neighborhood of 
Meadow Woods.  This neighborhood is located further down the road though, closer to 
other neighborhoods that are older and more dilapidated.  There is a large park located 
next door to the neighborhood, Meadow Woods Park, which is part of Orange County 
Parks and Recreation.  Also located around the park is the Orange County Recreation 
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Center, which is sponsored by the Orlando Magic basketball team.  There is a water 
plant around the corner as well.  There is only one entrance/exit into the neighborhood 
and it is not gated.  The neighborhood is made up of approximately 180, one to two-
story single family homes that were built in the early 2000s.   
 There is a Home Owners’ Association for the neighborhood, but it does not 
handle the maintenance of the yards; each resident is responsible for his/her own yard.  
The perimeter of the neighborhood is partially fenced, but mostly only on the east side 
of the neighborhood separating it from another residential neighborhood.  The rest of 
the boundary is either not fenced or has a heavily wooded area serving as a boundary.  
Also, the majority of the personal yards are not fenced.  Within the neighborhood, there 
is a community pool and a park/playground.  According to Table 1, Heather Glen at 
Meadow Woods’ foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 0, 9, and 15, while the 
residential burglary count was 2, 4, 4, 12, and 7.   Therefore, there was indeed an 
increase in residential burglary in the latter years when foreclosures increased.  
However, the largest increase in residential burglaries was in 2008, and then it 
decreased in 2009 when foreclosures peaked.  Yet, the residential burglary count was 
still higher in 2009 than the first three years which gives support to the hypothesis that 
foreclosures caused this area to be more socially disorganized.   
Canvass 1 – May 19, 2011, 1:20 pm 
 Upon arriving at Heather Glen at Meadow Woods there was a person jogging on 
the outside sidewalk of the neighborhood and there was a bit of vehicle traffic.  The 
neighborhood was not very large and was basically a big square, and had power lines 
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running through it.  The front of the property, which is maintained by the HOA, was in 
nice condition.  The activity within the neighborhood was minimal, with a vehicle traffic 
count of two, a foot traffic count of one, and four people located outside.  What’s more, 
no one was located at the community pool or park/playground.  From what I observed, 
there was only one ‘For Sale’ sign and ‘For Rent’ sign posted.  There were also several 
obvious homes either vacant or in foreclosures.   
 Some of the yards were not well maintained, and this was found to be common 
with both occupied and vacant homes.  It apparently was also trash pickup day, and 
there was loose trash along some of the road.  As mentioned previously, the 
neighborhood is surrounded by other older and more rundown neighborhoods.  In fact, 
there was physical disorder on the outside of the neighborhood, such as graffiti on 
fences and other structures.  Lastly, the park next door, Meadow Woods Park, 
consisted of a playground, basketball courts, a pavilion, and restrooms, and appeared 
to be very clean and well maintained.  On this day there were approximately six people 
at the park, ranging from bike riders, children playing at the park, and people walking.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 10:40 am 
 Upon second arrival at Heather Glen at Meadow Woods, the activity directly on 
the outside of the neighborhood was much quieter on this Saturday, with no foot or 
vehicle traffic.  The activity within the neighborhood was low, same as the first day of 
canvassing.  The vehicle traffic count was four, the foot traffic count was three, and the 
number of people located outside was two, one of which was a man painting his house 
and another one was a resident mowing his/her lawn.  Once again, there was no one at 
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the community pool or park/playground.  The ‘For Sale’ and ‘For Rent’ houses 
discussed above were still evident, and so were the several vacancies and/or 
foreclosures.  Meadow Woods Park next door was very active though.  There was a 
cricket team playing in the field, children at the playground, a person walking, and dogs 
with their owners at a designated dog section of the park.   
 As both canvasses suggest, Heather Glen appears to have less collective 
efficacy, based on many strong indicators such as the physical disorder observed, the 
lack of deterrent barriers present, and the level of activity.  For instance, there were 
many yards that were overgrown and unmaintained, some yard debris and trash 
present, and graffiti around the neighborhood, which are indicators of a reduction in 
collective efficacy (Skogan 1992).  There was also power lines running through the 
neighborhood, and the neighborhood was close to other, more rundown neighborhoods.  
In fact, of the surrounding neighborhoods, one neighborhood had a total foreclosure 
count of 18 and a residential burglary count of 43, substantially higher than Heather 
Glen and could cause a spillover effect for this neighborhood.  Two other 
neighborhoods nearby had less residential burglaries, but still had 11 and 12 reported 
residential burglaries for 2005-2009.  Therefore, this neighborhood seems to be nestled 
in an area with higher residential burglaries in general.   
 There are also a lack of barriers that can act as defensible spaces (Newman 
1972), since there is no gate at the entrance/exit.  Also, most of the perimeter of the 
neighborhood is not fenced, and the majority of the personal yards are not fenced 
(Brower et al 1983).  Moreover, the activity within the neighborhood on both days of the 
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canvass was minimal compared to other neighborhoods, which is a sign of social 
disorder (Woldoff 2002).  This could result in residents feeling a lower sense of safety 
which can also decrease the collective efficacy within the neighborhood.  Although the 
park next door was reasonably active, many of these people could have come from 
other neighborhoods.  All in all, Heather Glen has many indicators of low collective 
efficacy.     
Tudor Grove at Timber Springs 
Foreclosure Rate: 17.4 
Residential Burglary Rate: 5.3 
 Tudor Grove at Timber Springs lies in Census tract 167.19, which is an upper-
income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 53.8% white; 8.3% 
Black/African American; 28% Hispanic; and 7.3% Asian.  There is new shopping located 
near the neighborhood, with a Wal-Mart Super Center.  The neighborhood is 
surrounded by many other neighborhoods, in a heavily residential area in Avalon Park.  
Timber Springs is the main road the neighborhood is located off of, and there are about 
six other neighborhoods situated in the Timber Springs area.  There are two gates, one 
for entering and one for exiting, positioned at the front of the property and this is the 
only way of entering or exiting the neighborhood.  The neighborhood consists of 
approximately 132, one and two-story single family homes that were built in the mid 
2000s, mostly 2005 and 2006, around the construction boom.  There is a Home 
Owners’ Association present, which is responsible for enforcing rules and guidelines, 
such as the type of privacy fence; however, they are not responsible for the 
maintenance of residents’ yards.   
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 The perimeter of the neighborhood is not fenced but instead surrounded by 
wooded areas, ponds, and other neighborhoods.  The only place where the 
neighborhood is fenced is up front near the gate, where there is a small fence.  Also, 
most of the homes are not privately fenced.  The neighborhood does not have a 
community pool, tennis or basketball court, or park/playground.  There is a community 
park down the road that residents who live in Timber Springs use though.  Just as 
important, as Table 1 indicates, Tudor Grove at Timber Springs had 0, 0, 1, 9, and 13 
foreclosures for 2005-2009, and had only 1, 2, 1, 1, and 2 reported residential burglaries 
for the same years.  Thus, as foreclosures increased, residential burglary in this 
neighborhood remained stable, and very minimal, especially compared to previously 
discussed neighborhoods.  This is contradictory to social disorganization’s argument.   
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 10:40 am 
 Upon arrival at Tudor Grove at Timber Springs, the entrance and exit gates were 
both closed.  I was able to gain access into the neighborhood using a ‘dummy’ code.  
There was a landscaping company at the front of the neighborhood maintaining the 
entrance.  The vehicle traffic activity and the number of people outside were low on this 
day, one and one respectively.  The foot traffic activity, however, was moderately high, 
with a recorded five people.  What’s more, there were around three visible ‘For Sale’ 
signs and two visible ‘For Rent’ signs throughout the neighborhood.  There were also 
roughly four visible vacancies or foreclosures.  Many of the yards were well kept, but 
many were not as well.  Some of the unkempt yards belonged to households that were 
definitely occupied, while others belonged to the obvious vacancies and/or foreclosures.   
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Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 1:30 pm 
 Upon second arrival at Tudor Grove at Timber Springs, the gates were once 
again closed, and I was able to gain access using the same method as the first 
canvass.  For a Saturday afternoon, the neighborhood’s activity was low.  For example, 
the vehicle traffic count was six, foot traffic count was one, and the number of people 
outside was three.  There were some vehicles parked on the street on this day, and 
there were also several trashcans at the end of driveways still left out from trash day.  
On this day of canvassing, I observed around half of the yards to be in poor condition, 
and there was also some visible yards debris.   
 Interestingly, this neighborhood definitely exhibited signs of physical disorder, 
putting into question its level of collective efficacy, such as the obvious vacancies or 
foreclosures, ill-maintained yards, yard debris, lack of fenced perimeter, minimal 
privately fenced yards, and low level of activity (Skogan 1992; Brower et al 1983).  Yet, 
this neighborhood had only seven reported residential burglaries in the five years, with a 
residential burglary rate of 5.3.  So what factors can explain this phenomenon?  First, 
the fact that this neighborhood is smaller compared to other neighborhoods in this 
research, then residents could engage in more interaction and increase the level of 
collective efficacy more easily than if they were in a larger neighborhood.  Also, the 
neighborhood is nestled in the back of Timber Springs and is not easily accessible.  
There is not much traffic that passes by besides residents who live in the Timber 
Springs area.  Lastly, the neighborhood is gated and these gates stay closed.  This not 
only creates a barrier (Newman 1972) and/or a deterrent for criminals, it is also a strong 
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indicator of higher collective efficacy.  In the end, this neighborhood has been able to 
maintain a low level of residential burglary despite the higher number of foreclosures in 
the five years.  
Spring Isle UT 1 
Foreclosure Rate: 7.3 
Residential Burglary Rate: 2.7 
 Spring Isle UT 1 lies in Census tract 167.19, which is an upper-income level tract.  
The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 53.8% white; 8.3% Black/African 
American; 28% Hispanic; and 7.3% Asian.  The neighborhood is located down the road 
from Tudor Grove, the neighborhood discussed above.  There is new shopping located 
nearby: restaurants, a Wal-Mart Super Center, etc.  Moreover, as the neighborhood 
implies, there are other UT’s, or units, to Spring Isle.  For example, there is Spring Isle 
UT 2 and UT 3 as well.  Spring Isle UT 1, the section of the neighborhood of interest for 
this research, is located at the front of the neighborhood.  Interestingly though, the other 
two UT’s for the neighborhood, which were built in the same years, do not have nearly 
as many foreclosures (3 and 6), or as much reported residential burglaries (2 and 5).  
One explanation of this could be because these two UT’s are located behind UT 1, 
further back in the neighborhood.  Criminals often prefer an easy access in and out, and 
would rather stay closer to the main entrance to make it easier to get away.   
 The totality of the neighborhood is quite large compared to other neighborhoods 
observed.  The road leading into the neighborhood is the only entrance/exit, and there is 
a gate for entering and a gate for exiting.  Just as important, there is an occupied guard 
office located at the gates.  There is a Home Owners’ Association that is responsible for 
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the regulation of rules and enforcement of guidelines, but not personal lawn 
maintenance.  There are around 200 residences located in the neighborhood.  The 
neighborhood has both townhomes and one and two-story homes, which were built in 
the mid 2000’s, during the housing boom (mostly 2005 and 2006).  The perimeter of the 
neighborhood is partially fenced, while other parts are backed up to wooded areas.  The 
areas when there is a fence are where the neighborhood backs up to other 
neighborhoods, as well as there is a brick wall running along the front of the 
neighborhood.   
 Also, the majority of the single family homes are not privately fenced.  The 
neighborhood has a community pool located in the very back of the neighborhood (in 
either UT 2 or UT 3), and a park/playground located closer to the front of the 
neighborhood.  There are no sporting courts located within the neighborhood.  
Furthermore, as Table 1 illustrates, the neighborhood’s foreclosure count for 2005-2009 
increased from 0, 0, 0, 3 and 19, while the residential burglary count remained stable at 
0, 1, 3, 2, and 2.  Therefore, this neighborhood does not support the theory’s premise 
that as foreclosures increase, so does residential burglary because the neighborhood 
becomes socially disorganized.   
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 10:30 am 
 Upon arrival at Spring Isle UT 1, the gates were closed and the guard was 
present.  I was unable to gain access into the neighborhood unfortunately.  Therefore, I 
was unable to get an activity count of vehicle and foot traffic, the number of people 
located outside, and the number of people at the community pool and park/playground.  
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I was also unable to observe the number of ‘For Sale’ and ‘For Rent’ units and unable to 
visibly observe any vacancies or foreclosures.  Lastly, I was not able to observe any 
signs of physical disorder in the neighborhoods.  From my vantage point of observation, 
I was able to see that the outside of the neighborhood was very well maintained, and 
there was several cars entering and exiting the neighborhood.   
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 1:50 pm 
 Upon second arrival at Spring Isle UT 1, the gates were once again closed, the 
guard was present, and I was unable to gain access into the neighborhood.  Therefore, 
none of the observations were able to be conducted.  There was however heavy activity 
of vehicles entering and exiting on this day.  Due to these limitations, it is very difficult to 
draw any significant conclusions on the collective efficacy of this neighborhood.  
However, there are some factors that could explain the lower level of residential 
burglary.  For example, the neighborhood is gated and guarded.  That undoubtedly 
could act as a deterrent for would-be criminals, and could increase the sense of safety 
among residents, also increasing residents’ collective efficacy.  Despite these 
characteristics, I cannot draw any decisive conclusions of what causes this 
neighborhood to have less residential burglaries.   
 
Lakes of Windermere PH 2A 
Foreclosure Rate: 10.7 
Residential Burglary Rate: 1.5 
 Lakes of Windermere PH 2A lies in Census tract 171.03, which is considered an 
upper-income level tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 59.6% 
white; 3.4% Black/African American; 23% Hispanic; and 10% Asian.  The neighborhood 
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is surrounded by many other neighborhoods, water, and orange groves, and is what I 
consider to be in a rural setting.  The area surrounding is not heavily commercialized, 
but instead more residential.  There are 12 different entrances into Lakes of 
Windermere and none of them are gated.  The neighborhood also has 3 other phases 
(PH 1, PH 3, and PH 4) and it is a very large and dispersed neighborhood.  
Interestingly, one of the phases, PH 1, actually had more residential burglaries than PH 
2A, 11 residential burglaries for 2005-2009, but only had 19 total foreclosures, so it did 
not meet the sample requirements for this research.  Despite the multiple phases of the 
neighborhood, I did attempt to stay in PH 2A only for the neighborhood canvasses.   
 The roughly 200 houses within the neighborhood vary from one to two-story 
homes, which were built in the mid 2000s, during the construction boom.  There is a 
Home Owners’ Association for the neighborhood, which is responsible for enforcing 
certain guidelines, such as the type of privacy fencing residents can use.  Residents are 
all responsible for the maintenance of their own yards though.  The perimeter of the 
neighborhood is not fenced, and a small number of homes have privacy fences.  The 
neighborhood still looks newly constructed and is well taken care of. There is a 
community pool and a park/playground within the neighborhood, but no tennis or 
basketball courts.  Moreover, as Table 1 reveals, the foreclosure count for Lakes of 
Windermere PH 2A for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 0, 5, and 17, while the residential burglary 
count for the same years was 0, 0, 0, 3, and 0.  Thus, as foreclosures increased in the 
neighborhood, the residential burglary count did not increase.  There was an increase in 
2008, resulting in three reported residential burglaries, but when foreclosures research 
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their highest in 2009, residential burglaries actually decreased to zero.  As a result, the 
theory could not explain this neighborhood, which has a very low residential burglary 
count in general.   
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 12:35 pm 
 Upon arrival at Lakes of Windermere PH 2A, there were commercial grounds 
maintenance workers mowing.  The neighborhood was reasonably quiet, but that is 
expected on a weekday since people are typically either working or at school.  The 
vehicle traffic count was three, the foot traffic count was one, and the number of people 
located outside was three.  There were also two people riding bikes on the bike path on 
the outside of the neighborhood.  No one was at the community pool or 
park/playground.  Just as important, there were no visible ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs, 
but there were obvious signs of several vacancies or foreclosures.  In fact, some of the 
yards throughout the neighborhood were not maintained well, and this was found in 
occupied and vacant/foreclosed homes.  Lastly, there were also some vehicles parked 
on the street and trash cans left at the road (perhaps it was trash day that morning).   
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 10:20 am 
 Upon second arrival at Lakes of Windermere PH 2A, the activity in the 
neighborhood increased, as would be expected on a weekend.  For example, on this 
day of canvassing, the vehicle traffic count was ten, the foot traffic count was six 
(several dog walkers), and the number of people outside was five.  There was also a 
person riding a bike.  Once again though, the community pool and park/playground 
were vacant.  Moreover, there was no visible trash or debris in the neighborhood.  
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There were once again vehicles parked on the street.  During this canvass, however, 
there was a sheriff’s patrol vehicle parked in the neighborhood at a residence.  There 
were still yards that were not well taken care of, although the majority of them were.  
Some of the yards that were ill-maintained were vacant or foreclosed homes, but others 
were definitely occupied.  Overall, the community grounds were nicely maintained.     
 All in all, the activity in this neighborhood was more than other neighborhoods 
showing there was minimal social disorder (Woldoff 2002) and the majority of the 
homes were well maintained showing there was minimal physical disorder (Skogan 
1992).  It could be concluded that the there was a sense of safety throughout the 
neighborhood.  Interestingly though, the fact that the neighborhood has 12 
entrances/exits and none of them are gated, raises some interesting questions about 
importance of these characteristics as being good indicators of collective efficacy.  
Perhaps other indicators of more collective efficacy, such as the ruralness of the 
neighborhood (see Putnam 2007 and Taylor et al. 2010 on the relationship between 
rural areas and higher collective efficacy), it is in a higher-class area, and the higher 
level of activity all balance out the fact that the neighborhood is very open, which can 
decreases the criminal activity (Sampson et al. 1997), and in this case, residential 
burglaries.     
Island Walk 
Foreclosure Rate: 11.1 
Residential Burglary Rate: 8.9 
 Island Walk lies in Census tract 168.05, which is considered a middle-income 
level tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10% 
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Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian.  The neighborhood is located 
down from Wyndham Lakes next to a busy state road.  There is one entrance/exit for 
the neighborhood and it is gated with a brick fence running along the front of the 
neighborhood.  Even more, the neighborhood consists of 37 units, with approximately 
190 different townhomes.  The neighborhood is small compared to many other 
neighborhoods.  The townhomes were built in the early to mid 2000s, between 2002 
and 2005.  There is a Home Owners’ Association present which is responsible for 
maintenance of the neighborhood, especially the lawn.  Therefore, residents are not 
responsible for the maintenance of their own lawns.   
 The perimeter of the neighborhood is partially fenced.  When there is no fence 
there is a wooded area and a pond separating Island Walk from surrounding 
neighborhoods.  There are no personal privacy fences however.  There is a community 
pool and a park/playground located inside the neighborhood, but not any sporting 
courts.  Just as important, according to Table 1, the foreclosures for 2005-2009 
increased from 0, 0, 0, 8, to 13.  However, the residential burglary for the same years 
remained stable, at 2, 3, 5, 4, and 3.  When residential burglary was at its highest in 
2007, foreclosures were at zero, and then as foreclosures increased in 2008 and 2009, 
residential burglary actually decreased.  Therefore, the expectation, that residential 
burglaries will increase because foreclosures increased, an indicator of social 
disorganization, is not supported.   
Canvass 1 – May 19, 2011, 1:00 pm 
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 Upon arrival at Island Walk, the entrance and exit gates were closed.  I was able 
to gain access though by following another vehicle through the gate.  Located at the 
front gate of the neighborhood are a ‘Deed Restricted’ and a ‘Neighborhood Watch’ 
sign.  Also, there is a ‘No Parking’ and a ‘Tow Away’ sign located at the front entrance, 
perhaps in case people park and walk in the neighborhood since they are unable to gain 
access in a vehicle.  The overall activity inside the neighborhood was relatively low, but 
this is to be expected on a weekday when people are at work or school.  The vehicle 
traffic count was three, the foot traffic count was zero, and there were three people 
located outside.  There was no one at the community pool or park/playground either.  
 Moreover, there were no visible ‘For Sale’ signs but there was one ‘For Rent’ 
sign located in one of the townhome’s windows.  There were no visible vacancies or 
foreclosures, but since the neighborhood is maintained by the HOA, then being able to 
identify vacancies or foreclosures through observation only is difficult.  Although the 
activity was low, nearly half of the garages were open, and less than half of the 
townhomes had cars parked outside on the driveways.  Interestingly, there were also 
signs posted in the neighborhood indicating that there were not to be any playing in the 
alley way or courtyard, indicating that the HOA places strict rules on its residents.  The 
overall condition of the neighborhood and the housing were nice and clean.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 10:35 am 
 Upon second arrival at Island Walk, there were several runners located on the 
sidewalk in front of the neighborhood.  Once again, the entrance and exit gates were 
closed, but I was able to gain access by following another vehicle in.  The activity within 
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the neighborhood on this weekend was also relatively low.  For example, the vehicle 
traffic count was three, the foot traffic count was one, and the number of people outside 
was two.  In addition, there was no one located at the pool or park/playground.  There 
was construction workers present working on a resident’s townhome.  Similar as the 
first canvass, approximately half of the residents’ garages were open, indicating that 
residents were most likely home but not outside.   
 In summary, there were strong indicators of higher collective efficacy within this 
neighborhood.  For instance, the neighborhood is gated and the gates remain closed 
which can act as a defensible space (Newman 1972) and prohibit unwanted people 
from entering the neighborhood.  There are the various signs posted about the 
neighborhood having a neighborhood watch and being deed restricted, which are could 
act as an agent of social control themselves.  Just as important, the HOA does seem to 
enforce strict rules and regulations, such as the sign indicating no playing in certain 
parts of the neighborhood.  The HOA may assist in maintaining order and safety in the 
neighborhood.  Also, part of the neighborhood is enclosed which is a strong indicator of 
higher collective efficacy.   
 However, there are other indicators of low collective efficacy found within this 
neighborhood.   For example, although some of the neighborhood’s perimeter is fenced, 
other parts are not; especially along the south side of the neighborhood where is backs 
up to another residential neighborhood – there is no fence separating the two.  
Interestingly, the neighborhood/s that lie/s to the south also has/have higher residential 
burglary counts, such as 14 and 15 residential burglaries for the five years.  Therefore, 
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there could be a spillover of other neighborhoods, which helps to explain the larger 
amount of residential burglaries Island Walk despite the various indicators supporting 
having a lower level of collective efficacy.  Lastly, there was minimal outside activity on 
both days which can suggest more social disorder (Woldoff 2002).  So, perhaps 
residents in Island Walk do not have a sense of security, and thus are not outside, 
which could increase interaction and neighborhood bonds, ultimately increasing 
collective efficacy.  
Discovery Palms Condos 
Foreclosure Rate: 6.3 
Residential Burglary Rate: 2.1 
 Discovery Palms Condos lie in Census tract 170.05, which is considered a 
middle-income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 64.8% 
white; 6% Black/African American; 18.2% Hispanic; and 6.6% Asian.  The neighborhood 
is situated in a very busy, heavily populated area near the attractions in Orlando.  
Discovery Palms Condos is off of 1-4 and is surrounded by many different timeshares, 
vacation clubs, and hotels.  There is also a lot of shopping nearby, such as the Orlando 
Premium Outlets and a Walgreens.  So, these condos are in a relatively nonresidential 
area, and more of a tourist area.  There are two entrance/exits located at the front of the 
property and another located at the back.  All entrance/exits are gated.  The complex is 
made up of 28 different buildings with approximately 335 condos that were built in 2003.  
As with most condos, there is a Home Owners’ Association present that maintains the 
entire grounds, including the lawn.  Therefore, residents are not responsible for the 
upkeep of the lawn.   
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 The perimeter of the neighborhood is mostly fenced, with only a small portion not 
fenced along one side, where there is a heavily wooded area.  Within the neighborhood 
there is a community pool, a tennis court, a sand volleyball court, an indoor basketball 
court, and a playground.  Furthermore, according to Table 1, Discovery Palms Condos 
had a foreclosure count for 2005-2009 of 0, 2, 2, 6, and 11 and a residential burglary 
count of 0, 3, 1, 2, and 1.  Thus, as foreclosures steadily increased, the residential 
burglaries in the neighborhood remained stable.  In fact, the highest count of reported 
residential burglary was in 2006, when foreclosures were near their lowest, and when 
foreclosures were at their highest in 2009, residential burglary actually decreased.  As a 
result, this neighborhood did not appear to be socially disorganized based on using the 
measurement of foreclosures.   
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 1:45 pm 
 Upon arrival at Discovery Palms Condos, all of the entrance and exit gates were 
closed.  Also, these gates were equipped with swing down arms, which helps to prevent 
vehicles from following other vehicles in.  Therefore, unfortunately I was unable to gain 
access by following any vehicles in, and the dummy codes for the gates would not work 
either.  Regrettably, I was unable to gain access into this neighborhood.  Yet, located at 
the front of the neighborhood near that entrance/exit gates is a parking area, where the 
community center is located.  I parked there and conducted observations of the activity I 
could observe.  Just as important, there was a ‘Private Property’ sign posted at the 
entrance of the neighborhood.  The vehicle traffic count was two, and there was no 
observable foot traffic or people (residents) outside on this day.  There were grounds 
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keepers present though, maintaining the landscaping.  I was unable to observe any of 
the amenities for the condominium complex, so I do not have a count for the pool, 
tennis court, basketball court, volleyball court, or playground.  Also from where I was 
parked, it appeared that approximately half of the parking lot was full (at least the 
parking lot located at the front of the neighborhood).  All in all, the condos were very 
well taken care of and in very nice condition.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 2:05 pm 
 Upon second arrival at Discovery Palms Condos, all of the entrance and exit 
gates were once again closed and I was unable to gain access.  I therefore conducted 
observations from the front of the property, parked near the main entrance/exit.  During 
the period of observation, I counted one vehicle as vehicle traffic, and once again, could 
not observe any foot traffic or people located inside.  Similar as the first canvass, I was 
unable to observe any activity at the condo’s amenities.  Since many of the field 
observations were not able to be conducted, an interpretation of the level of collective 
efficacy for this neighborhood is difficult.  Yet, there are definitely some indicators of the 
neighborhood that support the claim that Discovery Palms has a higher level of 
collective efficacy.  These include indicators such as it being a gated, and closed 
community, mostly fenced, and in very nice condition, which increases the sense of 
security of residents and could increase the bonds between residents, all increasing the 
level of collective efficacy.  However, without getting a detailed canvass of the 
neighborhood, conclusions are hard to make.  It would be assumed that the level of 
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collective efficacy would in fact be higher in this neighborhood based on the indicators 
from an ‘outside’ appearance.   
Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C 
Foreclosure Rate: 6.5 
Residential Burglary Rate: 2.2 
 Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C lies in Census tract 171.05, which is an upper-income 
level tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 75.3% white; 5.8% 
Black/African American; 10.8% Hispanic; and 6.8% Asian.  The neighborhood is located 
in a more rural, secluded area, with lots of water and woods surrounding it.  Also, the 
neighborhood is located in what is considered a more ‘high class’ town, the town of 
Windermere.  There is a new Publix shopping center nearby as well.  There is a 
bike/jogging path located outside of the neighborhood.  Overall, Signature Lakes is a 
very large neighborhood with multiple parcels in it.  For instance, Signature Lakes is 
divided up into six different parcels – 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D PH 1, 1D PH 2, and PH 2.  
However, of interest for this research is only Parcel 1C.  The other parcels in Signature 
Lakes did not meet the requirements for sampling for this research and therefore were 
not included in the overall sample.  In fact, Parcel 1A had 13 foreclosures and 6 
residential burglaries, Parcel 1B had 12 foreclosures and 2 reported residential 
burglaries, Parcel 1D PH 1 had 0 foreclosures and 1 reported residential burglary, 
Parcel 1D PH 2 had 1 foreclosure and 0 reported residential burglaries, and Parcel PH 
2 has 0 foreclosures and 0 reported residential burglaries.  So, Parcel 1C had more 
foreclosures and residential burglaries than any of the other parcels located within the 
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same neighborhood.  I did attempt to limit my observations and analysis to Parcel 1C 
only.   
 There are two entrance/exits into Signature Lakes, one of which is located in 
Parcel 1C, in which the canvassing took place.  Neither of the roads into the 
neighborhood are gated.  The houses (n=325) in this neighborhood parcel vary 
significantly in size and value, as well as the year they were built.  For example, the 
houses were built between 2006-2010, some of them being townhomes, while others 
are one and two-store homes.  In fact, one road of the street also has waterfront homes 
that are valued at nearly $1 million.  What’s more, there are empty lots within this 
parcel, indicating that either the builders have halted construction or that construction 
companies are still building.  This is also obvious by the fact that some of the homes in 
the neighborhood were built as late as 2010.  However, there are many streets that 
consist of only empty lots with no homes situated at the back of the neighborhood.  This 
area though is located in a different parcel.  As a result though, it is obvious that parts of 
this neighborhood have halted any construction, which much of the construction did 
take place during the housing boom in the mid 2000s.   
 There is a Home Owners’ Association present that covers all of the various 
parcels in Signature Lakes.  The HOA is responsible for the enforcement of rules and 
guidelines, such as the type of privacy fencing residents can install, but residents are all 
still responsible for the maintenance of their own yards.  The majority of the perimeter of 
the neighborhood is not fenced (only a white PVC fencing running across the front of 
the neighborhood), with woods and ponds acting as barriers when there is no fencing.  
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There are some privacy fences throughout the neighborhood, but the majority does not.  
In fact, many of the homes do not have a large yard to even fence.  There are sidewalks 
located throughout the neighborhood as well.  Moreover, there are two community 
pools, tennis and basketball courts, and a park/playground located in the neighborhood 
(but in different parcels).   More importantly, as Table 1 illustrates, the foreclosures 
count for 2005-2009 in Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C was 0, 0, 1, 2, and 18, while the 
residential burglary count for the same years was 0, 3, 2, 3, and 3.  Thus, as 
foreclosures increased throughout the five years, the residential burglary count actually 
remained stable.  Accordingly, the theory was not supported for this neighborhood.   
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 12:15 pm 
 Upon arrival at Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C, the activity throughout the 
neighborhood was moderately busy.  For example, the vehicle traffic count was three, 
the foot traffic count was three, and the number of people outside was four.  Even more, 
there were a lot of service vehicles present throughout the neighborhood for various 
services, such as cable, lawn maintenance, security, etc.  There were around four 
people I could visibly see at one of the pools located at the community center, and there 
were also numerous bikes parked out front.  There was no one located at the tennis or 
basketball courts though.  There were about three children with parents present at the 
park/playground as well.  During the canvass I recorded approximately eight visible ‘For 
Sale’ signs but no ‘For Rent’ signs.  Furthermore, there were several visible vacancies 
or foreclosures in the neighborhood.   
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 Most of the residential yards were well kept, while some were not.  Those of 
which were not belonged both to occupied homes and vacant/foreclosed homes.  As 
mentioned above, most of the yards in Parcel 1C are not privately fenced either.  
Interestingly, of the nicer, waterfront homes in the neighborhood, these houses did have 
fences and coded-gates at the driveway.  The grounds belonging to the neighborhood 
were nicely maintained, and there were no real signs of physical disorder (i.e., trash, 
debris).  The main sign of physical disorder, as mentioned previously, were the 
numerous empty lots in the neighborhood. 
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 10:50 am 
 Upon second arrival at Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C, the activity within the 
neighborhood increased significantly, as is expected on a weekend.  For instance, the 
vehicle traffic count on this day was 13, the foot traffic count was 1 (a person jogging), 
and the number of people outside was 10 (mostly residents maintaining their lawns).  
Once again, there were yards that were not well kept, but there was not any visible 
trash or debris throughout the neighborhood.  There were vehicles parked on the street 
on this day as well.  There were three people located at the pool at the community 
center, but no one at the tennis and basketball courts of park/playground.  Interestingly, 
despite the increase in overall activity on the day of this canvass, there were not many 
children out playing.  In fact, during the canvass, I recorded no children outside, only 
adults.  Lastly, there was a jogger located on the path outside of the neighborhood.  
 According to both canvasses, there were obvious indicators of higher collective 
efficacy which can explain its lower residential burglary rate (Sampson et al. 1997).  
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Although the neighborhood is not gated, the perimeter is mostly not fenced, and many 
of the yards are not privately fenced, Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C is located in an area 
that is considered a safe area, and therefore the residents could have a sense of safety.  
The residential burglaries around the area in general are low, and if residents feel safe, 
they may be more likely to engage in interaction with others which could increase 
collective efficacy.  This is also supported by the higher activity count throughout the 
neighborhood.  The neighborhood is also located in a more rural, secluded area where 
there is not much outside traffic, and therefore there is a decrease in possible criminals.  
The fact that the neighborhood is more rural is an indicator of higher collective efficacy 
(Putnam 2007; Taylor et al 2010).  Besides the empty lots in the neighborhood, there 
were no other signs of physical disorder.  This neighborhood is much larger than many 
of the other neighborhoods as well, and with more people, there are more residents to 
look out for one another.  All in all, the other neighborhood in Windermere, Lakes of 
Windermere, also had a very low residential burglary count.  It appears that there are 
strong indicators of higher collective efficacy which can help explain this neighborhood’s 
lower residential burglary rate.   
 
 
Timber Isle 
Foreclosure Rate: 10.5 
Residential Burglary Rate: 6.8 
 Timber Isle lies in Census tract 167.19, which is considered an upper-income 
neighborhood.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 53.8% white; 
8.3% Black/African American; 28% Hispanic; and 7.3% Asian.  The neighborhood is 
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located within the Timber Springs area, which is where a previously discussed 
neighborhood, Tudor Grove, is also located.  In fact, these two neighborhoods are next 
to each other (with woods separating them directly).  So, this neighborhood is also 
positioned in a heavily residential area, with the same shopping centers close by.  Just 
as important, there is another phase to Timber Isle, PH 2, which is situated within the 
general Timber Isle neighborhood.  The canvass attempted to not incorporate this part 
of the neighborhood.  This phase of the neighborhood is smaller than Timber Isle, and it 
has a foreclosure count of five and a residential count of four, much less than the 
designated Timber Isle phase.  The entire Timber Isle neighborhood is larger than 
Tudor Grove as well, with approximately 300 homes in both Timber Isle  (n=190) and 
Timber Isle PH 2.   
 The neighborhood consists of one and two-story homes which were built in 2005 
and 2006, during the housing boom.  There is a Home Owners’ Association present 
which enforces guildelines (type of fencing) and helps maintain the neighborhood’s 
grounds.  Yet, all residents are responsible for the maintenance of their own yards.  The 
neighborhood has one entrance/exit with a gate.  Also, the perimeter of the 
neighborhood is only partially fenced, with other parts backing up to heavily wooded 
areas.  There is no community pool, sporting courts, or park/playground located inside 
the neighborhood.  There is a community park located outside of the neighborhood 
however, which other neighborhoods in Timber Springs also have access too.  The park 
has a playground, three basketball courts, and two tennis courts.  Moreover, as Table 1 
shows, Timber Isle’s foreclosure count for 2005-2009 was 0, 0, 1, 6 and 13.  The 
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residential burglary count for the same years was 2, 2, 3, 3, and 3.  Therefore, as 
foreclosures increased, the residential burglary in the neighborhood did in fact increase, 
but not substantially, and it could be argued that the residential burglary actually 
remained stable.  As a result, the hypothesis, that as foreclosures increase a 
neighborhood becomes more socially disorganized and thus crime (e.g., residential 
burglary) increases, was not supported.   
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 11:00 am 
 Upon arrival at Timber Isle, the gate at the entrance/exit was closed, but I was 
able to gain access by using a ‘dummy’ code.  New landscaping was being installed at 
the entrance of the neighborhood as well.  The neighborhood was relatively active on 
this day.  For instance, the vehicle traffic count was four, the foot traffic count was three 
(a few people jogging), and the number of people located outside was five.  There was 
no one at the tennis or basketball courts that are located at the park outside of the 
neighborhood but five people/children were located at the park/playground.  It should 
also be pointed out that there is a sidewalk and entrance into the neighborhood from the 
park, which is behind the gates into the neighborhood.  This at least allows for easy foot 
traffic into the neighborhood, but not vehicle traffic.  There were about six visible signs 
indicating a home was ‘For Sale’ and about five signs indicating a home was ‘For Rent.’  
There were also several visible vacancies or foreclosures throughout the neighborhood.  
As discussed above, the majority of the yards are not privately fenced either.  The roads 
appeared to be recently paved and speed bumps were currently being installed in the 
neighborhood.  Approximately half of the yards appeared to be unkempt (dead, 
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overgrown grass), some of which were yards of occupied homes, while others were 
vacant or foreclosed homes.  There were a few trash cans left out at the road, but 
perhaps trash day was the same day as this canvass.  For the most part, the 
neighborhood did not have any noteworthy signs of physical disorder, such as trash and 
debris.   
Canvass 2 – June 18, 2011, 1:15 pm  
 Upon second arrival at Timber Isle, the gates were once again closed, but I 
gained access by following another vehicle in.  The overall activity did increase on this 
day, which is to be expected since the canvass took place on a Saturday.  The vehicle 
traffic count was 15, the foot traffic count was 0, and the number of people outside was 
6.  There were several vehicles parked on the road on this day also.  Despite the 
increase in vehicle traffic, the neighborhood seemed fairly quiet for a weekend.  In fact, 
there were no children outside playing.  Located at the park outside the neighborhood, I 
counted one youth playing basketball and a mother and child at the playground.  No one 
was at the tennis courts.  Once again, there were trash cans left out at the road, and 
there was yard debris at the road, probably for pickup.   
 All in all, there were apparent indicators of higher collective efficacy found during 
the canvasses of Timber Isle, which can help to explain its low/moderate residential 
burglary rate.  First and foremost, the neighborhood is gated and the gates remain 
closed which creates a barrier or defensible space (Newman 1972).  This could also 
prevent easy access of any criminals.  Also, the neighborhood is located in a heavily 
residential area, where there is not much thru-traffic passing by but typically only 
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residents.  Even more, comparing other neighborhoods, the total activity of both 
canvasses is a sign of less social disorder (Woldoff 2002) which is a good indicator of a 
higher level of collective efficacy.  Although a fence surrounding a neighborhoods’ and 
residents’ yards being fenced typically is a strong indicator of higher collective efficacy 
(Brower et al. 1983), it does not seem to be a compelling indicator of collective efficacy 
in this neighborhood.  Although there were a few signs of physical disorder, such as 
trash cans and yard debris, and unkempt yards (Skogan 1992), the neighborhood 
overall appeared to be well taken care of and residents appeared to take action in their 
neighborhood when they feel it is needed (i.e., installation of speed bumps).  All of these 
indicators of higher collective efficacy help to explain this neighborhood’s lower level of 
residential burglary.    
Huntcliff Park 
Foreclosure Rate: 9.9 
Residential Burglary Rate: 6.9 
 Huntcliff Park lies in Census tract 168.05, which is a middle-income tract.  The 
racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% white; 10% Black/African 
American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian.  The neighborhood is located near Wyndham 
Lakes Estates, a neighborhood previously discussed.  It is a smaller neighborhood 
inside of Wyndham Lakes (Island Walk, a previously discussed neighborhood, is also 
located nearby).  There is a Publix shopping center located near the entrance of 
Wyndham Lakes.  In fact, Huntcliff Park is located directly next to Wyndham Lakes 
Elementary.  There is one entrance/exit of the neighborhood with a gate entering and a 
gate exiting.  There are approximately 200, one and two-story homes that were built in 
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2003 and 2004.  There is a Home Owners’ Association present that enforces certain 
guidelines, such as the type of privacy fencing, but residents are responsible for the 
care of their own yards.   
 The perimeter of the neighborhood is partially fenced, with fencing between the 
elementary school next door and along the front of the neighborhood.  However, there is 
no fencing around the remaining perimeter, which is a heavily wooded area instead.  
There is a community pool and a park/playground located within the neighborhood, but 
no sporting courts.  Only about a quarter of the residences have a fenced-in backyard.  
What’s more, according to Table 1, foreclosures in Huntcliff Park increased from 0, 0, 0, 
7 and 13 in 2005-2009, while the residential burglary count went from 3, 1, 2, 3, and 5.  
Accordingly, there was a slight increase in residential burglary in 2009 when 
foreclosures peaked.  Although the increase in residential burglaries was not 
substantial, there was in fact an increase, which supports, albeit modestly, the argument 
that as foreclosures increase a neighborhood becomes socially disorganized.   
Canvass 1 – May 19, 2011, 11:10 am 
 Upon arrival at Huntcliff Park, the gates were closed but I was able to gain 
access using a ‘dummy’ code.  There was also a ‘Deed Restricted’ sign posted at the 
entrance/exit, and the entrance/exit was nicely maintained.  There was not a significant 
amount of activity within the neighborhood on this day.  For example, the vehicle traffic 
count was six, the foot traffic count was zero, and the number of people outside was 
five.  Moreover, there was no one located at the community pool or park/playground.  
There were roughly two ‘For Sale’ signs and zero ‘For Rent’ signs that I visibly identified 
191 
during the canvass.  Just as important, there were several houses that could be 
identified as vacant or in foreclosure.   The majority of the yards were well maintained, 
but some were not; these yards belonged to both occupied and vacant/foreclosed 
homes.  There were signs posted in the neighborhood prohibiting vehicles parking on 
the street, although there were indeed vehicles parked on the street.  There was some 
visible trash in the neighborhood, but not a lot.  Also, it appeared that it was trash day 
because there were many garbage cans at the end of driveways.  Yet, there were also 
recycling bins at the street, but it was not recycling day.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 10:30 am 
 Upon second arrival at Huntcliff Park, the entrance gate into the neighborhood 
was closed, but I was once again able to gain access by using a ‘dummy’ code.  
However, the exit gate of the neighborhood was open, and remained open for the 
duration of my canvass.  The activity in the neighborhood on this day was also low, 
which is somewhat surprising since this canvass took place on a Saturday.  For 
example, the vehicle traffic count was two, the foot traffic count was zero, and the 
number of people outside was five.  No one was located at the community pool or 
park/playground once again.  There were some vehicles parked on the street, once 
again, despite the sign stating that is it prohibited.  All in all, the neighborhood was fairly 
quiet during this canvass and many residents were not out and active.   
   Overall, there are characteristics of Huntcliff Park that explains its rank of 13th of 
total residential burglary rates, a rather moderate ranking.  For instance, there are 
indicators within the neighborhood of high collective efficacy; such as, gated community, 
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located in a heavily residential area with minimal outside traffic, and the neighborhood is 
partially fenced (Newman 1972).  However, the neighborhood did exhibit some 
indicators of physical disorder, such as the overgrown, unkempt yards, trash and/or 
debris in some parts of the neighborhood, and recycling bins left out, even though it was 
not recycling day (Skogan 1992) which support having a lower level of collective 
efficacy.  Just as interesting, the fact that not all of the residents abide by the rules (e.g., 
parking on the street even though there are posted signs against doing so), shows signs 
of social disorder.  Also, it was apparent that the level of collective efficacy was lower 
because of the limited activity in the neighborhood, which is an indicator of collective 
efficacy, on both days of the canvass.  Even more, the majority of the residences were 
not fenced (Brower et al. 1983), which creates a barrier and acts as a deterrent to 
would-be criminals.  Taking all of the characteristics into consideration, it appears that 
the neighborhood ‘balances’ itself out, which helps explain why it falls close to the 
middle of the ranking in total residential burglaries.  There are both strong indicators of 
high and low levels of collective efficacy.   
Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2 
Foreclosure Rate: 18.3 
Residential Burglary Rate: 10.1 
 Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2 lies in Census tract 168.05, which is considered 
a middle-income tract.  The racial/ethnic composition of this tract is as follows: 23.3% 
white; 10% Black/African American; 61% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian.  The neighborhood 
is located among many other residential neighborhoods, such as Sandhill Preserve and 
Sandpoint at Meadow Woods, both of which are included in this research.  Nearby there 
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are a Super Target, a CVS, and many other shopping centers.  What’s more, Windrose 
at Southmeadow UT 2 is situated in a more secluded area, surrounded by woods and 
water.  As the name suggest, there is also a UT, or unit 1.  The UT 1 for Windrose is 
located at the entrance of the neighborhood.  Further back in the neighborhood is UT 2, 
the unit of interest for this research.  Windrose at Southmeadow UT 1 contains fewer 
residences than UT 2 as well.  In truth, UT 1 had a total foreclosure count of one and a 
total residential burglary count of eight for the five years, substantially less than UT 2.  
Although the difference in the residential burglary count is not considerable, this in itself 
is puzzling, since the only entrance/exit into the neighborhood is located at UT 1; yet 
more residential burglaries took place at the back of the neighborhood, UT 2, where 
there is no easy exit.  Although part of the neighborhood was a different unit, I did 
attempt to limit that as much as possible.   
 As mentioned above, there is only one entrance/exit for the neighborhood and it 
is not gated.  There are approximately 110 homes, which range from one to two-story, 
and were built in the mid 2000s, mostly 2006.  There is a Home Owners’ Association 
present that enforces rules and guidelines for resident.  Yet, the residents are 
responsible for the maintenance of their own yards.  The perimeter of the neighborhood 
is not fenced, with only a small fence along one side, but mostly surrounded by water 
and heavily wooded areas.  Also, the majority of the yards are not privately fenced.  
There is no community pool in the neighborhood, but there is a basketball court and two 
parks/playgrounds.  Just as interesting, as Table 1 indicates, the foreclosure count from 
2005-2009 significantly increased from 0, 0, 1, 2, and 17, while the residential burglary 
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count fluctuated and slightly increased from 0, 2, 3, 1, and 5.  With that said, there was 
a slight increase in residential burglaries when foreclosures were at their highest in 
2009.  This supports the claim that as foreclosures increase, a neighborhood becomes 
socially disorganized and then crime, residential burglaries, also increases.   
Canvass 1 – May 18, 2011, 2:35 pm 
 During the first canvass at Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2, the vehicle traffic 
count was recorded as four, the foot traffic count was one, and the number of people 
located outside was three.  Furthermore, no one was located at the basketball court or 
either of the parks/playgrounds.  Also, there were a large amount of vehicles parked at 
residences, although these people were not outside of their homes.  There were roughly 
three visible ‘For Sale’ signs and no ‘For Rent’ signs.  Just as important, there were 
about four visible homes that were vacant or in foreclosure.  Some of the yards within 
the neighborhood were unkempt, and these belonged to both occupied and vacant or 
foreclosed residences.  Also mentioned above, the majority of the yards were not 
privately fenced.  On this day, recycling bins were located at the end of driveways 
waiting for pickup.  Moreover, there was graffiti on the small fence located within the 
neighborhood.  Other signs of physical disorder, such as trash and debris, were not 
apparent in the neighborhood.   
Canvass 2 – June 4, 2011, 11:30 am 
 During the second canvass at Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2, the level of 
neighborhood activity increased significantly.  In fact, there was a HOA garage sale 
being conducted with multiple residences taking part.  Naturally then, the activity did 
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increase because there were more people in the neighborhood specifically for the yard 
sale.  With that said, the vehicle traffic count was 11 (some of which could be for the 
garage sale), the foot traffic count was 3, and the number of people located outside was 
15.  I conducted a second count of additional people that were located at the garage 
sale only, and that was 12.  However, of the 15 that were located outside, some of them 
could have been for the garage sale as well.  Despite this increase in activity, there was 
still no one at the basketball court or the two parks/playgrounds.  There were no 
additional signs of physical disorder from the previous canvass, aside from the unkempt 
yards and graffiti on the fence (the recycling bins were not located at the street).   
 According to both of the neighborhood canvasses of Windrose at Southmeadow 
UT 2, there are some indicators of high collective efficacy found within the 
neighborhood.  The fact that the neighborhood was isolated and situated in a vast area 
of residential neighborhoods, and the moderate level of activity (taking into 
consideration that the activity could be skewed because of the HOA yard sale) 
(decreasing social disorder; see Woldoff 2002), are indicators of more collective 
efficacy.  Yet, the neighborhood is not gated, most of it is not fenced, there is a minimal 
amount of privately fenced yards (Brower et al. 1984), and there are obvious signs of 
physical disorder (e.g., unkempt yards, foreclosures and graffiti) (Skogan 1992), all of 
which are indicators of low collective efficacy.  These latter indicators appear to be 
stronger and overshadow the other indicators, resulting in less collective efficacy within 
the neighborhood.  Perhaps this explains the ranking for this neighborhood at 7th in total 
residential burglary rates.  Undoubtedly, this neighborhood has obvious characteristics 
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that can reduce the level of collective efficacy, and therefore the residents may be less 
likely to act as informal agents of social control.  In the end, residential burglary 
increases.   
 This chapter has presented the findings of the two analyses.  First, I tested the 
overall argument of social disorganization theory – as an area becomes more socially 
disorganized (e.g., increase in foreclosures), crime, measured by residential burglary, 
will increase.  For the years 2005-2009, the results showed three different patterns of 
residential burglary among the neighborhoods as foreclosures increased – increased, 
remained stable, or decreased.  As Table 1 indicated, around half of the neighborhoods 
remained stable, while roughly twenty-five percent increased in residential burglary and 
the remaining twenty-five percent decreased.  Even though the comparison of years of 
foreclosures and residential burglary did not lend significant support for social 
disorganization theory in these more affluent neighborhoods, an analysis of the level of 
collective efficacy in the neighborhoods was still important.  It helps determine if 
collective efficacy can explain the difference between neighborhoods with high 
foreclosures and high residential burglaries and those with high foreclosures but low 
residential burglaries.   
 I measured collective efficacy through the observations I completed by 
canvassing the top thirty neighborhoods in foreclosures.  Table 3 presents a summary 
of the observations ranked from highest to lowest in residential burglary rate for the 
thirty neighborhoods (to get a more detailed table, see Appendix C).  After using ArcGIS 
to locate the neighborhoods, I conducted observations in each of the neighborhoods on 
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two separate days (one on a weekday and one on a weekend) to measure the collective 
efficacy within the neighborhood and among the residents.  I defined and measured 
collective efficacy by identifying certain indicators of physical disorder: gated or guarded 
community; fenced perimeter; HOA or deed restricted; privacy fences; overall condition 
of neighborhood and houses within; level of foot and vehicle activity; and the presence 
of visible foreclosures.  After I completed the neighborhood canvasses and analyzed the 
results, there were thirteen noteworthy neighborhoods that fell at the extreme ends of 
the foreclosure/residential burglary spectrum.  These thirteen neighborhoods were 
further analyzed to determine if collective efficacy explains differences in their 
residential burglary rates even though they all had significant foreclosure rates.  This 
analysis and my overall findings are presented in the next chapter.   
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Table 3: Observations of Neighborhood Characteristics by Residential Burglary and Foreclosure Rates 
Neighborhood Name 
Res Bur 
Rate* 
Fore 
Rate* 
Gated 
O/C 
HOA/ 
Deed
5
 
Vehicle 
Traffic 
Foot 
Traffic 
Ppl 
Outside 
Sale/ 
Rent 
Vac/ 
Fore 
Unkempt 
Yards
6
 
Fenced 
Hawthorne Village Condos 18.9 23.8 Y(1)-O  5 7 4    Partly 
Sandpoint at Meadow Woods 17.6 20.6 N(1)
1
  4 1 4    Mostly 
Heather Glen at Meadow Woods 16.1 13.3 N(1)  6 4 6    Partly 
La Cascada PH 1 11.4 13.9 N(3)  5 3 7    None 
Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos 11.2 17.3 N(1)  10 2 7    Mostly 
Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1 11.1 15.8 Y(1)-C
2
  8 13 2    None 
Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2 10.1 18.3 N(1)  15 4 18    None 
Sandhill Preserve 10.0 28.0 Y(1)-C
2
  12 3 2    Partly 
Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1 9.0 6.5 N(3)  6 7 4    Partly 
Island Walk 8.9 11.1 Y(1)-C
2
  6 1 5    Partly 
Island Cove Villas PH 3 8.6 15.4 N(1)  6 2 10    Partly 
Sand Lake Private Residences Condos 7.4 14.8 Y(1)-O  17 11 9    Partly 
Huntcliff Park 6.9 9.9 Y(1)-C
2
  8 1 10    Partly 
Timber  Isle 6.8 10.5 Y(1)-C
2
  19 1 11    Partly 
Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos 6.6 19.7 Y(1)-O  19 5 6    Partly 
Palms Villa Residences Condos 6.2 24.4 Y(2)-C,C  9 0 4    Fully 
Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village 5.8 10.1 N(3)  18 6 9    Partly 
Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos 5.7 13.0 Y(1)-O  6 0 4    Partly 
Capri at Hunters Creek Condos 5.6 15.6 Y(2)-C,O  8 1 7    Fully 
Tudor Grove at Timber Springs 5.3 17.4 Y(1)-C
2
  7 6 4    Partly 
Eagle Creek PH 1A 4.6 7.3 Y(1)-C
3
  11 NA NA   NA None 
Los Terranos 4.6 26.9 N(Multi)  7 4 5    None 
Plantation Park Private Residences Condos 4.6 9.9 Y(1)-C
2
  9 1 6    Partly 
Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos 4.5 23.1 Y(2)-C,O  11 4 2    Fully 
Bella Terra Condos 4.2 12.7 Y(2)
4
  17 0 6    Fully 
Spring Isle UT 1 2.7 7.3 Y(1)-C
3
  13 NA NA   NA Partly 
Signature Lakes – Parcel 1C 2.2 6.5 N(2)  16 4 14    Partly 
Summerport PH 5 2.2 16.4 N(3)  35 5 12    Partly 
Discovery Palms Condos 2.1 6.3 Y(2)-C,C  3 NA NA    Partly 
Lakes of Windermere PH 2A 1.5 10.7 N(12)  13 7 8    None 
 
  *: Rates are per 100 homes  
4
: 1
st
 day of canvass, O,C; 2
nd
 day C,C, gained access    NA: No Access gained to get a count 
1
: Guard shack present, empty  
5
: HOA/Deed varies depending on if they maintain entire 
2
: Closed, but gained access     premise (yard), restrict type of fencing or no restriction 
3
: Guarded, no access   
6
: Yards that were not unkempt were managed by the HOA             
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 As noted earlier, my research of selected neighborhoods is important for 
understanding if, and when, social disorganization theory can be applied to middle- and 
upper-income neighborhoods with high rates of foreclosures.  The in-depth canvasses 
that I conducted provide detailed information for each neighborhood.  The purpose of 
the canvasses was to measure a neighborhood’s level of collective efficacy to 
determine if it explains why neighborhoods with high foreclosures vary considerably on 
the level of criminal activity (residential burglary).  My research located neighborhoods 
that fell on both ends of the spectrum – neighborhoods with a significant amount of 
foreclosures and residential burglaries, and neighborhoods with foreclosures but less 
residential burglaries.  However, thirteen neighborhoods evidenced patterns that were 
in-line with the focus of my research.  Additional discussion of these neighborhoods is 
warranted. 
 After calculating the foreclosure and residential burglary rates for the 
neighborhoods, it really brought into perspective which neighborhoods were 
characterized by high foreclosure/high residential burglary and high foreclosure/low 
residential burglary (a table ranking the neighborhoods by residential burglary and 
foreclosures can be found in Appendix D).  The thirteen neighborhoods and the 
presence of collective efficacy within them are presented in Figure 4.  Seven 
neighborhoods were characterized by a significantly higher foreclosure and residential 
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burglary rates: Hawthorne Village Condos, Sandhill Preserve, Sandpoint at Meadow 
Woods, La Cascada PH1, Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH1, Heather Glen at 
Meadow Woods, and Windrose at Southmeadow UT2.  Six neighborhoods were 
characterized by a high foreclosure rate but much lower residential burglary rate: 
Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos, Summerport PH5, Palms Villa Residences Condos, 
Bella Terra Condos, Los Terranos, and Tudor Grove at Timber Springs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Collective Efficacy among the Thirteen Neighborhoods 
                                
 
                               
                
                                                                                                          
 
                                                                                                                         
        
        
        
 
HIGH 
FORECLOSURE 
 
HIGH  
CRIME 
 
HIGH 
FORECLOSURE 
 
 
LOW  
CRIME 
Hawthorne Village Condos 
C.E. Low 
Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH1 
C.E. Moderate 
Sandpoint at Meadow Woods 
C.E. Moderate 
C.E.: Collective Efficacy 
*: The collective efficacy in Los Terranos 
offered mixed results and drawing any 
conclusion on the collective efficacy within this 
neighborhood could not be done. 
La Cascada PH1 
C.E. Low 
Heather Glen at Meadow Woods 
C.E. Low 
Sandhill Preserve 
C.E. Low 
Windrose at Southmeadow UT2 
C.E. Low 
Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos 
C.E. High 
Los Terranos 
C.E. Unclear* 
Bella Terra Condos 
C.E. High 
Summerport PH5 
C.E. High 
Palms Villa Residences 
Condos 
C.E. High 
Tudor Grove at Timber Springs 
C.E. High 
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Once again, these neighborhoods represent two ends of the spectrum and are perhaps 
the most important neighborhoods in understanding and explaining social 
disorganization in middle- and upper-income neighborhoods.  
As discussed, Hawthorne Village Condos did exhibit signs of physical disorder, 
such as boarded windows.  This is a strong indicator of low collective efficacy (Taylor et 
al. 1984; Skogan 1992).  This neighborhood also was older than other neighborhoods in 
my study and had visible vacancies and/or foreclosures.  The level of outside activity 
was not considerable.  When neighbors are not out interacting with others then Woldoff 
(2002) argues that this is a lack of routine and social neighboring which is a sign of 
social disorder.  Although this neighborhood was gated, the gates remained opened for 
anyone to come and go as they please, including possible criminals.  In other words, the 
gates did not serve as a deterrent.  Moreover, this neighborhood lies in a middle-income 
tract, not a high-income tract, in an older, more rundown surrounding area.  All of these 
findings may explain why this neighborhood had the highest rate in residential burglary 
(18.9 per 100 houses) and the fourth highest rate in foreclosures (23.8 per 100 houses).  
In the end, this neighborhood’s indicators of collective efficacy were quite low which 
may account for the higher residential burglary in the neighborhood (Sampson et al. 
1997; Morenoff et al. 2001). 
 Sandhill Preserve is another middle-income neighborhood with high foreclosures 
and high residential burglary.  The findings from the neighborhood canvasses, such as 
vacancies or foreclosures, unmaintained yards, and yard debris, are indicators of 
physical disorder which can reduce collective efficacy (Taylor et al. 1984).  Just as 
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important, none of the yards in Sandhill Preserve were fenced, and therefore, may not 
have prevented residential burglaries.  Researchers have found that the presence of a 
fence around a home is a sign that the homeowners would react toward intruders 
(Brower et al. 1983).  Thus, a lack of a yard fence may not serve as a deterrent.  Also, 
during the canvasses, there was minimal activity in the neighborhood, which is a 
characteristic of social disorder (Woldoff 2002).  These are all strong indicators of a 
neighborhood having low collective efficacy.  However, the neighborhood is gated and 
the gates were closed on both days of the canvasses which can prevent criminal 
behavior (Newman 1972).  Moreover, the neighborhood is located within a larger 
neighborhood, and is a deed restricted neighborhood.  These are all indicators which 
could increase collective efficacy and thus reduce crime, such as residential burglary.  
That, however, does not appear to be the case since this neighborhood ranks as 
number one in foreclosures (28.0 per 100 houses) and number eight in residential 
burglaries (10.0 per 100 houses).  In sum, it appears that there are characteristics in 
this neighborhood that are stronger in reducing collective efficacy, which may explain 
the higher residential burglary rate, compared to others in my study.   
 Next, Sandpoint at Meadow Woods is a neighborhood with high foreclosures and 
high residential burglary rates.  Sandpoint is also a middle-income neighborhood.  
Interestingly though, there were some characteristics that would seem to increase 
collective efficacy in this neighborhood.  For example, there were no signs of physical 
disorder.  Also, the neighborhood was well maintained, and there was a sign at the 
entrance of the neighborhood indicating that there was video surveillance present.  
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Undoubtedly, this sign could deter would-be criminals from committing residential 
burglaries in this neighborhood because of the increased chance of being identified and 
caught.  Nevertheless, like the previously discussed neighborhood, there were other 
characteristics of this neighborhood that could lower the level of collective efficacy.  For 
instance, the neighborhood was not gated and although there was a guard shack at the 
entrance, there was no guard occupying it.  Also, during both canvasses there was little 
activity in the neighborhood which suggests social disorder (Woldoff 2002).  After further 
investigation however, the neighborhoods surrounding Sandpoint also had a reasonable 
amount of residential burglaries.  Therefore, it could be that Sandpoint was experiencing 
spillover from these other neighborhoods.  All of the evidence taken together suggests 
that there is a moderate level of collective efficacy within the neighborhood.  In other 
words, the neighborhood characteristics that would increase collective efficacy balance 
out the characteristics that would decrease collective efficacy, resulting in a moderate 
level.  In all, the neighborhood ranks sixth in foreclosure rate (20.6 per 100 houses) and 
second in residential burglary rate (17.6 per 100 houses).  
 Turning to La Cascada PH1, we find a middle-income neighborhood which also 
has high foreclosures and high residential burglary.  Interestingly, there are many 
physical and social characteristics in this neighborhood which support the claim that it 
has low collective efficacy.  For example, it has multiple entrances/exits which makes it 
easier to flee after committing a crime, no gates to prohibit easy access into the 
neighborhood, visible signs of vacancies or foreclosures which are a sign of disorder 
(Skogan 1992), minimal amount of personally fenced yards which can act as a deterrent 
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(Brower et al. 1983), and a lack of a sizable amount activity among residents indicating 
social disorder (Woldoff 2002).  All of these help explain why this neighborhood has the 
fourth highest rate (11.4 per 100 houses) in residential burglary.  It is interesting that the 
neighborhood’s rural location, which has been found to increase collective efficacy 
(Putnam 2007; Taylor et al. 2010), coupled with the presence of police living in the 
neighborhood, did not appear to be strong enough indicators to offset the factors which 
decreased its collective efficacy.   
 Cedar Bend at Meadow woods PH1, another middle-income neighborhood, 
displayed a moderate level of collective efficacy.  As discussed, a neighborhood 
exhibiting a moderate level of collective efficacy has strong indicators for both high and 
low collective efficacy, which offset each other and make it neither strictly low or high on 
my measure of collective efficacy.  For example, the neighborhood is gated (and it 
remains closed most, if not all of the time) and there was a reasonable amount of 
activity within the neighborhood which can facilitate routine and social neighboring, 
resulting in a lack of social disorder (Woldoff 2002).  Yet, the perimeter of the 
neighborhood is not fenced, which portrays a lack of a defensible space (Newman 
1972) that could invite possible criminals.  Brower and colleagues (1983) argue that 
having a privacy fence is a sign that the homeowners would react toward any intruders; 
however, the majority of the yards in this neighborhood are not privately fenced.  
Together, these factors may explain why Cedar Bend’s residential burglary rate is the 
sixth highest (11.1 per 100 houses).  During my canvasses, I located police officers who 
live in the neighborhood which would act as a deterrent.    However, with the previous 
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neighborhood, the officers may not have been present during 2005-2009.  Therefore, 
despite the presence of strong indicators that would increase collective efficacy in this 
neighborhood, there were other indicators that appear to be more influential, which 
explains this neighborhood’s higher level of residential burglary.   
 Heather Glen at Meadow Woods is another middle-income neighborhood that 
exhibited high foreclosures and high residential burglaries.  Interestingly, Heather Glen 
is the third neighborhood in my sample from Meadow Woods (the others are Cedar 
Bend and Sandpoint, discussed above).  The other two neighborhoods, however, 
demonstrated characteristics that pointed toward a moderate level of collective efficacy.  
In contrast, Heather Glen displayed low levels of collective efficacy based on the 
neighborhood canvasses.  For instance, there was no gate at the entrance of the 
neighborhood and the majority of the perimeter surrounding the neighborhood was not 
fenced (Newman 1972).  Also, there were obvious signs of physical disorder, such as 
unkempt yards, yard debris, trash, and obvious signs of vacancies and foreclosures in 
the neighborhood (Skogan 1992).  There was graffiti on the outside of the 
neighborhood, which indicated a lack of social control (Wilson and Kelling 1982).  In 
addition, there was apparent social disorder attributed to low social activity within the 
neighborhood (Woldoff 2002).  All of these are strong indicators which suggest that the 
neighborhood has a low level of collective efficacy.  This helps explain why this 
neighborhood is ranked third in residential burglary rate (16.1 per 100 houses) out of all 
the neighborhoods in this study.  
206 
 The last neighborhood characterized by high foreclosures and high residential 
burglaries was Windrose at Southmeadow UT2.  Windrose is also a middle-income 
neighborhood.  Interestingly, there are few characteristics in this neighborhood that 
would reduce its level of collective efficacy, such as being a more isolated 
neighborhood, distant from heavy traffic, and high to moderate levels of activity (Woldoff 
2002).  Yet, there are stronger indicators that overshadow these and explain why this 
neighborhood ranks seventh in total residential burglary rate (10.1 per 100 houses).  
The neighborhood was not gated and most of the perimeter or private yards were not 
fenced (Newman 1972; Brower at al. 1983).   There were also signs of physical 
disorder, such as unkempt yards, visible vacancies or foreclosures (Skogan 1992), and 
graffiti (Wilson and Kelling 1982).  These latter indicators help explain this 
neighborhood’s lower collective efficacy.  According to research (Sampson et al. 1997), 
lower levels of collective efficacy explain why disorganized neighborhoods have higher 
crime.   
 In contrast to the above discussion, there are six neighborhoods that were 
located at the other end of the spectrum – high foreclosures but low residential burglary.  
These neighborhoods were discussed earlier but need to be readdressed to understand 
the impact of collective efficacy on low residential burglary within these neighborhoods 
which demonstrated high levels of social disorganization as measured by high 
foreclosures.  The neighborhoods that are characterized by high foreclosures and low 
residential burglary are Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos, Summerport PH5, Palms 
207 
Villa Residences Condos, Bella Terra Condos, Los Terranos, and Tudor Grove at 
Timber Springs.  
 The first neighborhood, Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos, lies within an upper-
income Census tract.  Social disorder, measured by a lack of routine and social 
neighboring (Woldoff 2002), was not evident in this neighborhood.  The vehicle, foot, 
and outside activity were recorded as moderate.  There were other indicators that this 
neighborhood has a higher level of collective efficacy as well.  For example, the 
neighborhood is fully fenced with gates located at all entrances and exits.  Though the 
gates were open on one day of canvassing, they were closed on the other.  The fencing 
and gates can act as a deterrent for criminals as well as serve as indicators of higher 
collective efficacy (Newman 1972; Brower at al. 1983).  This, in turn, may also increase 
the residents’ sense of safety.  Even more, there was an obvious presence of a security 
guard.  These are all positive indicators of promoting collective efficacy within the 
neighborhood.  While canvassing the neighborhood, there was definitely a sense of 
safety I even felt within the neighborhood.  Taken together, these factors may explain 
why this neighborhood ranked 22nd out of the 30 neighborhoods in residential burglary 
(i.e., 4.5 per 100 houses) yet evidenced a significantly high foreclosure rate. 
 Next, Summerport PH5 was another upper-income neighborhood with a low rate 
of residential burglary (2.2 per 100 houses) despite a higher rate of foreclosures.  The 
results of my canvasses showed that this neighborhood has relatively high indicators 
collective efficacy, which may explain its lower residential burglary rate (25th out of the 
30 neighborhoods).  Interestingly, even though the neighborhood was not gated, there 
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was some fencing around the perimeter of the neighborhood (Brower et al. 1983).  Also, 
there is a golf course and open, expansive areas around other parts of the 
neighborhood that might discourage criminals because it resembled a rural area 
(Putnam 2007; Taylor et al. 2010). Perhaps more importantly, the activity within the 
neighborhood was much higher compared to the other neighborhoods in this study 
which implies less social disorder (Woldoff 2002) and is a good indicator of collective 
efficacy.  In fact, it had the highest recorded activity of all the neighborhoods I 
canvassed.  The neighborhood appeared to be more recently developed and located in 
an overall quiet area.  All of these are strong indicators of high collective efficacy within 
the neighborhood, which could explain the lower residential burglary rate (Sampson et 
al. 1997). 
 Another neighborhood with a low residential burglary rate was Palms Villa 
Residences Condos, which is a middle-income neighborhood.  Palms Villa Residences 
Condos is a neighborhood that also exhibits a higher level of collective efficacy.  
Despite the high rate of foreclosures (24.4 per 100 condos, ranking 3rd highest), this 
neighborhood has a residential burglary rate of 6.2 per 100 condos, ranking it around 
the middle of all neighborhoods.  Considering it has such a high foreclosure rate, it was 
expected to have more residential burglaries (Taylor 1984; Skogan 1992).  However, 
this neighborhood appears to have created a defensible space (Newman 1972).  For 
instance, the neighborhood is fully fenced and gated, and the gates remained closed.  
These characteristics found within Palms Villa Residences are significant indicators and 
support the argument that levels of collective efficacy within this neighborhood are high.   
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 Another middle-income level neighborhood, Bella Terra Condos, also had 
indicators of relatively high collective efficacy.  These indicators may help to explain the 
neighborhood’s lower residential burglary rate despite its higher rate of foreclosures 
(Sampson et al. 1997; Morenoff et al. 2001).  For example, the neighborhood was 
gated, though most remained closed one was open and it had a fully fenced perimeter 
(Newman 1972; Brower et al. 1983).  Also, video surveillance and signs indicating a 
neighborhood watch program were visible along with no obvious signs of physical 
disorder (Skogan 1992).  The higher amount of activity found within Bella Terra Condos 
is also another positive indicator of collective efficacy (Woldoff 2002).  Although one of 
the gates remained open during the canvasses, the other characteristics are strong 
indicators of higher levels of the neighborhood’s collective efficacy.  Despite this, the 
other indicators, especially the gated and fenced perimeters, are significant indicators of 
collective efficacy.  These characteristics may help to explain Bella Terra’s rank of 
twenty-third in the overall residential burglary rate (4.2 per 100 condos).   
 The middle-income neighborhood, Los Terranos, had a very high rate of 
foreclosures (26.9 per 100 houses) which ranked 2nd highest in foreclosures, but a 
significantly low residential burglary rate (4.6 per 100 houses) which was 21st among the 
neighborhoods in my study.  As discussed in the previous chapter, this neighborhood is 
an anomaly compared to the other neighborhoods I examined.  For example, since this 
neighborhood was in an older, more rundown area, was identified as a slightly 
moderate- to mostly middle-income neighborhood, had a high rate of foreclosures, and 
had more signs of physical disorder and decay, extant research would likely point to the 
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conclusion that Los Terranos should have higher levels of residential burglaries (Shaw 
and McKay 1942; Taylor 1984; Skogan 1992).  Yet, my findings do not support this 
conclusion.  There is a significantly lower rate of residential burglaries in Los Terranos.  
The indicator that might account for the lower residential burglary rate is the 
neighborhood’s ruralness, which past research has found to increase collective efficacy 
(Putnam 2007; Taylor et al. 2010).  In fact, more rural areas have been found to 
increase the bonds among residents which could increase the level of collective 
efficacy.  Over all, this neighborhood’s indicators produced somewhat conflicting 
findings with regards to extant research.   
 The last neighborhood that exhibited a low residential burglary rate, Tudor Grove 
at Timber Springs, is also an upper-income neighborhood.  Similar to the 
neighborhoods discussed above, there were some characteristics of Tudor Grove that 
are associated with increased levels of criminal activity.  For example, there were 
obvious signs of physical disorder (Skogan 1992) such as obvious vacancies and 
foreclosures with ill-maintained yards and visible yard debris. Also, there was a lack of a 
fenced perimeter, and minimal privately fenced yards (Newman 1972; Brower et al 
1983).   However, there were other characteristics of the neighborhood that could 
explain why Tudor Grove has such as a low residential burglary rate (5.3 per 100 
houses, ranking it 20th) despite its high foreclosure rate (17.4 per 100 houses, ranking it 
7th).  For instance, the neighborhood is smaller compared to other neighborhoods in my 
study, which may help to increase the likelihood that residents interact more frequently 
because of the close proximity.  The activity within the neighborhood was average 
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(Woldoff 2002), which could also indicate that residents feel a sense of safety.  Also, 
Tudor Grove is located in the back of a larger neighborhood which makes it less 
accessible.  Lastly, the neighborhood is gated and the gates remained closed, creating 
a barrier and/or deterrent for criminals (Newman 1972; Brower et al. 1983).  These are 
all strong indicators of the neighborhood’s higher level of collective efficacy.  Also, the 
characteristics could increase the residents’ sense of security, which may encourage 
more residents to be out and form mutual bonds with one another. 
 In the end, there were seven neighborhoods at one end of the spectrum – high 
foreclosures and high residential burglaries, and there were six neighborhoods at the 
other end of the spectrum – high foreclosures and low residential burglaries.  These two 
groups represent the main focus of my research – to explore the level of collective 
efficacy in an attempt to understand and explain its impact on residential burglary in 
middle- and upper-income neighborhoods with high foreclosures in Orange County, 
Florida.  There were some physical and social indicators of collective efficacy which 
neighborhoods exhibited that could undoubtedly encourage residents to act as informal 
agents of social control and thereby reduce criminal behavior.  These will be discussed 
next.  The next section will discuss these main characteristics and my key findings 
along with the limitations of my research as well as suggestions for future research.   
Disorganization in the Suburbs 
  
 My research examined levels of social disorganization in middle- and upper-
income neighborhoods using social disorganization theory.  I used foreclosures as the 
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main ecological characteristic to measure residential instability/mobility in 
neighborhoods in Orange County, Florida. Social disorganization theory, which was 
proposed by Shaw and McKay (1942), argues that various structural or ecological 
characteristics, such as concentrated poverty, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, residential 
mobility or instability, and family disruption are identifying factors on whether a 
neighborhood is socially disorganized.  The disorganization in neighborhoods that are 
characterized by these ecological factors results in higher levels of criminal behavior.   
 Research by Sampson and his colleagues (Sampson et al. 1997; Morenoff et al. 
2001) extended social disorganization theory by arguing that collective efficacy, the link 
between mutual trust and the willingness of residents to intervene for the good of the 
community, is the explanatory variable in whether criminal behavior occurs, even in 
neighborhoods with the structural characteristics noted above.  In all then, collective 
efficacy is the ability of residents to act as informal agents of social control to reduce 
crime in their neighborhood.  This is only possible if residents are able to form bonds 
and mutual trust with each other.  With the increase in foreclosures (a form of residential 
instability/mobility), it creates a situation where fewer residents are available to build 
these relationships.  Also, with the continuous flow of residents moving in and out of 
neighborhoods, it will become more difficult for residents to act as informal agents of 
social control, and thus, diminish their ability to control crime in their neighborhood.   
 I collected my data from various sources such as the Orange County Sheriff’s 
Office (residential burglary data), the Orlando Realtors Association (foreclosure data), 
and the Orange County Property Appraisers Office (neighborhood data).  Just as 
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important, I used ArcGIS mapping as a sampling tool to locate the neighborhoods’ 
levels of foreclosures and residential burglary.  I located neighborhoods with high 
foreclosure from the years of 2005 to 2009.  I then found the residential burglary rate for 
these neighborhoods to obtain my sample.  I used qualitative methods of analysis, 
specifically neighborhood canvassing and observation, to identify and measure the 
neighborhoods’ level of collective efficacy.  In the end, I draw my conclusions from 
these various sources and methodologies.  
 My analysis of Orange County middle- and upper-income neighborhoods first 
looked at whether the neighborhoods increased in residential burglaries as foreclosures 
increased between the years of 2005-2009, which was before and during the radical 
increase in foreclosures.  This part of the analysis tested the basic premise of social 
disorganization theory -- as foreclosures increase (an ecological characteristic 
measuring residential instability/mobility), the neighborhood becomes socially 
disorganized and thus, crime (e.g., residential burglary) increases.  As previously 
discussed and presented in Table 1, the majority of the eighty-four neighborhoods 
analyzed did not increase in residential burglaries as foreclosures increased.  In fact, as 
foreclosures increased, it appeared that the majority of the neighborhoods remained 
stable in residential burglaries (n=41).  However, to measure the collective efficacy of 
these neighborhoods, I combined the data from 2005-2009 for both foreclosures and 
residential burglaries to locate the top thirty neighborhoods.   
 The second part of my research examined the collective efficacy within 
neighborhoods that evidenced high foreclosures and high residential burglary rates and 
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neighborhoods with high foreclosures and low residential burglary rates.  This aspect of 
my project was undertaken to determine if neighborhoods with high foreclosures and 
high residential burglaries had fewer indicators of collective efficacy than neighborhoods 
with high foreclosures and low residential burglaries.  As stated previously, past 
research (Sampson 1997) has shown that neighborhoods which evidence structural 
characteristics of disorganization, such as high poverty, high residential 
mobility/instability, high racial and ethnic heterogeneity, and high family disruption, may 
experience reduced rates of criminal behavior if residents’ level of collective efficacy is 
high.  This occurs because high levels of collective efficacy among residents enables 
them to act as informal agents of social control and thereby monitor, and reduce, 
criminal behavior.  In my study, all the neighborhoods exhibited consistently high levels 
of foreclosures, but differed in their residential burglary rates.  According to social 
disorganization theory, the level of collective efficacy explains this difference (Sampson 
et al. 1997; Morenoff et al. 2001).   
 To conduct this part of my analysis, I located thirty neighborhoods with the 
highest foreclosures.  I then measured residential burglary in these neighborhoods to 
identify neighborhoods that were at the opposite ends of the spectrum.  The canvasses 
of these thirty neighborhoods identified various characteristics that measured levels of 
collective efficacy.  These indicators included the following:  was the neighborhood 
gated; was it guarded; was it fenced; were the houses privately fenced; how was the 
condition of the neighborhood and the houses within; was there a lot of debris and/or 
trash in the neighborhood; was there visible vacancies/foreclosures; was there ‘For 
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Rent’ or “For Sale’ signs; and, the level of various forms of activity in the neighborhood.  
My findings were presented in Chapter Four.  After summarizing the thirty neighborhood 
canvasses, thirteen noteworthy neighborhoods were then discussed in more detail.  
These thirteen neighborhoods fell at the far ends of the spectrum – neighborhoods with 
high foreclosures and high residential burglaries and neighborhoods with high 
foreclosures and low residential burglaries.  These thirteen neighborhoods were then 
compared in greater detail to determine if collective efficacy helped explain variations in 
the neighborhoods’ residential burglary rates.  Essentially, to gauge the level of 
collective efficacy, I adopted various physical and social disorder indicators that other 
researchers have used in order to identify whether there was high or low collective 
efficacy within the thirteen neighborhoods (Skogan 1992; Woldoff 2002).   
 As discussed throughout this paper, there were some characteristics that differed 
between the neighborhoods with high residential burglaries and low residential 
burglaries.  For instance, if the neighborhood was gated and remained closed, there 
appeared to be less residential burglaries because it could act as a barrier or defensible 
space (Newman 1972).  It also may increase the level of collective efficacy because 
residents may feel safer and more likely to monitor residential traffic as well as engage 
in relationships with other residents.  If the neighborhood was fully fenced it seemed to 
be a good indicator of higher collective efficacy as well, which could also act as a 
defensible space barrier.  Privacy fences also were a good indicator (Brower et al. 
1983).  Another interesting finding is that if the neighborhood was located in a more 
rural area or nestled back in other neighborhoods, residential burglaries were lower.  
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Past research has shown that rural neighborhoods exhibit more social capital or 
collective efficacy (Putnam 2007; Taylor et al. 2010).  In addition, the majority of the 
neighborhoods with high foreclosures and high residential burglaries also had visible 
vacancies and/or foreclosures (Skogan 1992).  Lastly, the level of activity within the 
neighborhood was also a good indicator, which Woldoff (2002) also found by measuring 
routine behavior and social neighboring among residents.  She found that with more 
interaction, which results from coming into contact with neighbors, there is less social 
disorder.  All of these indicators can increase collective efficacy because if residents 
feel safer due to the physical characteristics of the neighborhood, they may be more 
likely to spend time outside interacting with one another, which enhances their ability to 
operate as informal agents of social control.   
 Interestingly, when comparing middle- to upper-income neighborhoods, there 
was no substantive difference in residential burglaries between the two income groups.  
In fact, the majority of the upper-income neighborhoods fell in the middle of the 
spectrum, not at either end.  Moreover, the presence of a police officer living in the 
neighborhood was not a strong indicator of collective efficacy.  However, as already 
discussed, the data comes from 2005-2009 and the canvasses took place in 2011.  As 
such, I cannot determine if the police officers lived in the neighborhood during the years 
of interest.  Just as important, the presence of signs, such as deed restricted signs or 
signs indicating there was video surveillance did not appear to be strong indicators of 
collective efficacy.  Lastly, among neighborhoods with stronger indicators of collective 
efficacy, there was typically more activity within the neighborhood.  However, some 
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neighborhoods that had higher rates of residential burglaries also had a moderate level 
of activity, which should reduce social disorder and thus increase collective efficacy 
(Woldoff 2002).  More research is needed to understand how levels of activity may 
operate as an indicator of disorder and collective efficacy.   
With that said, there are several concerns that need to be discussed.  First, 
during the years of analysis (2005-2009), there was still residential construction going 
on and more homes could have been built during the years of this study.  With an 
increase in homes there could be an increase in the chance of victimization.  Moreover, 
within the five years of study, neighborhoods could have taken measures to increase 
the safety and well-being of its residents, which undoubtedly increases collective 
efficacy.  For example, the neighborhood may have added a gate at some point within 
the five years that could have caused a decrease in criminal behavior.  Unfortunately, I 
cannot control for these measures that a neighborhood might have undertaken within 
the years of my study.  The same concern may be attributed to actions taken by 
residents within the neighborhoods.  For instance, the privacy fences may not have 
been there during the five years of data.  However, they could have been constructed 
later and would have been present during the canvassing that took place over a year 
later.  As the economy worsened, however, it would not seem likely that the majority of 
neighborhoods, nor residents, took these costly actions, such as adding a gate at the 
entrance or constructing privacy fences.  Lastly, there is no way to determine how long 
a home was in foreclosure and/or empty without any occupants present.  For example, I 
only have the foreclosure addresses for homes that went into REO status during the 
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years of 2005-2009.  It is unclear whether the home way empty for a couple months or 
several years.   
 There are policy implications resulting from the findings of my research.  First, if a 
neighborhood is gated, but the gate remains open, it defeats the purpose of the gate 
acting as a protective agent.  Also, neighborhoods that only have fencing along the 
front/entrance do not protect the rest of the perimeter which is where criminals may gain 
easy access to the neighborhood.  Even more important, from my experience working in 
the field of property preservation and foreclosed homes, the mortgage companies need 
to take quicker action to maintain foreclosed homes as they quickly become an eye 
sore, and an easy target for vandalism and/or squatting making them a safe haven for 
unwanted entities (animals and humans alike).  Foreclosed properties can take over a 
year before the banks and mortgage companies finalize foreclosures and they are often 
left unattended during this process.  The yards become overgrown and the houses often 
turn into easy targets for vandalism. This increases physical disorder and decreases 
collective efficacy – both of which may lead to increased levels of crime, such as 
residential burglary.    
 Using foreclosures to solely measure social disorganization in middle- and upper-
income neighborhoods in central Florida did not result in overly strong findings and may 
benefit from additional measures.  It is difficult to say whether it is the foreclosures, the 
middle- and upper-income neighborhoods, or a combination of both that did not lend 
strong support for social disorganization theory, but on the whole, the findings in my 
study did not fully support the hypotheses.  There was some support for certain 
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indicators of collective efficacy as an important determinate in shaping a neighborhood’s 
level of crime, such as residential burglary.  However, more research is needed to fully 
understand this relationship.  Many of these neighborhoods definitely evidenced an 
increase in physical and social disorder with the presence of foreclosures, but only 
select indicators were identified in helping to explain the level of collective efficacy.  
More effort is needed in our neighborhoods around the country to improve the housing 
market, clean up our neighborhoods, and make our residents feel safer, which in the 
end, would increase their collective efficacy and their ability to function as informal 
agents of social control.  Ultimately, this could decrease the levels of criminal behavior 
in our neighborhoods.   
Contextualizing Social Disorganization among the Affluent 
 
 
 My research has shed light on the impact that foreclosures have had on middle- 
and upper-income neighborhoods and families.  Not only has there been an apparent 
increase in residential burglary in some neighborhoods, the overall disorder that has 
increased in the majority of the neighborhoods examined in my study is also cause for 
concern.  As stated previously, the measurement used in the current study to test 
disorganization in more affluent neighborhoods, such as foreclosures, could possibly 
benefit from additional measures.  Also, perhaps how I measured collective efficacy 
could benefit from other measures of visible physical and social disorder, such as 
residents’ subjective perceptions rather than a more objective approach.  However, the 
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findings of my study still contribute to the large and growing body of research on crime, 
social disorganization theory, and foreclosures.    
 The research on social disorganization theory is very vast.  The theory is widely 
researched to test its relationship on various indicators of crime and physical 
characteristics.  My research has added to the body of research with a new and 
interesting approach – using foreclosures to measure disorganization and applying the 
theory to middle- and upper-income neighborhoods.  I applied disorganization theory, 
which has usually been used to look at high poverty, urban areas, to examine more 
suburban, single-family, affluent neighborhoods.  Also, most research using social 
disorganization theory uses a quantitative approach.  My research has taken a 
qualitative approach to bring an in-depth, visual representation of foreclosures in 
middle- and upper-income neighborhoods and a presentation of indicators of collective 
efficacy.  It is important to test a theory’s scope and extend its research into other 
phenomena and that is what I have attempted to do.  Therefore, with the change in 
neighborhood dynamics it seemed important to attempt to apply social disorganization 
theory to different areas, such as affluent, suburban neighborhoods, using qualitative 
analysis.   
 Collective efficacy, a major focus of my research, draws from the systemic 
approach of social disorganization and focuses on informal social control through social 
ties.  Sampson and colleagues (1997) argue that mutual trust and expectations of 
residents in a neighborhood greatly affects the willingness of residents to intervene in 
acts of crime and delinquency.  Also, the shared norms and values, as well as mutual 
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trust among neighbors, is used to assess social cohesion within communities.  It is this 
link between mutual trust and the willingness of residents to intervene for the good of 
the community that they claim is collective efficacy.  The higher this collective efficacy 
among residents, the more likely they are to take on the role of informal social control 
agents.   
 Research on collective efficacy among residents has been measured it various 
ways.  For instance, Woldoff (2002) looked at attitudinal and behavioral attachment 
(communicating and/or spending time with neighbors).  Others have looked at how the 
physical residential environment can impact social ties (Taylor 1984).  In fact, some 
research found that the presence of a fence around a home implied to the observers 
that the homeowners would react toward any intruders (Brower et al. 1983).  Newman 
(1972) developed his theory of defensible space based on this concept.  The physical 
environment of a neighborhood and its surroundings can either increase of decrease 
perceptions of fear among residents.  The more secure residents feel in their 
neighborhood, the more likely they are to be outside and to come into contact with 
others (Newman 1972).  Moreover, Skogan (1992) found that abandoned structures 
(e.g., foreclosed homes) can indirectly reduce collective concern among neighborhood 
residents.  Thus, the collective efficacy of a neighborhood can be impacted if residents 
do not feel safe enough in their neighborhood to form social ties and establish mutual 
trust with other residents.  It is from prior research (Newman 1972; Brower et al. 1983; 
Taylor 1984; Skogan 1992) that I developed the measurement of collective efficacy for 
my current research.  
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 Therefore, the present study borrowed measurements of collective efficacy from 
previous research but also implemented additional measurements.  For instance, I 
recorded the physical characteristics of the environment – debris around the 
neighborhood and residential homes, the condition of the yards and homes (Skogan 
1992), the activity by foot and vehicle to measures social disorder (Woldoff 2002), the 
presence of privacy fences (Brower et al. 1983), the presence of a fence around the 
perimeter of the neighborhood, the presence of a gate or guard at the entrance 
(Newman 1972), and the overall condition of the surrounding environment of the 
neighborhood.  In all, every characteristic of the neighborhood and surrounding areas 
were used as indicators to measure collective efficacy.  All observations were taken into 
consideration when explaining the collective efficacy among residents.  The detailed 
observations allowed more in-depth measurement and future research examining 
collective efficacy should adopt this approach.  Collective efficacy cannot be tested by 
analyzing crime statistics or trends.  It requires a further understanding of the dynamics 
of neighborhoods, such as their physical and social characteristics.   
 One recommendation for researchers is to go even further into measuring 
collective efficacy.  For example, Woldoff (2002) extended the concept by investigating 
collective efficacy from the perspective of the residents.  I have measured collective 
efficacy objectively.  Yet, collective efficacy has a subjective component – residents 
define it differently.  Future research may need to look at collective efficacy subjectively 
and acquire accounts from the residents themselves to understand how they define 
collective efficacy.  This would help develop a more solid measurement of collective 
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efficacy and allow research to determine if collective efficacy is differentially defined in 
more affluent neighborhoods.  Overall though, an examination that encompasses all 
characteristics, while not disregarding any visible characteristic in the neighborhood, is 
the ideal way to measure collective efficacy across neighborhoods.   
 Another recommendation for future research is to investigate further the 
association between various structural characteristics of social disorganization theory, 
especially foreclosures, and academic performance or achievement.  Past research has 
found that neighborhood structural characteristics such as high levels of crime and 
violence exposure (Schwartz and Gorman 2003; Shumow, Vandell, and Posner 1999), 
high levels of economic impoverishment (Plunkett, Abarca-Mortensen, and Behnke 
2007), and low levels of employment in professional jobs (Ensminger, Lamkin, and 
Jacobson 1996) are associated with poorer academic achievement. Even more, 
homeownership has been found to have positive effects on the educational 
development and attainments of children (Aaronson 2000; Bramley and Karley 2007; 
Green and White 1997; Harkness and Newman 2001).  Because of the high rate of 
foreclosures across the country, researchers should further understand the effects, if 
any at all, that foreclosures have on students’ academic performance or achievement.   
 Lastly, future research needs to explore the relationship between condos and 
high foreclosures.  According to the present research, many of the neighborhoods with 
high foreclosures were condominium complexes.  Although many of the high 
foreclosure neighborhoods were condos, most of these had a lower residential burglary 
rate compared to single-family housing neighborhoods.  Perhaps the close proximity of 
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condo units and the overall layout of these types of neighborhoods help explain the 
lower residential burglary rate.  Future research should investigate this phenomenon to 
gain a further understanding of the differences in neighborhood organization.     
 Not only does my research contribute to the plethora of research on social 
disorganization theory, it also addresses concerns raised by other researchers on the 
impact of foreclosures on crime.  For instance, Immergluck and Smith (2006b) found 
that residents in neighborhoods are concerned about foreclosures because they can 
jeopardize the security and safety of the neighborhoods.  Research on abandoned 
structures, such as homes, has concluded that there are an abundance of negative 
consequences that abandoned homes can have on the community.  Some of these 
consequences could be simply a harbor for trash or more worrisome, a harbor for 
criminals.  Vandalism is also frequent in empty homes (Skogan 1992).  Others have 
shown great concern for more affluent neighborhoods because of the increase in 
foreclosures (Wilson and Paulsen 2008) and argued that violent and property crime has 
increased as a result of the increase in foreclosures in these neighborhoods (Bess 
2008).  While others have suggested we need to further investigate the relationship 
between foreclosures and crime, my research has provided a step in this direction.   
 There are many ways to measure social disorganization theory – poverty, 
racial/ethnic heterogeneity, residential instability or mobility, and female-headed 
households – which have been the primary method of explaining high crime in 
neighborhoods.  Using foreclosures as a measurement of residential instability and 
mobility is ideal in the current time because of the significant number of foreclosures 
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nationwide.  However, foreclosures may not be a good measurement in affluent 
neighborhoods, or any neighborhoods for that matter.  Foreclosures are so widespread 
that there is not any group of people who have not been affected in some way by the 
housing crisis.  This could explain why the current research did not establish stronger 
conclusions on the relationship between residential burglaries and foreclosures.  Yet, 
collective efficacy is still very important among all socioeconomic neighborhoods as a 
means to decrease crime. More indicators of collective efficacy need to be identified to 
further understand the extent of residents’ ability to act as informal agents of social 
control.  Just as important, a subjective approach may better understand how collective 
efficacy explains an increase or decrease in crime.  Also, understanding it from the 
perspective of residents could help in increasing collective efficacy among residents.  In 
the end, my study adds to the body of research on social disorganization by focusing on 
foreclosures in middle- and upper-income neighborhoods. 
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Neighborhood Canvassing Checklist 
Tract and Block I.D.: 
Neighborhood Name: 
 
Entrance in Neighborhood 
  - The neighborhood is gated. 
  - The neighborhood has a home owners association or is deed restricted (circle    
    which one). 
_____ - The neighborhood is fenced: partially or fully. 
 
Canvassing the Streets of the Neighborhood 
  - The neighborhood and/or streets have trash present.  
  - There is activity in the neighborhood (e.g., people outside). 
  - There is evidence (e.g., whether the home has been secured, which will have a  
    changed lock and a sign in the window, or whether it is visible that the home is    
    vacant and unkempt) of multiple foreclosures in the neighborhood. 
  - Estimate the number of total, visible, foreclosures. 
  - Number of entrances/exits the neighborhood has.  
 
Arrival at Foreclosed Home 
  - The home in foreclosure been secured? 
  - The home is listed by a realtor (realtor for sale sign present).  
  - The house has trash or other debris built up around it. 
  - The yard and shrubs are overgrown.  
  - The home has one or more broken windows. 
228 
  - Indicate the number of broken windows. 
  - The home has windows boarded up. 
  - Indicate the number of boarded windows. 
  - There are visual marks of graffiti on the outside of the house. 
 
 
Additional Comments:  
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APPENDIX B: STRUCTURAL SOCIAL CONTROLS BY 
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT SURROUNDING NEIGHBORHOOD 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
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Structural Social Controls/Physical Environment 
Tract and Block I.D.: 
Name of Neighborhood (if available): 
 
List the stores (grocery) that are available to the neighborhood and describe the overall 
condition of the store/plaza. 
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
List and describe any commercial structures around the neighborhood (i.e., types, 
condition, and in business/foreclosed).   
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
Identify parks around the neighborhood and document the condition of the park/s and 
how many people are in the park (MUST also be documented on a weekend).  
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Describe the foot and bicycle traffic on sidewalks in the local of the neighborhood (also 
give a count within a specific amount of time). 
              
              
              
              
              
Describe the vehicle traffic on streets around the neighborhood, such as is it busy or 
quiet (also give a count within a specific amount of time of the number of passing 
vehicles). 
              
              
              
              
              
 
Additional Comments:  
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APPENDIX C: NEIGHBORHOOD CANVASSING RESULTS 
TABLE
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                                          Neighborhood Demographics              Neighborhood Characteristics 
  Name Fore Crime Tract/Income Date of Obs Gated (O/C) 
1 Hawthorne Village Condos 87 69 170.08/MI 5/13, 2:15; 6/4, 1:00 Y (1)-O 
2 Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos 72 14 170.07/U 5/17, 2:00; 7/4, 12:30 Y (2) - C, O 
3 Sand Lake Private Residences Condos 62 31 171.07/U 5/13, 3:15; 6/4, 2:00 Y (1)-O 
4 Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos 60 20 148.13/U 5/17, 11:30;6/4, 1:30 Y (1)-O 
5 Summerport PH5 52 7 171.05/U 5/17, 12:15; 6/18, 11:15 N (3) 
6 Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos 48 31 167.19/U 5/12, 11:45; 6/18, 12:55 N (1) 
7 Palms Villa Residencecs Condos 47 12 170.08/MI 5/13, 2:00; 6/4, 12:45 Y (2)-C, C 
8 Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos 46 20 170.07/U 5/17, 2:20; 6/4, 11:45 Y (1)-O 
9 Bella Terra Condos 46 15 152.01/MI 5/13, 12:20; 6/18, 12:15 Y (2)-O, C; C,C (GA) 
10 Sandhill Preserve 42 15 168.05/MI 5/17, 3:00; 6/4, 11:00 Y (1)-C (GA) 
11 Capri at Hunters Creek Condos 39 14 170.07/U 5/17, 2:45; 6/4, 11:50 Y (2)-C, O 
12 Eagle Creek PH 1A 35 22 167.04/U 5/17, 4:00; 6/4, 9:40 Y (1)-C (G); 2nd C 
13 Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village 33 19 167.19/U 5/12, 11:00; 6/18, 2:00 N (3) 
14 Plantation Park Private Residences Con. 32 15 170.05/MI 5/17, 1:25;6/4, 1:50 Y (1)-C (GA) 
15 Los Terranos 29 5 * 5/12, 1:00; 6/18, 9:30 N (Multiple) 
16 Sandpoint at Meadow Woods 28 24 168.05/MI 5/18, 2:40; 6/4, 11:20 N (1); Gshack, Emp 
17 La Cascada PH 1 28 23 168.05/MI 5/19, 1:45; 6/4, 10:00 N (3) 
18 Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1 27 19 168.05/MI 5/19, 11:35; 6/4, 10:20 Y (1)-C (GA) 
19 Island Cove Villas PH 3 27 15 168.05/MI 5/18, 2:50; 6/4, 3:00 N (1) 
20 Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1 26 36 168.05/MI 5/19, 12:25; 6/4, 10:15 N (3) 
21 Heather Glen at Meadow Woods 24 29 168.05/MI 5/19, 1:20; 6/4, 10:40 N (1) 
22 Tudor Grove at Timber Springs 23 7 167.19/U 5/18, 10:40; 6/18, 1:30 Y (1)-C (GA) 
23 Spring Isle UT 1 22 8 167.19/U 5/18, 10:30; 6/18, 1:50 Y (1)-C (G) 
24 Lakes of Windermere PH 2A 22 3 171.03/U 5/18, 12:35; 6/18, 10:20 N (11) & (1) 
25 Island Walk 21 17 168.05/MI 5/19, 1:00; 6/4, 10:35 Y (1)-C (GA) 
26 Discovery Palms Condos 21 7 170.05/MI 5/18, 1:45; 6/4, 2:05 Y (2)-C, C 
27 Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C 21 7 171.05/U 5/18, 12:15; 6/18, 10:50 N (2) 
28 Timber Isle 20 13 167.19/U 5/18, 11:00; 6/18, 1:15 Y (1)-C (GA) 
29 Huntcliff Park 20 14 168.05/MI 5/19, 11:10; 6/4, 10:30 Y (1)-C (GA) 
30 Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2 20 11 168.05/MI 5/18, 2:35; 6/4, 11:30 N (1) 
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                       Neighborhood Characteristics    
 HOA/Deed Car Traffic Foot Traffic Ppl Outside Pool (#) Tennis/Hoop Park/PLG (#) For Sale For Rent Vac/Fore 
1 Yes-All 3; 2 2; 5 1; 3 Y(2)-0; 0 Y(2T)-0; 0 Y(1)-0; 0 0V 0V ≈ 3V 
2 Yes-All 4; 7 3; 1 1; 1 Y-0; ≈ 3 N N 0V 0V  
3 Yes-All 9; 8 6; 5 3; 6 Y- 0; 2 Y(1/1)-0; 2H Y(1)-0; 0 0V 0V  
4 Yes-All 11; 8 2; 3 1; 5 Y-0; 4 Y(1/1)-0; 0 Y(3)-0; 2 0V 2V  
5 Yes-Fence 12;23 3;2 2; 10 Y-0; 0 Y(1/1)-0; 0 Y(3)-2; 0 Multi Multi Sev Vis 
6 Yes-All 3; 7 0; 2 1; 6 Y-0; 2 N N 0V 0V  
7 Yes-All 4; 5 0; 0 0; 4 Y(1)-0; 3 N N 0V 0V  
8 Yes-All 3; 3 0; 0 2; 2 Y-0; Prty Y(1/1)-0; 0 N 0V 0V  
9 Yes-All 8; 9 0; 0 2; 4 Y-2; 4 Y(1T)-0; 0 Y(1)-0; 0 0V 0V  
10 Yes-NoFen 7; 5 0; 3 0; 2 N N N 0V 0V ≈ 2V 
11 Yes-All 2; 6 0; 1 2; 5 Y-0; 0 N N 0V ≈ 2V  
12 Yes-NoFen 6; 5 ? ? Y- ? N N  - -  
13 Yes-All 9; 9 3; 3 3; 6 Y-2; 3 Y(1/1)-1T; 0 Y(1)-0; 0 ≈ 12V ≈ 2V Sev Vis 
14 Yes-All 4; 5 1; 0 1; 5 Y-2; 6 Y(1T)-0; 0 Y(1)-0; 0 0V 0V  
15 No 3; 4 0; 4 0; 5 N N N 0V 0V  
16 Yes-All 1; 3 0; 1 2; 2 Y-Closed N N ≈ 2V ≈ 1V ≈ 3V 
17 Yes-Fence 4; 1 1; 2 4; 3 Y-5; 1 N Y-0; 0 ≈ 8V ≈ 3V ≈ 4V 
18 Yes-Fence? 6; 2 7; 2 0; 6 Y-0; 0 N Y-0; 0 0V 0V ≈ 5V 
19 Yes-All 3; 3 1; 1 1; 9 Y-3; 0 N N 0V 0V ≈ 4V 
20 Yes-Fence? 5; 1 3; 4 2; 2 N N N 0V 0V Sev Vis 
21 Yes-Fence? 2; 4 1; 3 4; 2 Y-0; 0 N Y-0; 0 ≈ 1V ≈ 3V Sev Vis 
22 Yes-Fence? 1; 6 5; 1 1; 3 N N N ≈ 3V 2V ≈ 4V 
23 Yes-All? 5; 8 ? ? Y-? N Y-? - -  
24 Yes-Fence? 3; 10 1; 6 3; 5 Y-0; 0 N Y-0; 0 0V 0V Sev Vis 
25 Yes-All 3; 3 0; 1 3; 2 Y-0; 0 N Y-0; 0 0V 1V  
26 Yes-All 2; 1 ? ? Y-? Y(1T)-? N - -  
27 Yes-Fence 3; 13 3; 1 4; 10 Y(2)-4; 3 Y(1/1)-0; 0 Y-3;0 ≈ 8V 0V Sev Vis 
28 Yes-Fence 4; 15 3; 0 5; 6 N Y(1T)-0; 1 Y-5; 2 ≈ 6V ≈ 5V Sev Vis 
29 Yes-Fence 6; 2 0; 1 5; 5 Y-0; 0 N Y-0; 0 ≈ 2V 0V Sev Vis 
30 Yes-Fence? 4; 11 1; 3 3; 15 (GrgSl-12) N Y(1H)-0; 0 Y(2)-0; 0 ≈ 3V 0V ≈ 4V 
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                                         Neighborhood Characteristics                          School Grades for 2005-2009 
  Yards Fenced Miscellaneous Notes   Elementary Middle High 
1 Little Tall (HOA) Partly Speed bumps    C, B, A, A, A NG, A, A, A, A, C, C, D, D, B 
2 Nice Kept (HOA) Fully      A, A, A, A, A A, A, A, A, A C,C, D, D, B 
3 Nice Kept (HOA) Partly      A, A, A, A, A A, A, A, A, A B, B, B, A, B 
4 Some Yrds unkept Partly Speed bumbs    A, A, A, A, A A, A, A, A, A B, B, B, A, B 
5 Grnds Nice; yrds unkept Partly NoSol Sign; Some Per. Fence   NG for All NG, NG, NG, A, A B, C, D, C, B 
6 Nice Kept (HOA) Most VidSurv Sign; Sheriff Veh; College  A, A, A, A, A A, A, A, A, A B, B, C, B, C 
7 Nice Kept (HOA) Fully NoTres Sign    C, B, A, A, A NG, A, A, A, A, C, C, D, D, B 
8 Nice Kept (HOA) Partly StTroop Res    A, A, A, B, A A, A, A, A, A C, C, D, D, B 
9 Nice Kept (HOA) Fully VidSurv Sign; NBHD Watch sign   A, A, A, A, A B, A, C, B, C C, C, C, C, D 
10 Some Bkyrd debris; unkept Yrds Partly DeedRes Sign    NG, NG, C, C, A B, A, B, B, C C, C, D, D, B 
11 Nice Kept (HOA) Fully Speed bumps; scrnd prchs 1stflr  A, A, A, B, A A, A, A, A, A C, C, D, D, B 
12 - None Vacant Lots; No fncd yrds   NG, NG, NG, A, A NG for All NG for All 
13 ≈ 1/2 yrds unkept; yrd debri Partly Mnml fncd yrds;    NG, NG, A, A, A NG, NG, A, A, A NG for All 
14 Nice Kept (HOA) Partly Some blinds 
disarray 
   C, A, B , A, A NG, A, A, A, A, C, C, D, D, B 
15 Some Yrds unkept None Industrial; country; Vrty of houses; Some fncd NG, NG, A, A, A* NG; B, C, C, A, C* C, C, C, C, C; 
NG* 
16 Nice Kept (HOA) Most VidSurv Sign; Speed bumbs; Grd Ofc Not Ocp  A, B, A, A, A B, A, B, B, C C, C, D, D, B 
17 Many Yrds unkept; yrd debri None 2 OPDVeh; Some fncd; rural   A, C, A, B, A NG, NG, A, A, A C, C, D, D, B 
18 Some Yrds unkept, some nice Partly Mnml fncd; OCSO&OPDVeh; Some debri  NG, NG, C, C, A B, A, B, B, C C, C, D, D, B 
19 Nice Kept (HOA) Partly NBHD Watch, NoSol Sign; No fncd; Spd bumps A, B, A, A, A B, A, B, B, C C, C, D, D, B 
20 Some yrds unkept Partly Mstly fncd; OSCOVeh; NBHD Watch&Deed Sign NG, NG, C, C, A NG, NG, A, A, A C, C, D, D, B 
21 Some yrds unkept Partly Some fncd    A, C, A, B, A B, A, B, B, C C, C, D, D, B 
22 Some yrds unkept; yrd debri Partly Mnml fncd;     NG, NG, NG, NG, A NG, NG, A, A, A B, B, C, B, C 
23 - Partly Some fncd    NG, NG, NG, NG, A NG, NG, A, A, A B, B, C, B, C 
24 Some yrds unkept None Rural, Orange Groves; Mnml fncd  NG, NG, NG, A, A NG for All B, C, D, C, B 
25 Nice Kept (HOA) Partly NBHD Watch/TowAway Sign   NG, NG, C, C, A B, A, B, B, C C, C, D, D, B 
26 Nice Kept (HOA) Partly I Drive; Vaca Clubs Nearby; PrivProp Sign  C, A, B , A, A NG, A, A, A, A, C, C, D, D, B 
27 Some yrds unkept Partly Windermere/Secl; Vacant Lots/FS; Mnml fncd NG for All NG, NG, NG, A, A B, C, D, C, B 
28 ≈ 1/2 yrds unkept; yrd debri Partly Some fncd; installing spd bumps  NG, NG, NG, NG, A NG, NG, NG, A, A B, B, C, B, C 
29 Some yrds unkept Partly Mnml fncd    NG, NG, C, C, A B, A, B, B, C C, C, D, D, B 
30 Some yrds unkept None Mnml fncd; graffiti on fnc; HOA GarSal/busy A, B, A, A, A B, A, B, B, C C, C, D, D, B 
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APPENDIX D: TOP 30 NEIGHBORHOODS RANKING BY 
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY AND FORECLOSURES RATES
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Neighborhood  
Name 
Residential Burg. Rate 
Ranking 
Foreclosure Rate 
Ranking 
Residential Burg. 
Rate 
Foreclosure  
Rate 
     
Hawthorne Village Condos 1 4 18.9 23.8 
Villanova at Hunters Creek Condos 24 5 4.5 23.1 
Sand Lake Private Residences Condos 12 15 7.4 14.8 
Sanctuary at Bay Hill Condos 15 7 6.6 19.7 
Summerport PH5 27 11 2.2 16.4 
Crest at Waterford Lakes Condos 5 10 11.2 17.3 
Palms Villa Residencecs Condos 16 3 6.2 24.4 
Audubon Villas at Hunters Creek Condos 18 18 5.7 13.0 
Bella Terra Condos 25 19 4.2 12.7 
Sandhill Preserve 8 1 10.0 28.0 
Capri at Hunters Creek Condos 19 13 5.6 15.6 
Eagle Creek PH 1A 21 26 4.6 7.3 
Waterford Trails PH 2 East Village 17 23 5.8 10.1 
Plantation Park Private Residences Con. 22 24 4.6 9.9 
Los Terranos 23 2 4.6 26.9 
Sandpoint at Meadow Woods 2 6 17.6 20.6 
La Cascada PH 1 4 16 11.4 13.9 
Cedar Bend at Meadow Woods PH 1 6 12 11.1 15.8 
Island Cove Villas PH 3 11 14 8.6 15.4 
Wyndham Lakes ESTS UT 1 9 28 9.0 6.5 
Heather Glen at Meadow Woods 3 17 16.1 13.3 
Tudor Grove at Timber Springs 20 9 5.3 17.4 
Spring Isle UT 1 26 27 2.7 7.3 
Lakes of Windermere PH 2A 30 21 1.5 10.7 
Island Walk 10 20 8.9 11.1 
Discovery Palms Condos 29 30 2.1 6.3 
Signature Lakes-Parcel 1C 28 29 2.2 6.5 
Timber Isle 14 22 6.8 10.5 
Huntcliff Park 13 25 6.9 9.9 
Windrose at Southmeadow UT 2 7 8 10.1 18.3 
238 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
Aaronson, Daniel.  2000.  “A Note on the Benefits of Homeownership.”  Journal of 
Urban Economics.  47(3): 356-369.   
Akers, Ronald L., and Christine S. Sellers.  2009.  Criminological Theories: Introduction, 
Evaluation, and Application.  New York: Oxford University Press.  
Avery, Robert B., Kenneth P. Brevoort, and Glenn B. Canner.  2006.  “Higher-Priced 
Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data.”  Federal Reserve Bulletin.  A123-
A166.   
Avery, Robert B., Glenn B. Canner, Robert E. Cook, Shannon C. Mok, Caitlin G. 
Coslett, Patricia J. Dykes, and Sylvia A. Freeland.  2005.  “New Information 
Reported Under HMDA and its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement.”  
Federal Reserve Bulletin.  Summer:344-394.   
Ambrose, Brent W., and Richard J. Buttimer Jr.  2000.  “Embedded Options in the 
Mortgage Contract.”  The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics.  
21(2):95-111.   
 Ambrose, Brent W., Charles A. Capone.  1998.  “Modeling the Conditional Probability 
of Foreclosures in the Context of Single-Family Mortgage Default Resolutions.”  
Real Estate Economics.  26(3): 391-429. 
Anderson, Richard, and James VanderHoff.  1999.  “Mortgage Default Rates and 
Borrower Race.”  Journal of Real Estate Research.  18(2): 279-289. 
239 
Apgar, William, and Allegra Calder.  2005.  “The Dual Mortgage Market: The 
Persistence of Discrimination in Mortgage Lending.” Pp. 101-123 in The 
Geography of Opportunity: Race and Housing Choice in Metropolitan America 
edited by Xavier de Souza Briggs.  Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.  
Apgar, William, and Mark Duda.  2005.  “Collateral Damage: The Municipal Impact of 
Today’s Mortgage Foreclosure Boom.”  Homeownership Preservation 
Foundation. 
Becker, Howard S.  1963.  Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance.  New York:  
Free Press.   
Bellair, Paul E.  1997.  “Social Interaction and Community Crime: Examining the 
Importance of Neighborhood Networks.”  Criminology.  35(4):677-703.   
Berliner, David C.  2005.  “Our Impoverished View of Educational Reform.”  Teachers 
College Record.  Retrieved September 1, 2010 from 
http://www.tcrecord.org/content.asp?contentid=12106  
Bess, Michael.  2008.  “Assessing the Impact of Home Foreclosures in Charlotte 
Neighborhoods.”  Geography & Public Safety.  1(3):2-5. 
Blumer, Herbert.  1969.  Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method.  Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.   
Boushey, Heather, and Christian Weller.  2008.  “Has Growing Inequality Contributed to 
Rising Household Economic Distress?”  Review of Political Economy.  20(1):1-
22.  
240 
Boyle, Douglas J., and Constance Hassett-Walker.  2008.  “Individual-Level and Socio-
Structural Characteristics of Violence: An Emergency Department Study.”  
Journal of Interpersonal Violence.  23(8):1011-1026.   
Bradford, Calvin.  2002.  “Risk or Race? Racial Disparities and the Subprime Refinance 
Market.”  Washington: Center for Community Change.  Retrieved May 14, 2010 
from http://www.butera-andrews.com/legislative-updates/directory/Background-
Reports/Center%20for%20Community%20Change%20Report.pdf  
Bramley, Glen, and Noah Kofi Karley.  2007.  “Homeownership, Poverty and Education 
Achievement: School Effects as Neighbourhood Effects.”  Housing Studies.  
22(5): 693-721.   
Brower, Sidney, Kathleen Dockett, and Ralph B. Taylor.  1983.  “Resident’s Perceptions 
of Site-Level Features.”  Environment and Behavior.  15(4):419-437.   
Brown, Timothy.  2008.  “The National Neighborhood Indicators Partnership – Creating 
Positive Change for Depressed Neighborhoods.”  Geography & Public Safety.  
1(3):11.   
Buist, Henry, Isaac F. Megbolugbe, and Tina R. Trent.  1994. “Racial Homeownership 
Patterns, the Mortgage Market, and Public Policy.”  Journal of Housing 
Research.  5(1):91-116.   
Bunce, Harold, Debbie Gruenstein, Christopher Herbert, and Randall Scheessele.  
2001.  “Subprime Foreclosures: The Smoking Gun on Predatory Lending?  U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development.  Washington D.C. 
241 
Burnette, Kimberly, Christopher Herbert, and Bulbul Kaul.  2002.  “Subprime 
Originations and Foreclosures in New York State: A Case Study of Nassau, 
Suffolk, and Westchester Counties.” Prepared for American Association of 
Retired Persons Public Policy Institute.  
Bursik, Robert J., Jr. and Harold G. Grasmick.  1993a.  Neighborhoods and Crime: The 
Dimensions of Effective Community Control.  New York: Lexington.   
------.  1993b.  “Economic Deprivation and Neighborhood Crime Rates, 1960-1980.”  
Law & Society Review.  27(2):263-283.     
Calem, Paul, Kevin Gillen, and Susan Wachter.  2004.  “The Neighborhood of Subprime 
Mortgage Lending.”  Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics.  29(4): 393-
410. 
Cantillon, Dan, William S. Davidson, and John H. Schweitzer.  2003.  “Measuring 
Community Social Organization: Sense of Community as a Mediator in Social 
Disorganization Theory.”  Journal of Criminal Justice.  31:321-339.   
Capowich, George E.  2003.  “The Conditioning Effects of Neighborhood Ecology on 
Burglary Victimization.”  Criminal Justice and Behavior.  30(1): 39-61.   
Carr, James H.  2007.  “Responding to the Foreclosure Crisis.”  Housing Policy Debate.  
18(4):837-860.   
Center for Responsible Lending.  2003.  “The Case Against Predatory Lending.”  
Durham, NC: Center for Responsible Lending.   
------.  2009.  “Florida Foreclosures: Impact & Opportunity.”  Durham, NC: Center for 
Responsible Lending.   
242 
------.  2010a.  “The Cost of Bad Lending in the United States.”  Durham, NC: Center for 
Responsible Lending.   
------.  2010b.  “New Foreclosures by State for 2009.”  Durham, NC: Center for 
Responsible Lending.   
Clauretie, Terrence.  1987.  “The Impact of Interstate Foreclosure Cost Differences and 
the Value of Mortgages on Default Rates.”  AREUEA Journal.  15(3):152-167. 
Clontz, Kenneth A.  N.d.  “Spatial Analysis of Residential Burglaries in Tallahassee, 
Florida.”  Retrieved August 5, 2010 from 
http://proceedings.esri.com/library/userconf/proc97/proc97/to250/pap233/p233.ht
m.  
Cornish, Derek B., and Ronald V. Clark.  1986.  The Reasoning Criminal: Rational 
Choice Perspectives on Offending.  New York: Springer.   
Cohen, Lawrence, and Marcus Felson.  1979.  “Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: 
A Routine Activities Approach.”  American Sociological Review.  44:588-607. 
Collins, Michael.  2003.  “Chicago’s Homeownership Preservation Challenge: 
Foreclosure.  Unpublished research.   
Couchrane, Marsha J., Brian J. Surette, and Peter M. Zorn.  2004.  “Subprime 
Borrowers: Mortgage Transitions and Outcomes.”  Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics.  29(4):365-392.   
Cutts, Amy, and Robert Van Order.  2004.  “On the Economics of Subprime Lending.”  
Freddie Mac. 
243 
Delgadillo, Lucy, and Amber Gallagher.  2006.  “Borrower- and Mortgage-Related 
Factors Associated with FHA Foreclosures.”  Family and Consumer Sciences 
Research Journal.  34(3): 204-222. 
DiPasquale, Denise, and Edward L. Glaeser.  1999.  “Incentives and Social Capital: Are 
Homeowners Better Citizens?”  Journal of Urban Economics.  45(2): 354-384.   
Dornbusch, Sanford, M, Philip L. Ritter, and Laurence Steinberg.  1991.  “Community 
Influences on the Relation of Family Statuses to Adolescent School 
Performance: Differences between African Americans and Non-Hispanic Whites.”  
American Journal of Education.  99(4): 543-567.   
Edmiston, Kelly, and Roger Zalneraitis.  2007.  “Rising Foreclosures in the United 
States: A Perfect Storm.”  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic 
Review. 
Elmer, Peter, and Steven Seelig.  1998.  “The Rising Long-Term Trend of Single-Family 
Mortgage Foreclosure Rates.”  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division 
of Research and Statistics.  Working Paper 98-2. 
Ensminger, Margaret E., Rebecca P. Lamkin, and Nora Jacobson.  1996.  “School 
Leaving: A Longitudinal Perspective Including Neighborhood Effects.”  Child 
Development.  67(5): 2400-2416.   
Felson, Marcus.  2006.  Crime and Nature.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.   
Florida Department of Education.  Retrieved on July 17, 2010, from  http://fcat.fldoe.org/  
244 
Gerardi, Kristopher S., and Paul S. Willen.  2009.  “Subprime Mortgages, Foreclosures, 
and Urban Neighborhoods.”  The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy.  
9(3).  
Green, Richard K., and Michelle J. White.  1997.  “Measuring the Benefits of 
Homeowning: Effects on Children.”  Journal of Urban Economics.  41(3): 441-
461.   
Grover, Michael, Laura Smith, and Richard Todd.  2008.  “Targeting Foreclosure 
Interventions: An Analysis of Neighborhood Characteristics Associated with High 
Foreclosure Rates in Two Minnesota Counties.”  Journal of Economics and 
Business.  60: 91-109. 
Gruenstein, Debbie, and Christopher Herbert.  2000.  “Analyzing Trends in Subprime 
Originations and Foreclosures: A Case Study of the Atlanta Metro Area.”  
Prepared for The Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation.   
Gruenstein-Bocian, Debbie, Keith Ernst, and Wei Li.  2007.  “Unfair Lending: The 
Impact of Race and Ethnicity on Loan Pricing in the Subprime Market.”  Center 
for Responsible Lending.  
Harkness, Joseph, and Sandra Newman.  2003.  “Differential Effects of Homeownership 
on Children from Higher- and Lower-Income Families.”  Journal of Housing 
Research.  14(1): 1-20.   
Hevesi, Dennis.  2002.  “New Curbs on Predatory Loans.”  New York Times.  Retrieved 
on May 6, 2010, from http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/10/realestate/new-curbs-
on-predatory-loans.html?pagewanted=1  
245 
Hipp, John R., George E. Tita, and Robert T. Greenbaum.  2009.  “Drive-bys and Trade-
ups: Examining the Directionality of the Crime and Residential Instability 
Relationship.”  Social Forces.  87(4):1777-1812.   
Hirschi, Travis.  1969.  Causes of Delinquency.  Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press.   
Hunter, Albert J.  1985.  “Private, Parochial, and Public Social Orders: The Problem of 
Crime and Incivility in Urban Communities.”  Pp. 230-242 in The Challenge of 
Social Control: Citizenship and Institution Building in Modern Society, edited by 
Gerald D. Suttles and Mayer N. Zald.  Norwood NJ: Ablex.   
Immergluck, Dan.  2004.  “Hypersegmentation and Exclusion in Financial Services in 
the U.S.: The Effects on Low-Income and Minority Neighborhoods.”  Social Policy 
Journal.  3:25-44. 
------.  2008.  “From the Subprime to the Exotic: Excessive Mortgage Market Risk and 
Foreclosures.”  Journal of the American Planning Association.  74(1):59-76. 
------.  2009.  “The Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosed Properties, and Federal Policy.”  
Journal of the American Planning Association.  75(4):406-423.   
Immergluck, Dan, and Geoff Smith.  2005.  “Measuring the Effect of Subprime Lending 
on Neighborhood Foreclosures: Evidence from Chicago.”  Urban Affairs Review.  
40(3):362-389. 
------.  2006a.  “The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family 
Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values.”  Housing Policy Debate.  17(1):57-
79. 
246 
------.  2006b.  “The Impact of Single-family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood 
Crime.”  Housing Studies.  21(6):851-866. 
Jacobs, Jane.  1961.  The Death and Life of Great American Cities.  New York: Random 
House.   
Janowitz, Morris and James Burk.  1991.  On Social Organization and Social Control.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.   
Joint Center for Housing Studies.  2007.  “The State of the Nation’s Housing.” 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.  Retrieved on October 4, 2009, from 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2007/son2007.pdf  
Kaplan, David H., and Gail G. Sommers.  2009.  “An Analysis of the Relationship 
Between Housing Foreclosures, Lending Practices, and Neighborhood Ecology: 
Evidence from a Distressed Count.”  The Professional Geographer.  61(1):101-
120.   
Kasarda, John, and Morris Janowitz.  1974.  “Community Attachment in Mass Society.”  
American Sociological Review.  39(3): 328-339.   
Kelling, George and Catherine Coles.  1996.  Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order 
and Reducing Crime in Our Communities.  New York: Free Press.   
Kingston, Beverly, David Huizinga, and Delbert S. Elliott.  2009.  “A Test of Social 
Disorganization Theory in High-Risk Urban Neighborhoods.”  Youth & Society.  
41(1):53-79.   
Kornhauser, Ruth.  1978.  Social Sources of Delinquency: An Appraisal of Analytic 
Models.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.   
247 
Kubrin, Charis E., and Ronald Weitzer.  2003.  “New Directions in Social 
Disorganization Theory.”  Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency.  
40(4):374-402.   
Lanier, Christina and Lin Huff-Corzine.  2006.  “American Indian Homicide: A County-
Level Analysis Utilizing Social Disorganization Theory.”  Homicide Studies.  
10(3): 181-194.   
Lax, Howard, Michael Manti, Paul Raca, and Peter Zorn.  2004.  “Subprime Lending: An 
Investigation of Economic Efficiency.”  Housing Policy Debate.  15(3): 533-571. 
Lee, Moosung and Na’im Madyun.  2009.  “The Impact of Neighborhood Disadvantage 
on the Black-White Achievement Gap.”  Journal of Education for Students Placed 
at Risk.  14: 148-169.   
Leven, Charles L, and Michael E. Sykuta.  1994.  “The Importance of Race in Home 
Mortgage Approvals.”  Urban Affairs Quarterly.  29:479-491.   
Leventhal, Tami, and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn.  2003.  “Children and Youth in 
Neighborhood Contexts.”  Current Directions in Psychological Science.  12(1):27-
31.   
Lowenkamp, Christopher T., Francis T. Cullen, and Travis C. Pratt.  2003.  “Replicating 
Sampson and Grove’s Test of Social Disorganization Theory: Revisiting A 
Criminological Classic.”  Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency.  40(4): 
351-373.   
Madyun, Na’im, and Moosung Lee.  2008.  “Community Influences on EBD Students.”  
Education and Urban Society.  40(3): 307-328.   
248 
Mares, Dennis.  2010.  “Social Disorganization and Gang Homicides in Chicago: A 
Neighborhood Level Comparison of Disaggregated Homicides.”  Youth Violence 
and Juvenile Justice.  8(1): 38-57.   
Markowitz, Fred E., Paul E. Bellair, Allen E. Liska, and Jianhong Liu.  2001.  “Extending 
Social Disorganization Theory: Modeling the Relationships between Cohesion, 
Disorder, and Fear.”  Criminology.  39(2):293-319. 
Moreno, Ana.  1995.  “Cost Effectiveness of Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention: 
Summary of Findings.”  Family Housing Fund. 
------.  1998.  “Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention: Program and Trends.”  Family Housing 
Fund. 
Morenoff, Jeffrey D., Robert J. Sampson, and Stephen Raudenbush.  2001.  
“Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban 
Violence.”  Criminology.  39:517-559.   
National Community Reinvestment Coalition.  2003.  “The Broken Credit System: 
Discrimination and Unequal Access to Affordable Loans by Race and Age: 
Subprime Lending in Ten Large Metropolitan Areas.” 
Nichols, Joseph, Anthony Pennington-Cross, and Anthony Yezer.  2005.  “Borrower 
Self-Selection, Underwriting Costs, and Subprime Mortgage Credit Supply.”  The 
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics.  30(2): 197-219. 
Nicolaides, Becky M. and Andrew Wiese.  2006.  The Suburb Reader.  New York: 
Routledge.   
249 
Nieuwbeerta, Paul, Patricia L. McCall, Henk Elffers, and Karin Wittebrood.  2008.  
“Neighborhood Characteristics and Individual Homicide Risks: Effects of Social 
Cohesion, Confidence in Police, and Socioeconomic Disadvantage.”  Homicide 
Studies.  12(1): 90-116.   
Newman, Oscar.  1972.  Defensible Space.  New York: MacMillan.   
Newman, Kathe, and Elvin Wyly.  2004.  “Geographies of Mortgage Market 
Segmentation: The Case of Essex County, New Jersey.”  Housing Studies.  
19(1): 53-81. 
Nolz, Diana.  2010. Project Manager, Orange County Clerk of Courts.  Retrieved 
through email May 18, 2010. 
------.  2012.  Project Manager, Orange County Clerk of Courts. Retrieved through email 
March 26, 2012. 
Office of the Press Secretary.  2010.  “Help for the Hardest Hit Housing Markets.”  The 
White House.  Retrieved July 2, 2010, from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/help-hardest-hit-housing-markets   
Oh, Joong-Hwan.  2005.  “Social Disorganization and Crime Rates in U.S. Central 
Cities: Toward an Explanation of Urban Economic Change.”  The Social Science 
Journal.  42:569-582.   
Olson, Christa Polczynski, Minna K. Laurikkala, Lin Huff-Corzine, and Jay Corzine.  
2009.  “Immigration and Violence Crime: Citizenship Status and Social 
Disorganization.”  Homicide Studies.  13(3):227-241.   
250 
Orange County Board of County Commissioners.  2008.  “Foreclosures and Abandoned 
Properties.”   
Osgood, D. Wayne and Jeff M. Chambers.  2000.  “Social Disorganization Outside the 
Metropolis: An Analysis of Rural Youth Violence.”  Criminology.  38(1):81-115.   
Papachristos, Andrew V., and David S. Kirk.  2006.  “Neighborhood Effects on Street 
Gang Behavior.”  Pp. 63-84 in Studying Youth Gangs, edited by James F. Short 
and Lorine A. Hughes.  Lanham, MD: Alta Mira.   
Park, Robert E. and Ernest W. Burgess.  1924.  Introduction to the Science of 
Sociology.  2nd Ed.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.   
Pennington-Cross, Anthony, Anthony Yezer, Joseph Nichols.  2000.  “Credit Risk and 
Mortgage Lending: Who Uses Subprime and Why?”  Research Institute for 
Housing America, Working Paper No. 00-03. 
Perkins, Douglas D. and Ralph B. Taylor.  1996.  “Ecological Assessments of 
Community Disorder: Their Relationship to Fear of Crime and Theoretical 
Implications. “  American Journal of Community Psychology.  24:63-107.  
Plunkett, Scott W., Sandra Abarca-Mortensen, Andrew O. Behnke, and Tovah Sands.  
2007.  “Neighborhood Structural Qualities, Adolescents’ Perceptions of 
Neighborhoods, and Latino Youth Development.”  Hispanic Journal of Behavior 
Sciences.  29(1): 19-34.   
Press Room.  2010.  “Administration Announces Second Round of Assistance for 
Hardest-Hit Housing Markets.”  U.S. Department of the Treasury.  Retrieved July 
2, 2010, from  http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg618.htm    
251 
Putnam, Robert D. 2007.  “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-
First Century.”  The 2002 Johan Skytte Price Lecture.  Scandinavian Political 
Studies.  30(2):137-174. 
Quercia, Roberto, Spencer Cowan, and Ana Moreno.  2005.  “The Cost-Effectiveness of 
Community-Based Foreclosure Prevention.”  Family Housing Fund. 
RealtyTrac, Inc.  2008.  Data Retrieved October 2, 2008 from 
http://www.realtytrac.com/.  
Rose, Morgan.  2008.  “Predatory Lending Practices and Subprime Foreclosures: 
Distinguising Impacts by Loan Category.”  Journal of Economics and Business. 
60: 13-32. 
Ross, Catherine E., and John Mirowsky.  1999.  “Disorder and Decay: The Concept and 
Measurement of Perceived Neighborhood Disorder.”  Urban Affairs Review.  
34(3):412-432.   
Sampson, Robert J.  1985.  “Neighborhood and Crime: The Structural Determinants of 
Personal Victimization.”  Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency.  
22(1):7-40.  
------.  1986.  “Neighborhood Family Structure and the Risk of Personal Victimization.”  
Pp. 25-46 in The Social Ecology of Crime, edited by James M. Byrne and Robert 
J. Sampson.  New York: Springer-Verlag.   
------.  1987.  “Communities and Crime.”  Pp. 91-114 in Positive Criminology, ed. By 
Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi.  Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.   
252 
------.  1988.  “Local Friendship Ties and Community Attachment in Mass Society: A 
Multi-Level Systemic Model.”  American Sociological Review.  53: 766-79.     
------.  1991.  “Linking the Micro- and Macrolevel Dimensions of Community Social 
Organization.”  Social Forces.  70(1): 43-64.   
------.  1997.  “Collective Regulation of Adolescent Misbehavior: Validation Results from 
Eighty Chicago Neighborhoods.”  Journal of Adolescent Research.  12:227-244.   
Sampson, Robert J., and W. Byron Groves.  1989.  “Community Structure and Crime: 
Testing Social-Disorganization Theory.”  American Journal of Sociology.  
94(4):774-802.   
Sampson, Robert J., Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Thomas Gannon-Rowley.  2002.  
“Assessing ‘Neighborhood Effects’: Social Processes and New Directions in 
Research.”  Annual Review of Sociology.  28:444-478.   
Sampson, Robert J., and Stephen W. Raudenbush.  1999.  “Systematic Social 
Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods.”  
American Journal of Sociology.  105(3):603-651.   
Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls.  1997.  
“Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy.”  
Science.  277:918-24.   
Savage, Leonard, J.  1954.  The Foundations of Statistics.  New York: Wiley.   
Schloemer, Ellen, Wei Li, Keith Ernst, and Kathleen Keest.  2006.  “Losing Ground: 
Foreclosures in the Subprime Market and Their Costs to Homeowners.” Center 
253 
for Responsible Lending.  http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/foreclosure-
paper-report-2-17.pdf.  
Schwartz, David, and Andrea Hopmeyer Gorman.  2003.  “Community Violence 
Exposure and Children’s Academic Functioning.”  Journal of Educational 
Psychology.  95(1): 163-173.   
Shaw, Clifford and Henry McKay.  1942, 1969.  Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.   
Shumow, Lee, Deborah Lowe Vandell, and Jill Posner.  1999.  “Risk and Resilience in 
the Urban Neighborhood: Predictors of Academic Performance Among Low-
Income Elementary School Children.”  Merrill-Palmer Quarterly.  45(2): 309-331.   
Skogan, Wesley G.  1992.  Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in 
American Neighborhoods.  University of California Press. 
Spelman, William.  1993.  “Abandoned Buildings: Magnets for Crime?”  Journal of 
Criminal Justice.  21:5(481-495).   
Squires, Gregory D., and William Velez.  1987.  “Neighborhood Racial Composition and 
Mortgage Lending: City and Suburban Differences.”  Journal of Urban Affairs.  
9(3):217-232.   
Sutherland, Edwin H.  1947.  Principles of Criminology.  4th Ed. Philadelphia: Lippincott.   
Taylor, Joanna, Liz Twigg, and John Mohan.  2010.  “Exploring the Links Between 
Population Heterogeneity and Perceptions of Social Cohesion in England.”  Pp. 
269-287 in Ethnicity and Integration: Understanding Population Trends and 
254 
Processes – Volume 3, edited by John Stillwell and Maarten van Ham.  
NY:Springer. 
Taylor, Ralph B.  1996.  “Neighborhood Responses to Disorder and Local Attachments: 
The Systemic Model of Attachment, Social Disorganization, and Neighborhood 
Use Value.”  Sociological Forum.  11(1):41-74. 
Taylor, Ralph B, Stephen D. Gottfredson, and Sidney Brower.  1984.  “Block Crime and 
Fear: Defensible Space, Local Social Ties, and Territorial Functioning.”  
21(4):303-331.   
U.S. Department of Treasury and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.  
2000.  “Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending.”  Washington, DC. 
Walters, Neal, and Sharon Hermanson.  2001.  “Subprime Lending and Older 
Borrowers.”  American Association for Retired Persons.  
http://www.aarp.org/research/credit-debt/mortgages/aresearch-import-182-
DD57.html. 
Wells, L. Edward, and Ralph A. Weisheit.  2004.  “Patterns of Rural and Urban Crime: A 
County-Level Comparison.”  Criminal Justice Review.  29(1):1-22. 
Wells, William, Joseph A. Schafer, Sean P. Varano, and Timothy S. Bynum.  2006.  
“Neighborhood Residents’ Production of Order: The Effects of Collective Efficacy 
on Responses to Neighborhood Problems.”  Crime and Delinquency.  52(4):523-
550.   
Wilcox, Pamela, Neil Quisenberry, Debra T. Cabrera, and Shayne Jones.  2004.  “Busy 
Places and Broken Windows? Toward Defining the Role of Physical Structure 
255 
and Process in Community Crime Models.”  The Sociological Quarterly.  
45(2):185-207.   
Wilson, James Q., and George L. Kelling.  1982.  “Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety.”  Atlantic Monthly 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/198203/broken-windows  
Wilson, Ronald E., and Derek J. Paulsen.  2008.  “Foreclosures and Crime: A 
Geographical Perspective.”  Geography & Public Safety.  1(3):1-2. 
Woldoff, Rachael A.  2002.  “The Effects of Local Stressors on Neighborhood 
Attachment.”  Social Forces.  81(1):87-116.  
Wolf, Richard and Stephanie Armour.  2009.  “$75B Anti-Foreclosure Plan is a ‘Chance 
to Rebuild,’ Obama Says.”  USA Today.  Retrieved July 2, 2010, from 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2009-02-18-obama-
foreclosure-plan_N.htm   
Xie, Min, and David McDowall.  2008.  “The Effects of Residential Turnover on 
Household Victimization.”  Criminology.  46(3):539-575.  
